



WILL CHINA INVADE TAIWAN: POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, CHINA AND TAIWAN

Dr. Muhammad Ali
Assistant Professor of International Relations
DHA Suffa University
Karachi - Pakistan
muhammadaliehsan1@hotmail.com

Muhammad Ahsanullah Khan Durrani
Research Scholar M. Phil
International Relations at Humanity and Social Science Department
DHA Suffa University
Karachi - Pakistan
makdurrani@gmail.com

Abstract

The big question on every body's mind today is whether and if China will invade Taiwan? The assumption that China will invade Taiwan has its roots in how China has continued to grow more wealthier, more powerful and more nationalist thus forcing many International Relations Scholars to believe that China might just be strong enough to embrace and absorb Taiwan as part of main land China. Given the results of the elections in Taiwan which the pro-independence party DPP has won the threat of a Chinese aggression against Taiwan seems to have increased. This paper gives a background history of China-Taiwan conflict, reflects on how democracy in Taiwan may have affected this conflict and studies both the internal Taiwanese political environment and the changing geopolitical environment in the region. The paper also examines the loss of Taiwan's diplomatic allies and the role of Taiwan's leadership in influencing Taiwan's policy towards China. In the end to avoid the possibility of a conflict and resultant war in the region the paper proposes the best policy options in the coming years for all the three stake holders in the conflict – China, USA and Taiwan.

Key Words: China, Taiwan, United States, History, Strategy, Policy, Elections, Democracy, Geopolitics

Introduction

From China's point of view and from the point of view of its relationship with Taiwan two years are very significant – years that China would not like to forget. The year 1895, when Beijing ceded Taiwan to Japan after the war between the two countries in which China was defeated (Mack,



2022). The second year is 1949 when the Republic of China (ROC) leader Chiang Kai-Shek and his 1.5 million followers fled to Taiwan after losing the Chinese Civil War (Rummel, 2007). Today, China considers Taiwan as one of its provinces and it is the retention of Taiwan as mainland China that guides the current China's policy towards the island. In his book published in 1962 titled, '*Taiwan's 400 Year History*', Su Beng, a Taiwan independence activist projected Taiwan as a distinct nation that caught the world's attention as a large Han immigration started taking place to the island in the year 1600. Later the other colonial powers such as Dutch, Spain and Japan all of them colonized the Island laying claims to the throne of disintegrating Ming and Qing dynasties (Chanis, 2012). Su's basic argument in the book is that for over 400 years people living in Taiwan have been denied control over their own lives and their destinies and only after Kuomintang (KMT) gained control of the island in 1949 that people of Taiwan started feeling independent enough to control their lives and their destinies.

KMT was almost destroyed by the Chinese communists in 1949 but it relocated to Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek who served as the leader of Republic of China (ROC) till his death in 1975 (Reporter, 1975). Taiwan had been annexed by Japan and was under the Japanese Emperor rule from 1895 to 1945 (Barclay, 2020). Earlier, the island was annexed by Qing dynasty in 1683 and was ceded to Japan in 1895 (Huang C.-J., 2023). However, the Republic of China which had overthrown the Qing dynasty in 1911 took over the control of Taiwan following the surrender of Japan in 1945 (Ultimately Japan would renounce sovereignty over Taiwan in 1952) (Shu-ling, 2009).

During the rule of KMT, Taiwan was literally under martial law but after the death of Chiang Kai-shek a democratization movement started and the single party rule was abolished and martial law was lifted and constitutional democracy restored in 1987 (Harrison, 2017). Taiwan continued progressing on the democratic road and in 1991 was able to fully re-elect a national-level representative body with the power to elect the president and amend the constitution (Ogasawara, 1998). The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which was the main opposition of KMT raised its voice for the replacement of ROC with independent republic of Taiwan.

Since the communist victory in the civil war, China has considered Taiwan as part of mainland China but if the journey of Taiwanese people – a journey they have travelled from 1949 up to this point has to be clearly understood then it is imperative that this Taiwanese history be understood in two periods. The first period one, is the martial law period in which the Taiwanese people were ruled by KMT for 38 years from 1949 to 1987, the year when martial law finally ended (Rubinstein, 1999). The second period is Taiwan's period of the democratic journey which began with the retirement of lifetime legislators in 1991 and which continues till today (International Committee, 1991). The first full multiparty elections were held in Taiwan in 1991 which resulted in KMT's resounding victory. It was only in the presidential elections of 2000 that KMT was finally defeated by DPP's candidate Chen Shui-bian after KMT had ruled Taiwan for over five decades (Li, 2024).



