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## THE TRANSFORMATION OF JAPAN'S POLICY TOWARDS CHINA ON THE EVE OF THE NORMALIZATION OF SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: AN EXAMINATION BASED ON JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES

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### Abstract:

*An examination of Japanese diplomatic archives shows that during the two decades between the post-war period and the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, the Japanese government made constant adjustments to its China policy in response to the evolution of the domestic and international situation. In the early post-war period, the Japanese government established diplomatic relations with the Taiwanese authorities, and Sino-Japanese relations were in a state of "political and economic separation." In 1969, the Japanese government insisted on the "two Chinas" line, but due to the easing of Sino-American relations, Sato Eisaku's cabinet began to consider official-level contacts with the Chinese government. In 1971, influenced by the "Nixon Shock" and the restoration of China's legal seat in the United Nations, Japan adjusted its policy toward China and accelerated the process of normalization of diplomatic relations. In 1972, the cabinet of Kakuei Tanaka was established and set out to improve Sino-Japanese relations, and the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan was realized in September.*

**Keywords:** Diplomatic Archives; Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between China and Japan; Sino-Japanese Relations; Chinese Diplomacy; China Policy

From the end of World War II in 1945 to 1972, the diplomatic relations between China and Japan remained in an abnormal state for a long time, going through a tortuous path from only civilian exchanges to the normalization of diplomatic relations. The changes in Sino Japanese relations during this period reflect the adjustment process of the foreign policies of the two governments. This process was made by the leaders of both sides in the context of significant changes in the international situation, based on considerations of the realities of different periods. Among them, the Japanese government's foreign policy is not only an important influencing factor



in the development trend of Sino Japanese relations, but also constantly adjusted due to the influence of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations. This paper examines Japan's diplomatic archives and further analyzes the process and influencing factors of its policy transformation towards China from the perspective of the Japanese government.

### **1 “Political and Economic Separation” of Sino Japanese Relations in the Early Period of Post-WWII**

In the early post-WWII period, as a defeated country with a low international status and a sluggish domestic economy, the Japanese government chose to rely on the United States for survival. The signing of *The Japan US Security Treaty* in September 1951 officially institutionalized Japan's national strategy, closely tied to the US foreign policy, and aimed to enhance national strength through economic revitalization. Due to the long-term development of Japan's foreign strategy led by the United States after the war, its diplomatic relations were significantly influenced by America. In particular, the introduction of the “Yoshida Letter” clarified the basic principles of Yoshida Mao Cabinet's policy towards China, namely “following and obeying the US Far East strategy, fully catering to the US government's policy towards China, being pro Chiang Kaishek and anticommunist, transforming Japan into a US Far East outpost, and promoting the policy of ‘one China, one Taiwan’ or ‘two Chinas’.” In April 1952, Japan and the Taiwan authorities signed the “Japan China Peace Treaty,” establishing “diplomatic relations” between the two sides, resulting in that the two countries only engaged in exchanges at the civilian level during the two decades from the end of World War II to the normalization of Sino Japanese relations.

At this stage, the relationship between China and Japan exhibits a characteristic of “separation of politics and economy.” According to Professor Soeya Yoshihide, a Japanese international political scholar, there were “trial errors” in the relationship between China and Japan at that time. (Yoshihide, 1995)

In the 1960s, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued proposals on the China issue, such as the “Conditions for the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Communist Party of China,” the “Meeting Project Between Prime Minister Sato and Southeast Asian Countries, as well as the Leaders of Australia and New Zealand,” the “Meeting Minutes of Ambassadors in the Asia Pacific Region,” the “Materials for Discussion at the Asia Pacific Ambassadors' Meeting – China Issue,” and “Japan's Policy Toward China,” indicating that Japan adheres to the “Two Chinas” policy, that is, to adopt a policy of recognizing both the Chinese government and the Taiwan authorities. While maintaining “diplomatic relations” with Taiwan, Japan also carries on people-to-people exchanges with the mainland in the forms of trade and culture.