DPP won the elections in year 2000 and 2004 but it lost the elections to KMT in 2008 and 2012. It came back to power in 2016 and won the elections in 2020 as well as the elections held in 2024. Both parties have divergent views on the issue of Taiwan's national identity and it is predominantly this issue that decides which party the people in Taiwan want to see in power. So, if the Taiwanese independence versus Chinese unification is the most divisive issue in the Taiwanese politics than it is also an issue upon which Taiwan's parties take the most polarized positions (Niou, 1996).

Democracy in Taiwan – The Harbinger of One Country Two Systems

In year 2000 KMT's dominance of elections in Taiwan came to an end and KMT lost the Presidency and also its majority in the Legislative Yuan as DPP became the largest represented party that voters put in power and elected Chen Shui-bian as the president. However, Chen's pro-independence rhetoric landed Taiwan in trouble with China as it sparked increased diplomatic and military tensions with the mainland. Besides this, President Chen also made the Taiwanese parliament pass law permitting referendum on issues such as national sovereignty, opening the door to a future vote on whether to formally declare independence (France-Presse, 2003). But amidst allegations of corruption and general economic malaise, Chen's popularity plummeted and in 2008, KMT returned to power with Ma Ying-jeou winning with a landslide 58 percent of the vote (Tkacik, 2008). Chen was arrested later that year and was given a 19-year jail sentence (Barboza, 2008).

President Ma of KMT who replaced Chen followed the policy of economic rapprochement with China and it culminated in a landmark trade deal with China because of which tariffs were removed from a number of products (Wu, 2023). The policy also resulted in the increase of air routes between the countries and also boosted Taiwan's investment in China. Because of President Ma's pro-China policy tourists from China were also allowed to visit Taiwan. But all this changed dramatically as in 2011 the DPP chose Tsai Ing-wen as Presidential candidate for 2012 elections. Although DPP lost both the presidential and legislative elections to Ma Ying-jeou's KMT party but Tsai stuck to the pro-independence stance which started becoming popular specially with the young voters in Taiwan who started reconsidering the underlying preferences of their country as far as its relationship with China was concerned. "In the period between 2012 and 2016 Ma's cross-strait policies continued which if categorized were; 1. Economics first and politics later. 2. Modus Vivendi diplomacy: Taiwan adopted the diplomatic truce strategy with no confrontation policy with China in the international arena and hence it could keep its 23 diplomatic allies. 3. Comprehensive engagement and transformation policy: Allowing Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan and Chinese students to study in Taiwan, and encouraging official and unofficial exchanges across the straits in the hope that Chinese people can learn more about Taiwan's democratic values and experiences. 4. Taiwan's hedging strategy: except cooperation with China, Taiwan also realizes that military preparation is important in case that future confrontation occurs in Taiwan Strait" (Ger, 2012).

In 2016 elections Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP chairperson and presidential candidate won with 56.1



percent of vote with KMT receiving 30.1 percent of vote (Bush R. C., Taiwan’s Election Results, Explained, 2016). It was generally believed that the public had grown skeptical about Ma’s policy of engaging with China and this skepticism continued throughout Ma’s second term (Bush R. C., Taiwan’s Election Results, Explained, 2016). President Tsai in her victory speech termed Taiwan not as Republic of China which is how it is officially known and said that, “I would like to thank everyone who voted today regardless of how you voted. With each presidential election I want to show the world how much we value our democratic way of life and how much we value our nation, the democratic republic of Taiwan” (Bush R. C., 2016). The elections were held in October 2016 but Tsai’s popularity had begun to rise in mid-June, as around the time nearby Hong Kong began to descend into political chaos amid mass anti-government protests against Beijing’s perceived growing influence over the semi-autonomous Chinese city (Bush R. C., 2016).

Taiwan had previously been offered similar ‘one country two systems’ status as was offered to Hong Kong and the people started fearing that a similar fate may be in waiting for them. People started saying that they don’t want to become another Hong Kong and since KMT was bringing Taiwan closer to China they feared this happening if they didn’t prevent this through their vote. Another factor that contributed to Tsai’s electoral victory was that many voters who voted in 2016 elections were the voters that were born after the end of martial law in 1987 and these young voters considered themselves more as Taiwanese than Chinese (Bush R. C., 2016). Yet another demographic distinction also played a role in the voting pattern – while the young favored Tsai the Han and KMT were favored by the older Taiwanese who were deeply concerned about the economy and wished for Taiwan to maintain closer ties with the economic power house China (Bush R. C., 2016). Already, in 2014 a protest movement called Sunflower movement had taken place in Taiwan when a trade deal was signed between China and the KMT led parliament and which unleashed a wave of protests that saw students take over Taiwan’s parliament and government Headquarters.

Since 2016, the year when Tsai has taken power in Taiwan the relationship between Taiwan and main land China have been quite strained. China views Tsai with distrust as she and her party represent a policy of outright Taiwanese independence. China also views Tsai with suspicion as she did not endorse the 1992 Consensus – the consensus refers to the understanding reached between China and Taiwan that there is only one China but both China and Taiwan can have different interpretations of what that China is (Resar, 2022). The consensus was something that Tai’s predecessor Ma Ying-jeou had agreed to but President Tai refused to endorse it. She is also seen by China as somebody who is cutting the cultural and historical bonds across the strait by initiating measures such as bringing in changes in Taiwanese textbooks to downplay elements of Chinese history (Tsoi, 2015). She is also seen as someone who doesn’t mind ‘Taiwanese independence rhetoric’, something reflected in how she failed to condemn her Prime Minister William Lai who on multiple occasions who said that he is a ‘Taiwan independence worker’ (Lai, 2023).



After President Tai's pro-independence stance China had no other choice but to suspend official ties between the two sides following which the number of tourists and students that visit Taiwan dropped significantly. China also ended the informal diplomatic truce with Taipei which it had maintained during President Ma's time. Given change in Taipei's China policy under President Tai, China also switched its diplomatic strategy and now started working to encourage countries that were diplomatic allies of Taiwan to end their diplomatic relations with the Island.

Taiwan's Loss of Diplomatic Allies

In view of the changed China diplomatic policy over the past 20 years, Taiwan has lost half of its diplomatic allies, with pressure from China significantly increasing from 2002 to 2008 and again from 2016 to the present. With Honduras cutting ties with Taiwan in 2023, the number of Taiwan's remaining allies is reduced to 12, which is a record low (Al-Jazeera, 2023). The cross-strait diplomatic battle was in fact started by Chen Shui-ban who was president of Taiwan from 2000 to 2008 and who introduced the concept of 'one country on each side' (Report, 2015). 'Chen Shui-bian is a retired Taiwanese politician and lawyer and was the first president from the DPP which ended the Kuomintang's 55 years of continuous rule in Taiwan. The ex-president is now serving a 20-year sentence awarded in 2010 for money laundering and bribery, but was released on medical parole in January 2015 for reasons of declining health' (Staff-Writer, 2015).

It is interesting to see how China has responded to President Tai's provocation as China is fast closing the diplomatic space for the island. "Some of the countries that have been made to cease diplomatic ties with Taiwan include Nauru (2002), China offered Nauru US\$ 135 million in financial aid for it to cut its diplomatic ties with Taipei. Liberia (2003), under the backdrop of The Second Liberian Civil War, Liberia cut its ties with Taiwan and turned to China in 2003. Dominica and Vanuatu (2004), Vanuatu established diplomatic relations with Taiwan for only seven days, becoming the shortest-lived bilateral relation on record. China immediately released US\$2 million to the Vanuatu government for education. Grenada (2005), Grenada cut its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in exchange for China's commercial and economic advantages. Senegal (2005), China became an important trading partner for Senegal, and by establishing diplomatic relations with China, Senegal hopes to attract more Chinese investment. Chad (2006), by establishing diplomatic relations with China, Chad hopes to attract Chinese investment and assistance in developing its infrastructure and natural resources. Costa Rica (2007), Malawi (2008), Malawi established diplomatic relations with China by the end of 2007 and ended its ties with Taiwan in January 2008. China proposed a US\$ 6 billion offer in financial aid. Gambia (2013), Gambia was the only country to terminate its diplomatic relations with Taiwan despite President Ma Ying-Jeou's Flexible diplomacy. São Tomé and Príncipe (2016), São Tomé and Príncipe's decision was primarily driven by economic factors. Panama (2017), Panama severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in June 2017 as China's economic and political influence in Latin America increased. China offered Panama a range of economic incentives to sever ties with Taiwan, including increased investment, access to the Chinese market, and the possibility of a free trade agreement. China also reportedly promised to help Panama with a major infrastructure project - the construction of a new subway system in



Panama City. Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Burkina Faso (2018), Solomon Islands and Kiribati (2019), China reportedly promised to help fund various infrastructure projects in Kiribati, including upgrades to the country's international airport and the construction of public housing. Nicaragua (2021), Some analysts have suggested that Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega may have been motivated in part by a desire to consolidate his political power, as well as to secure more economic and trade opportunities for Nicaragua. Honduras (2023) is the latest country to cut ties with Taipei” (Huang I. , 2023).