According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Archives, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly expressed its intention to improve relations with the Chinese government in 1968. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Division. (February 19, 1964) The Japanese



government recognized that its policy toward CCP<sup>1</sup> played an important part in making Asian policy and Japanese diplomacy, and it was meaningless and unrealistic to consider the CCP issue separately from other important diplomatic ones. The current situation in the Asia Pacific region is tending to ease with the economy becoming prosperous. In this context, it is practical and feasible to improve Sino Japanese relations. However, as long as the Chinese Communist Party's government persists in mainland China, its concessions to Japan will have certain boundaries, with differences in their views on the Taiwan issue, nuclear militarization, and the Japanese-US security system. According to the Japanese government, the easing of tensions in the Asia Pacific region should be taken into consideration to make the "Chinese Communist regime" more realistic and rational so that the obstacles between China and Japan are eliminated. If the possibility of improving Sino US relations increases, and China's restoration of a legitimate seat in the United Nations is supported by the majority of UN member states, it is imperative to improve Sino Japanese relations, which is a long-term task, requiring to be achieved. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Division. (May 1, 1968)

In addition, the Japanese government has formulated long-term and short-term policies toward the Chinese government based on the situation in Asia and the relationship between China and Japan. In the long run, such complicated issues as the North South Korean issue, the "two Chinas" issue, the Indochine issue, and the India Pakistan dispute cannot be solved overnight, which are directly or indirectly related to China. If China's foreign policy tends to soften in the future, and the relations between China and Asian countries led by the United States and Japan apt to improve, the tension in Asia will be eased to a certain extent. Therefore, Japan has nothing but only to choose to coexist with China. The Communist Party of China regards its policy towards Japan as a part of China's world and Asian policies, and Japan in the same vein aims to elevate its policy towards China to an important diplomatic issue.

In the short term, specific measures need to be considered to achieve the aforementioned long-term policies. Japan hopes that China understands its intention not to interfere in Chinese internal affairs and not to worsen Sino Japanese relations, while also stating that it will make concessions to China if necessary. In addition, Japan adopts a policy of "separation of politics and economy," supporting civil exchanges between the two countries and informal contacts between embassies abroad, which is consistent with the economic and trade exchanges at the civil and semi-official levels.

Although Japan hopes to improve its relationship with China in the long run, it cannot change the situation in China and the world in the short term. Therefore, the Japanese side has stated that there is no need to change the current policy of "separating politics and economy" for the time being. It can be seen that before 1968, the Asian Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs failed to find a solution to the issue of "two Chinas," and the relevant policies had to be discussed in detail in the future.

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1 In Japanese diplomatic archives, "CCP" refers to the Japanese government's expression of "the government of the People's Republic of China" at that time, and this expression is directly quoted in the paper to indicate the Chinese government.



## **2 From “Two Chinas” to Official Contact in 1969**

After Sato Eisaku took power, he, on the one hand, maintained “diplomatic relations” with Taiwan, while maintaining economic and cultural exchanges with the mainland on the other hand, continuing to implement the “Two Chinas” policy. This is not only a diplomatic follow-up to the United States, but also a political process, that is, the Japanese government has a dilemma in China’s political situation.

### **2.1 Adherence to the “Two Chinas” Route by the Sato Government**

In 1969, the diplomatic authorities of Japan and the United States held negotiations before the Japan US summit. From the content of the negotiations, it can be seen that the United States still maintains a tough attitude towards China. However, considering the political goals of stabilizing Japan US relations and the East Asian situation, the United States is equally concerned about the understanding of China issue by its ally Japan, as well as the development of Sino Japanese relations.

According to data from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the US containment policy towards China has limited the development of Sino Japanese relations, especially Japan’s policy towards China. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1998) According to data from the US Department of State, “The China issue is an unstable factor in Japan US relations, and the US has shown concern about Japan’s unilateral actions on the China issue.” (Ikeda, 2004) During the Sato administration, there was no substantial progress in China Japanese relations, but rather a deterioration. Apart from the Sato administration or individual reasons, following the US and opposing China are important factors, with the return of Okinawa being a major issue. The China issue has caused internal strife in Japanese politics, and party disagreements have hindered Japan’s formulation of its policy towards China. Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes it is necessary to adjust the relationship between China and Japan. In 1967, Sato visited Taiwan without making any commitment to Chiang Kai Shek’s “counterattack on the mainland” and proposed that Japan would continue to maintain trade relations with the mainland and implement the “Two Chinas” route.