Relations with China - Role of Taiwan’s Leadership

Tsai Ing-Wen

One can easily argue that as China gains more global recognition and prominence it will further reduce the diplomatic maneuvering space for Taiwan but what are DPP Party and President Tsai’s plans? Tsia has a very good education background, she received a law degree (1978) from National Taiwan University in Taipei and then attended Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, and the London School of Economics, earning, respectively, master’s (1980) and doctorate (1984) degrees in law. Tsai then returned to Taiwan, where until 2000 she taught law at universities in Taipei (Ehsan, 2023). She has also managed to indulge in political activities that have created political events that became a ‘first’ in Taiwanese history. In December 2016 she placed a telephone call to U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, who overturned several decades of diplomatic protocol by becoming the first U.S. chief executive to speak with his Taiwanese counterpart since 1979 (Campbell, 2016). This prompted China to make a formal complaint to the U.S. government. Also, in a display of good diplomatic relations Trump administration also committed to major arms sales to Taiwan that included, tanks, missiles, and jet fighters (Wong, U.S. Pushes Large Arms Sale to Taiwan, Including Jet Missiles That Can Hit China, 2020). Tsai’s government also performed well during the pandemic and as one of the world’s leading producers of semiconductors, Taiwan made the most of the worldwide shift to working at home and the increased need for laptop computers, and its GDP increased by 3 percent in 2020 (Miller, 2022). Resultantly, in some three decades Taiwan’s annual economic growth for the first time outstripped that of China (Leary & Hutzler, 2022). Tensions in U.S.-China relations were also ratcheted up in August 2022 when U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan to meet with Tsai to show support for Taiwan’s democracy. China’s government had vehemently warned against Pelosi’s visit to the island, the first by a U.S. elected official of her stature in some 25 years, which China viewed as provocatively enhancing the international status of Taiwan’s government (Perlez, 2022). President Tsai Ing-wen has stepped down at the end of her second term in 2024, under constitutional limits. Her chosen successor, Lai, is now the President. The 63-year-old former public health expert has been in politics since 1996, including as mayor of Tainan (Davidson & Lin, Taiwan’s choice: who will replace Tsai Ing-wen as president amid China tensions?, 2023). DPP’s win in January 2024 elections marks the first time a party has won three consecutive terms since democratic elections began in Taiwan in 1996 (Davidson & Lin, 2023).



Hou You -yi

Hou You-yi from KMT is a popular moderate political figure, who became mayor of Taiwan’s most populous jurisdiction, New Taipei City, in 2018, and was most recently re-elected in November (Davidson & Lin, 2023). He spent three decades as a police officer, and was involved in several high-profile cases, including during Taiwan’s period of authoritarianism. He has been a member of the KMT since 1975. Hou was seen as a pragmatic choice for the KMT, with the best chance of uniting its ageing base with the younger voters it desperately needed. The KMT still identifies with the idea of a unified Chinese nation, but a growing majority in Taiwan – especially younger people – no longer identify as Chinese (Davidson & Lin, 2023). Helen Davidson while writing for Guardian comments that “I would speculate that, given the KMT’s traditional foreign policy, he would not see the need for much cooperation with the US and would be more interested in negotiating with China” (Davidson & Lin, 2023). It is under the shadow of such democratic dispensation and power politics that China has to execute its Taiwan policy in the coming years and decades.

Geopolitical Realities and the Triangular Pulls and Pushes Between the United States, China and Taiwan

What is the likely environment, the geopolitical realities, the developing scenarios in a triangular pull and pushes between United States, China and Taiwan? Election 2008 was a disaster for DPP—the KMT’s main opposition—which had confidently called for replacing the Republic of China with a formally independent Republic of Taiwan, this resulted in DPP winning just 23 percent of the vote. The verdict of the electorate was clear that the formal independence was just too radical, and for a generation afterward, the country’s common political wisdom was that Taiwan independence was ballot-box poison (Batto, Taiwan Is Already Independent, 2022). Taiwan was going through a process of gradual democratization and this helped KMT the pro-China unionist party in 2008 to get back in power. People in Taiwan were also witnessing the unprecedented Chinese economic growth and since economic growth had helped Taiwan democratize, people in Taiwan believed that similar growth will bring about an identical political end in China (Bush R. C., 2021). The Taiwanese nationalist assumption was that if China’s political model changed and if the states joined together, Taiwan may play a dominant role in defining and shaping their shared future. But as the years passed nothing changed politically in China, in fact what changed was that greater nationalism seeped into Chinese politics and as China became more wealthier and more powerful it became more nationalist. DPP’s political position also changed overtime and instead of recklessly advocating formal independence it now took the position that Taiwan was already independent sovereign state named the Republic of China, and no declaration of independence was necessary (Chhabra, 2024). So, given the mood of Taiwanese people DPP in 2024 elections secured a clear electoral advantage over its political adversaries (Thornton, 2024). This means that Taiwan again has a government that has an anti- One China policy. This also means that there is an unfavorable domestic Taiwanese internal political environment that will be largely beyond the control of China’.



China’s Geopolitical Balance Around Taiwan

Externally, China’s military buildup is fast eroding deterrence in Taiwan strait. U.S already considers China as the most significant challenge to its interests in the world and one such interest is maintaining deterrence in Taiwan strait. Yet, on ground one finds no visible U.S effort to field a military to actually maintain deterrence and deny Chinese invasion of Taiwan. U.S National Defense Strategy called for prioritizing China but that prioritization did not take place in 2024 as the U.S administration proposed shrinking of the defense budget while the Congress beefed up the 2022 and 2023 defense budgets (O’Hanlon, 2019).

Even the U.S navy opted not to fully fund acquisition of SM-6 missiles or naval mines, both of which are critical for defeating Chinese naval forces in a Taiwan invasion scenario (Colby, America Must Prepare for a War Over Taiwan; Being Ready Is the Best Way to Prevent a Fight With China, 2022). In May 2023, the chief of U.S. naval operations, Michael Gilday, testified that even the most optimistic option in the navy’s latest shipbuilding plan would be unable to meet the operational requirements for defeating a Chinese attack against Taiwan before the 2040s (Colby, 2022). U.S military options against China are also hindered because of the ongoing Ukrainian War. There is an increase in U.S. forces in Europe from 60,000 in 2021 to more than 100,000 and according to General Christopher Cavoli, commander of the United States European Command, these levels are likely to remain at least until the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine (Colby, 2022). U.S cannot afford to have an ongoing two front strategic competition as it will not be easy to sustain such a competition simultaneously both against Russia and China. So, under such a strategic restrain what are the U.S options? Diplomatically, U.S must ensure that all three parties must not cross the given red lines. What are those red lines? Taiwan must be deterred from declaring formal independence, Washington must be deterred from recognizing Taiwan as an independent state or restoring a formal alliance with the island, and Beijing must be deterred from using military force against Taiwan to compel unification (Glaser, Weiss, & Christensen, 2023). U.S would also like to desist from unnecessarily provoking China and to do that it must stop calling for formal recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state, as former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo did; or calling for the stationing of significant U.S. forces on the island in peacetime, as former U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton did; or designating Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally,” as the original language of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 proposed (Policy Brief , 2022). To deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan U.S will have to match Chinese military capabilities with its own military capabilities. To do this, in the next two to five years, the United States will have to reorient U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific by arming U.S. bombers deployed to the Indo-Pacific with large numbers of long-range anti-ship missiles (Nakamura & Moriyasu, 2023).

Even if it is imagined that China can successfully invade and hold Taiwan, China will not get time to celebrate the acquisition and might get in deeper trouble. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry will land in trouble, a very large number of people will become hostile against the invader. Internationally, like Russia, Beijing will face diplomatic blowback and sanctions as the world will



get proactively involved to safeguard the Chinese eastern coastline which represents the world’s busiest maritime corridors and the world cannot afford its incapacitation (Mills, 2023). China’s own economy will also be badly affected and on top of this all, invasion of Taiwan would mean an invitation of military engagement with U.S and maybe Japan and other regional countries. Basing on these assumptions it is fair to say that invading Taiwan should not be a preferred Chinese option. These are the realities that Chinese policy makers are well aware of and that is why it is unlikely that China may undertake the extreme option of invading Taiwan. However, considering Chinese economic and military growth which has brought it to the peak of its national strength, the counter argument that China may attack Taiwan in the near term may not be unjustified (Nathan, 2022).

History teaches a lesson that regardless of consequences when nations feel compelled to act they become undeterrable and the best example of this is Japan in the late 1930s, many Japanese officials admitted that they would lose a long war against the United State but despite that grim assessment, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, because it concluded that it had no other option (Bardos, 2021). Today many Indo-Pacific nations worry that taking sides between the United States and China means possibly getting dragged into a war over Taiwan. So, they prefer to resort to the strategy of hedging. Even the U.S cannot take its own side as it is bound by its agreements with China on the Taiwanese issue. In the 1972 agreement known as the Shanghai Communique the United States promised that it would not challenge China’s position, that there is “but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China” (Lee & Heritage , 2022). In a separate agreement signed in 1979, the United States agreed that the Chinese authorities based in Beijing were the country’s sole legal government (Green & Glaser, 2017).