### **2.2 Japan’s Official Contact with China**

In 1969, the Treasure Island incident led to the rupture of Sino Soviet relations, and the United States was deeply mired in the Vietnam War and shifted its attack to defense in the struggle for supremacy with the Soviet Union. Based on the goal of jointly resisting the Soviet Union, there are signs of easing in Sino US relations. In this context, there has been a significant shift in Japan’s policy towards China: “Japan hopes to resolve its ‘unnatural relationship with the Communist Party’ as soon as possible, otherwise Japan’s other important diplomatic issues will not be resolved.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asia Bureau. (January 2, 1969) Therefore, the Japanese government believes it is necessary to communicate with the Chinese government and increase government level contacts while promoting civil exchanges.

In terms of trade and other legal systems, Japan will “try to treat China the same as Taiwan, and this policy will not change in the future.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asia Bureau. (November 25, 1969) The Japanese government hopes that the Chinese government will maintain



a coordinated and constructive attitude towards foreign relations with countries such as Japan.

It can be seen that although Japan maintains the policy of “separating politics from economy” towards Chinese Mainland in the short term, in the long run, it proposes to hold talks at the ambassadorial level or foreign ministers’ level between China and Japan, and discuss the following four issues. First, as a regional power, China and Japan negotiate countermeasures to ease tensions and maintain permanent peace in Asia. The second is to discuss unresolved issues between China and Japan, such as the release of Japanese detained by China, with discussing countermeasures to expand Sino Japanese trade as the third. The fourth is to upgrade the LT office to a quasi-government representative office in a phased manner. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asia Bureau. (January 2, 1969)

### **3 Two Failed Approaches to China in the 1970s**

In the 1970s, the international situation continued to change with China’s international status gradually improving, the US policy towards China began to ease. The Japanese government attempted to ease relations with the Chinese government twice, but both attempts ended in failure.

#### **3.1 The Japanese Government’s First Attempt to Approach China**

From December 1969 to February 1970, the Japanese government promoted its first policy of approaching China. On December 13th, Sato Eisaku expressed his willingness to improve Sino Japanese relations in the Japanese general election. In order to convene ambassadorial level talks between China and Japan as soon as possible, Sato hopes to engage in dialogue on expanding economic exchanges, releasing Japanese detained in China, exchanging journalists, and other issues. On January 7, 1970, Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi conveyed Sato’s intention to achieve intergovernmental contact between China and Japan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry then discussed the following three aspects: firstly, the Japanese government will express its willingness to engage with the Chinese government in the Prime Minister’s parliamentary policy speeches and the Foreign Minister’s diplomatic speeches; Secondly, the Japanese embassy abroad will investigate whether Chinese diplomats have any intention of engaging with Japan; The third is to consider financing with the Export Import Bank of Japan in China.

Upon instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to France, Ming Matsui, expressed the willingness to engage with the Chinese Embassy through the French diplomatic authorities. On February 6th, the Chinese side politely refused because “contact at this time is not yet appropriate since the meeting with specific figures such as the Japanese ambassador has not been recognized.” On the 10th of that month, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a telegram to the Japanese embassies in Paris and Washington that China’s negative attitude stemmed from the Chinese diplomatic authorities currently busy negotiating with the Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada, and the Japanese government’s goal of conveying its intentions to the Chinese government has been achieved. Therefore, the Japanese government continues to prepare for government contact between China and Japan and “waits for signs or intentions from Beijing.” (Hiroshi, M 2006) However, the Chinese side did not respond to this afterwards, and the Ministry



of Foreign Affairs's expectations fell through.

To "comfort young people who feel frustrated about the CCP issue," (Minoru K., 2001) the Sato cabinet quickly changed its original positive attitude towards Sino Japanese relations. On February 13th, the Japanese government no longer mentioned the proposition that "the Sino Japanese issue is a topic of the 1970s" and that the Chinese side would maintain a "coordinated and constructive attitude" (Hiroshi, M., 2006) in its policy speech. The first attempt by the Japanese government to approach China ended in failure.

The failure of the Japanese government's first attempt to approach China was mainly due to the following three reasons: firstly, the Sato cabinet's hope for achieving government to government contact between China and Japan was too simplistic, believing that it was possible and effective to follow the approach of the China US ambassador level talks. However, Sato did not fully realize that China's attitude towards the United States and Japan was different.