U.S can only assist Taiwan in a collective defense against China if U.S considers Taiwan as a sovereign and independent state as TRA (Taiwan Relations Act) honors U.S one China policy. So, if Chinese military and economic power has grown from strength to strength than what are U.S options to maintain its own reliability and deterrence in Taiwan strait? Should it continue to follow the strategy of ambiguity or should it bring strategic clarity in its stand on Taiwanese issue? As explained earlier the U.S military planners see no firm U.S defense commitment in deterring China, so therefore U.S lacks in defense preparation and also defense and contingency planning. So, when China is unsure of the US commitment to Taiwan it is least likely to be deterred (Brands,, 2023). But a look at an event in the past would suggest that U.S has deterred China when it considered that deterring China was the only option it was left with. One such event was the 1995 address Lee gave at his alma mater, Cornell University, on what he dubbed “Taiwan’s democratization experience” (Sacks, How to Survive the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis, 2022). The fact that the Taiwanese president was granted a visa to visit the United States after Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured his Chinese counterpart that Lee would not be allowed to enter the country enraged Beijing (Sacks , 2022). In retaliation, the Chinese military conducted missile tests and exercises in the Taiwan Strait. This prompted Secretary of Defense Willaim Perry to announce that the United States would dispatch two aircraft carrier strike groups to the area,



demonstrating that the United States was prepared to intervene to repel a Chinese invasion (Sacks , 2022). But whatever the kind of hype and tension that prevails eventually it has been observed that both China and U.S work together to de-escalate tensions rather than escalate them. The accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and an incident in 2001, when a Chinese fighter jet collided with a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, or the shooting down of a Chinese balloon by U.S on the charge of spying, in all these cases, Chinese leaders ultimately sought a way to de-escalate tensions (Sacks , 2022).

Analysis: Why China Will or Will Not Invade Taiwan

The big question that is on every body’s mind today is whether and if China will invade Taiwan and absorb it in mainland China? As recently as 2022, many eyes rolled when Admiral Phil Davidson, then Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), warned that China might be able to successfully invade Taiwan by 2027 (Shelbourne, 2021). Meanwhile, Bill Burns, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated that Xi Jinping had in no way dispensed with his goal of seizing Taiwan. More recently, in July 2024, he stated that Beijing is determined to take over Taiwan and is prepared to use military action to do so; he also judged that Beijing would conclude from Russia’s experience in Ukraine that overwhelming force would be the right way to resolve the Taiwan issue in its favor (Colby, 2022). If U.S allows Beijing to control Taiwan it would caste very negative aspiration on many other U.S allies in Asia but if U.S supports Taiwan’s separation from China than it will also result provoking rather than deterring China from attacking Taiwan. So, U.S policy makers seem to be in a difficult position as formulation of any pro-independence polices by them would risk the coming of a war that U.S wouldn’t want. Supporting and supplying military equipment to Ukraine is different, doing the same to Taiwan which doesn’t enjoy any land borders with other countries will be extremely difficult. No doubt that Taiwan is a leading democracy in the heart of Asia, and it sits at the core of global value chains and its security is a fundamental interest for the United States but the best U.S policy should be to create space for Beijing and Taipei to either indefinitely postpone conflict or reach some sort of political resolution (Blanchette & Hass, *The Taiwan Long Game; Why the Best Solution Is No Solution*, 2022). This policy also has a historical precedence. In the final years of the 1945–49 Chinese Civil War, the losing Nationalists retreated to Taiwan, establishing a mutual defense treaty with the United States in 1954. In 1979, however, Washington severed those ties so it could normalize relations with Beijing (Blanchette & Hass, 2022). Since then, the United States has worked to keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait by blocking the two actions that could lead to outright conflict: a declaration of independence by Taipei and forced unification by Beijing (Blanchette & Hass, 2022). “This U.S policy has worked for the last many decades and the factors that contributed to the working of this policy are; First, the United States maintained a big lead over China when it came to military power, which discouraged Beijing from using conventional force to substantially alter cross-strait relations. Second, China was focused primarily on its own economic development and integration into the global economy, allowing the Taiwan issue to stay on the back burner. Third, the United States dexterously dealt with challenges to cross-strait stability, whether they originated in Taipei or Beijing, thereby tamping down any embers that could ignite a conflict” (Blanchette & Ryan



Hass, 2022). But lot has changed in the last few decades as well. China has grown to become an economic and military giant and has acquired the capability to hit U.S aircraft carriers that might operate in the region. The pro-Beijing KMT party in Taiwan is losing political space and DPP is fast consolidating power as is demonstrated by the results of 2024 elections in Taiwan which DPP won. This is not to China’s liking. U.S assessment of China’s likelihood of attacking Taiwan is also reflected in the instructions that Bill Burns, the director of the CIA passed to his military, according to him Xi instructed his military to be prepared for conflict by 2027, as he declared that progress on unification with Taiwan is a requirement for fulfilling the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” for which he set 2049 as the target date (Blanchette & Hass, 2022). There are two faces of China, one is when it chooses options other than military occupation to achieve its objectives, such as building artificial islands in the South China Sea and using lawfare in Hong Kong (Blanchette & Hass, 2022). The other face is in how it responded to U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan as after the visit, Beijing lobbed missiles over Taiwan for the first time, conducted unprecedented air operations across the Taiwan Strait median line, and simulated a blockade of Taiwan’s main ports (Blanchette & Hass, 2022). Therefore, if in any future U.S arrangement it backs China into a corner, for example, by permanently stationing military personnel on Taiwan or making another formal mutual defense commitment with Taipei, Chinese leaders might feel the weight of nationalist pressure and take drastic actions that could devastate the island (Hillie , 2023).

China’s Proposed Policy Option

War with Taiwan can never be in line with President Xi’s grand strategy which is more economic than military in nature and which seeks to restore China as a leading power on the global stage. Post-war China will not be a China that will in line with China’s grand strategy. China imports 70 percent of its oil and 31 percent of its natural gas; it is the world’s largest coal producer but still needs to import more. Although it is striving for food self-sufficiency, China is the world’s largest importer of food, especially corn, meat, seafood, and soybeans and some of these energy and food imports come from Russia, but many come from countries that would sanction China if it invaded Taiwan (Nathan, 2022). China’s navy doesn’t have the global reach to defend the shipping routes across which these and many other vital commodities flows. Any war over Taiwan, even a successful one for Beijing, would deal a devastating blow to the Chinese economy, creating conditions that would threaten domestic political stability and usher in the failure, not the realization, of the Chinese dream (Nathan, 2022).

The US Proposed Policy Option

The best U.S policy option is to ensure that crisis in Taiwan strait doesn’t culminate into another war. This U.S policy option can be summarized in one line – it should reassure China that it adheres to one China policy and it will not support Taiwan’s independence. U.S may also refrain from extending military commitments to Taiwan and can use other nonmilitary measures like cautioning China that invading Taiwan would entail severe economic, diplomatic and political consequences for China. The actions that US could undertake may include, deployment of U.S forces in



neighboring countries to build military pressure on China, denying Chinese student’s academic access to U.S and expelling Chinese diplomats from the various international organizations (Wong & Barnes , 2020). All these measures will prevent U.S from violating the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). U.S can also help Taiwan to enhance its war fighting capabilities. U.S should also try to enhance cooperation with allies to prepare for joint or coordinated military responses to a conflict over Taiwan. Not the military approach but the broader diplomatic would be the right way forward for U.S. The clear articulation of U.S policy on China specially if such a policy is guided by military approach is dangerous and should be avoided. An example of this is President Biden’s comments in September 2022 that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if China were to launch an “unprecedented attack (Ni & Agencies, 2022).

Taiwan’s Proposed Policy Option

The one-line policy guideline for Taiwan could be for it to understand that ‘pursuing independence is contrary to their interests’. This does not mean that Taiwan should not make military preparations to defend itself, increase its defense spending and enhance the much-needed deterrence. Currently Taiwan’s policy is guided by fear – something manifested from China’s forcible integration of Hong Kong despite its commitment to allow it to remain self-governing under the formula of one country two systems. To most people, Taiwan is already a fully sovereign country, not merely a self-governing island that exists in a state of limbo. There is no need to rock the boat by formally declaring what is already the case, especially given that it is certain Beijing would have a furious response to such an action (Batto, 2022). There is a visible and welcoming change in the stance of the ruling party DPP. The party no longer advocates formal independence for the island, instead asserting that Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China, is already a sovereign and independent country and that any change in the status quo must be decided by all residents of Taiwan through a plebiscite (Hioe & Nachman, 2021). This must remain the central point around which Taiwan must build its relationship with China.