Secondly, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an overly simplistic understanding of the current situation. The proposal for government-to-government contact between China and Japan was rejected by China, and Japan analyzed it for three reasons: firstly, the Chinese diplomatic authorities were busy with diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada, and had no time to correspond with negotiations with Japan; Secondly, the Chinese side is unable to confirm Japan's true intentions; Thirdly, China cannot benefit from it. It can be seen that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs's estimation of the Chinese government's attitude towards Japan at that time was too one-sided and superficial.

Thirdly, the Japanese government has placed the abolition of *Treaty of Peace Between the Republic of China and Japan* outside the scope of discussion. In accordance with the three principles of diplomatic relations proposed by the Chinese government, namely "severing diplomatic relations, abolishing treaties and withdrawing troops," Prime Minister Sato and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fully recognize that the Taiwan issue is the key to opening Sino-Japanese relations, but the Japanese government has not expressed its intention to sever "diplomatic relations" with Taiwan and holds a firm attitude toward the *Treaty of Peace Between the Republic of China and Japan*. Therefore, even though the Japanese government "recognizes the fact that there is a Beijing government with a population of nearly 800 million on the Chinese Mainland, and maintains and promotes non-governmental exchanges with it," the fact that "it has always maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Division. (May 4, 1970) violates the bottom line of China's diplomatic principles.

### **3.2 The Japanese Government's Second Attempt to Approach China**

After the first failure of the Japanese government's approach to China, it readjusted its policy towards China and expressed several "hopes": "Through the accumulation of various exchanges, we hope to eliminate misunderstandings from China and establish good neighborly and friendly relations. We hope that in the future, with the consensus of the Beijing government, we can ease the tense situation in the Far East and improve Sino Japanese relations, opening up the path of government-to-government contact. This is a topic of Japan in the 1970s. We hope to engage in sincere dialogue with the Beijing government and be committed to it for a long time. We hope that



through peaceful dialogue, we can achieve mutual understanding and improve relations with China.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Division. (May 4, 1970)

On New Year's Day in 1971, Sato proposed to discuss the normalization of diplomatic relations with China in a speech entitled “On the Ambassadors' Ambitions for the Year.” This was the first time that Sato mentioned the normalization of diplomatic relations as part of the discussion in his speech, and expressed hope for trade in the *China-Japan Memorandum of Understanding*, but avoided the issue of China's accession to the United Nations. On the 4th, Sato reiterated his previous principles and proposed that the China issue is not only a matter between China and Japan, but also a concern for countries around the world. Sato attempts to maintain a political balance, sometimes expressing his intention to promote Sino Japanese relations, while sometimes reaffirming his consistency in adhering to the China policy.

On the 18th, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that even if China joined the United Nations, the Japanese government would not immediately recognize China. The organization and personnel of the Japanese political and economic circles, which have important interests in Taiwan, will check the government's policy of approaching China. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Division. (January 18, 1971)

On the 25th, Sato emphasized the following seven points in his response to a question from the representative of the Socialist Party Chairman, Chichi Narita, in the House of Representatives: firstly, he cannot support the Albanian resolution; Secondly, regarding the supply of Japanese yen loans to Taiwan, the previous overall framework has been revised to assist various plans; Thirdly, China's condemnation of the revival of Japanese militarism is due to misunderstanding; Fourthly, if China wishes to achieve intergovernmental negotiations, Japan is always welcome; Fifthly, it is hoped that the trade negotiations between China and Japan under the *Memorandum of Understanding* can also be successfully achieved in 1971; Sixth, welcome those who do not harm national interests to participate in personnel exchanges between the two countries; Seventh, he reiterated that he is not considering immediate severing of “diplomatic relations” with the Taiwan authorities. It can be seen that Sato expressed his willingness to engage in dialogue with China while emphasizing that Japan's policy towards China remains unchanged and refuses to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Sato's ambiguous attitude has been criticized by domestic public opinion. The opposition party accuses him of “pretending to be without motivation, speaking in public, and causing unnecessary distrust.” The media stated that “no matter how many times the government calls for an ambassador level meeting, China may not sincerely accept it... If the supreme decision-maker of politics is not determined, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot act in any way.” (Hiroshi, M, 2006)

#### **4 A Strong Call for the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations in 1971**

With the rise of China's international status and the increasing number of countries supporting China's restoration of the legitimate seat in the United Nations, Japan's policy towards China has been further adjusted. On January 10th, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hori Sigeru presented his “My Views on the China Issue” to the government, stating that relations with China will be



developed in six aspects: “Firstly, the Japanese government respects and maintains friendly relations with the government of the Republic of China; secondly, the Japanese government recognizes that the capital of the Chinese government is Beijing; thirdly, the Japanese government is not hostile to the Chinese government; fourthly, the Japanese government welcomes the Chinese government to participate in activities of the international community in the spirit of international cooperation; fifthly, the Japanese government strives to develop mutual friendship between the two peoples and enhance extensive exchanges in economic, cultural and other forms; sixthly, based on the current situation in China, there are still difficulties in establishing diplomatic relations with the Chinese government, and the Japanese government will pay attention to the development of the current situation.” (Minoru, 2001)

#### **4.1 The Adjustment Trend of Japan's Policy towards China**

The adjustment trend of Japan's policy towards China can be seen from the official file entitled “Japan's Policy Towards China,” which was formulated by the China Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 1971.

First, on the issue of China's representation in the United Nations, the dossier predicts that the number of countries that recognize the mainland Chinese government and the number of countries that recognize the Taiwan authorities will not only reverse in the future, but the number of countries that recognize China will also be overwhelming. In this context, the government of Chinese Mainland is the only legitimate government in China and will be recognized. The Japanese government realized that it was impossible to establish diplomatic relations with China while maintaining “diplomatic relations” with the Taiwan authorities. For the time being, the Japanese government will maintain friendly relations with the Taiwan authorities and strive to preserve its status in the United Nations. But when most countries recognize the mainland Chinese government, Japan will move to recognize China and normalize relations with it.

Second, the dossier said that the Japanese government should maintain as much consistency as possible in its policy toward China, adhere to the so-called “international faith,” insist on recognizing “the Taiwan authorities as the legitimate government of China,” and maintain “diplomatic relations” with Taiwan. But due to changes in the domestic and foreign situation, Japan's policy toward China will be subject to discussion in the future.

Thirdly, Japan is preparing to improve its relations with China, ready to engage in official contact with the Chinese government at any time to correct China's hostile attitude towards Japan.

Fourthly, regarding the current “Japan Taiwan relations” and future Sino Japanese relations, it remains to be carefully considered whether Japan should become a co-sponsor of the so-called “dual representation” resolution, and whether Japan should recognize China's status as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Fifthly, the CPC has been in power in Chinese Mainland for a long time, and most countries in the world have recognized the political power in Chinese Mainland. Therefore, it is only a matter of time before China joins the United Nations, and Japan should formulate policies towards China on this premise. When dealing with China issues, try to avoid external influences and make independent judgments as much as possible.



Sixth, according to the analysis of the Japanese government, China's current strategy towards Japan is to establish "friendly individuals" at all levels of the Japanese people and isolate "Japanese reactionaries." With the increasing number of countries recognizing China internationally and with the pressure from Japanese citizens, the Japanese government is under great pressure to achieve reconciliation between China and Japan. Therefore, how to respond to China's polity towards Japan and safeguard Japan's interests to the utmost remains an issue to be discussed for the Japanese government. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Division. (April 20, 1971)

#### **4.2 Japan's Call for the Normalization of Sino Japanese Diplomatic Relations on the Rise**

In 1971, two international events led to a turning point in the Japanese cabinet's policy towards China. "The Nixon shock" in July and the restoration of China's legitimate seat in the United Nations in October forced the Sato cabinet to consider adjusting its policy towards China and easing relations with China at the government level. The attitude of Japanese politics and the public towards China has significantly changed, and the call for the normalization of Sino Japanese diplomatic relations has become increasingly strong.

On November 18th, the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs analyzed the impact of China's accession to the United Nations on the international community and Japanese society in a document entitled *The Impact of China's Joining the United Nations and our Countermeasures*. On the one hand, China's international status and influence will increase accordingly. At the same time, China is making use of the United Nations and other platforms to enhance its leadership and influence over small and medium-sized countries. In the view of the Sato Cabinet, this is "restraining Japan and alienating Japan US relations, attempting to isolate Japan on the international stage, condemning the revival of Japanese militarism, the military alliance between Japan and the United States, and denying cooperation between Japan and Taiwan, and that of Japan and South Korea." However, due to China's limited national strength and influence on other countries at that time, China's diplomacy is fragile.

On the other hand, China's accession to the United Nations has had a strong impact on Japanese public opinion. For the sake of national interests and to ensure the support of its citizens for its foreign policy, the Japanese government intends to formulate effective measures in the following areas: firstly, in response to the influence of "China's division of domestic public opinion in Japan," Japan should eliminate China's misunderstandings about the revival of Japanese militarism and the cooperation between Japan, the United States, and South Korea; Secondly, while seeking to normalize diplomatic relations between China and Japan, Japan emphasizes that Japan US relations remain the most important in order to avoid misunderstandings caused by public opinion; Once again, clarify to the United States that there is no policy that can replace the *Japan US Security Treaty*, in order to gain the understanding of the United States; Furthermore, to make the people deeply aware that the status of China and Japan in the international community is equal, and to strive for the understanding of the Japanese people regarding the role of China and Japan in the United



Nations. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Research Division. (November 18, 1971)

### **5. Achievement of the Normalization of Sino Japanese Diplomatic Relations in 1972**

In 1972, while Japanese officials and civilians called for the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between China and Japan, the call for Sato Rongzuo to step down also grew louder. On the day of its establishment on July 7th, the Tanaka Cabinet immediately and publicly stated its intention to improve Sino Japanese relations, which was highly valued by people from all walks of life in Japan. This is completely contrary to the hostile policy of former Prime Minister Sato towards China. Since then, the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan has been officially included in the important work agenda of the Japanese government. "From Prime Minister Sato's ideology, system, and the People's Republic of China's hostile attitude towards Sato, resolving the Japan-China issue is a difficult task for the Sato cabinet. Public opinion and the internal demands of the Liberal Democratic Party for Sato's retirement are precisely for this reason." (Togawa, Rusong & Qiang, 1987)

At the same time, the Tanaka government also analyzed China's policy towards Japan, believing that China has the sincerity to restore normal diplomatic relations with Japan, and put it into practice. Especially since the establishment of the Tanaka Cabinet, the Chinese government has taken this opportunity to change its tough attitude towards Japan, adjust its strategy, and show great enthusiasm for normalizing diplomatic relations between China and Japan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes that after 1969, China's foreign strategy has undergone a transformation, adjusting its foreign policy and diplomatic route from a strategic level, from a hard diplomacy that originally focused on supporting revolutionary struggles to a realistic diplomacy that has softened. This is based on considerations of the internal and external situation. On the one hand, China pursues political stability and economic development. On the other hand, due to Western countries implementing Eastern policies, the Chinese government recognizes the need to change its foreign policy in order to enhance its international status and ensure national security. After the 1969 Treasure Island incident, China deeply felt the threat from the Soviet Union in the north. Japan's analysis shows that in the context of significant changes in the international situation, China's adjustment of foreign policy can counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union and ensure its own interests. At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs predicts that after the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, the Chinese government will increase its diplomatic activities with the change of the international situation, while ensuring the stability of the domestic situation, and actively carry out foreign affairs. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Division. (August 5, 1972)

In late September, Tanaka Kakuei officially visited China and received warm hospitality with Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido Susumu in China. Between the 25th and 28th, Premier Zhou Enlai held four talks with Tanaka, and the foreign ministers of the two countries held two. Both sides fully exchanged views on seven issues related to the normalization of diplomatic relations, namely, the three principles of resuming diplomatic relations, ending the state of war between China and Japan, how to view the war of aggression against China, war compensation, the Japan US Security Treaty, the Diaoyu Islands issue, and



future Japan Taiwan relations, and reached a consensus. (Araki, Jianrong, Yoshihide, & Xiaoguang, 2003) On the morning of the 29th, China and Japan signed the *Sino Japanese Joint Declaration*, marking the end of the 23-year long abnormal relationship after the war, and opening a new chapter in Sino Japanese relations.



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