Conclusion

For peace and security to prevail, President Xi Jinping must back away from taking a tough approach against Taiwan. He may face domestic criticism for doing so and that may be the reason why he has said that “reunification” of the island with mainland China is “inevitable,” but he has given no indication that he would jeopardize Chinese interests. China should never rule out American military intervention if in case it opts for the extreme option. Ideally, it should continue improving its “anti-access/area-denial” capabilities to keep U.S military forces at bay. U.S must remove Chinese fears that it is moving away from its one-China policy. Already, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has publicly referred to Taiwan as a “country.” But China must not get provoked and may resort to nonmilitary means to build pressure on Taiwan including cutting off its market to Taiwan. But President Xi has set an objective of achieving China’s “great rejuvenation” by 2049; unification with Taiwan is a condition for that goal and he may want to move more rapidly than that timeline suggests: Xi is unlikely to live to see 2049 (he would be approaching 100 years old) and has said that this issue cannot be passed from generation to generation. President Xi may



also have learned a dangerous lesson from Russia’s mistakes in Ukraine—namely, that if he wants to take Taiwan by force, he needs to go big and move fast. But president Xi may stick to what he said in his speech at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing in October 2022, Xi declared that “peaceful reunification remains the best way to realize reunification across the Taiwan Strait. “China will not allow U.S to use Taiwan as a tool to weaken and divide China. President Xi considers that time and momentum is on China’s side and one country two systems or cross-strait integration may be a less costly and favorable option for it. China must rely on the gravitational pull of its economy to bring Taiwan closer rather than the strategic opening it might see in Europe because of the tied up military resources there to take an aggressive action. For decades, China’s policy toward Taiwan has been characterized by strategic patience, as has its approach to other territorial claims and disputes—from India to the South China Sea. China must continue with this strategy of patience; it should allow time to Taiwan to reconsider its options as going to war is a high-cost risk that China must avoid at all costs. Waiting with patience rather than undertaking a rash choice of aggression and losing the support of Taiwanese people for ever is not the right choice. It is imperative that China demonstrates strategic patience as its high-end goal that enables it to gain the support of Taiwanese people without triggering a war.



References

- Al-Jazeera . (2023, March 26). *Honduras cuts ties with Taiwan, opens relations with China*. Retrieved from Al Jazeera: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/26/honduras-cuts-diplomatic-ties-with-taiwan>
- Barboza, D. (2008, April 12). *Former Party Boss in China Gets 18 Years*. Retrieved from The New York Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/12/world/asia/12shanghai.html>
- Barclay, P. D. (2020, June 30). *Japanese Empire in Taiwan*. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.376>
- Bardos, A. (2021). *Why did Japan attack Pearl Harbor?; Japan had no choice but to strike first against America*. Retrieved from Aspect of History: <https://aspectsofhistory.com/why-did-japan-attack-pearl-harbor/>
- Batto, N. F. (2022, December 22). *Taiwan Is Already Independent*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwan-already-independent>
- Batto, N. F. (2022, December 12). *Taiwan Is Already Independent; Why Most of the Island’s People Don’t Desire a Formal Declaration*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwan-already-independent>
- Blanchette, J., & Hass, R. (2022, December 20). *The Taiwan Long Game; Why the Best Solution Is No Solution*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-long-game-best-solution-jude-blanchette-ryan-hass>
- Blanchette, J., & Hass, R. (2022, December 20). *The Taiwan Long Game; Why the Best Solution Is No Solution*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-long-game-best-solution-jude-blanchette-ryan-hass>
- Blanchette, J., & Hass, R. (2022, December 20). *The Taiwan Long Game; Why the Best Solution Is No Solution*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-long-game-best-solution-jude-blanchette-ryan-hass>
- Blanchette, J., & Hass, R. (2022, December 20). *The Taiwan Long Game; Why the Best Solution Is No Solution*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-long-game-best-solution-jude-blanchette-ryan-hass>
- Blanchette, J., & Hass, R. (2022, December 20). *The Taiwan Long Game; Why the Best Solution Is No Solution*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-long-game-best-solution-jude-blanchette-ryan-hass>
- Blanchette, J., & Hass, R. (2022, December 20). *The Taiwan Long Game; Why the Best Solution Is No Solution*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-long-game-best-solution-jude-blanchette-ryan-hass>



- Blanchette, J., & Ryan Hass, R. (2022, December 20). *The Taiwan Long Game; Why the Best Solution Is No Solution*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-long-game-best-solution-jude-blanchette-ryan-hass>
- Brands, H. (2023, September 8). *Deterrence in Taiwan Is Failing; The United States has committed to keeping the peace but isn't doing enough to stop the war*. Retrieved from FP (Foreign Policy): <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/08/us-military-deterrence-china-taiwan-war-east-asia/>
- Bush, R. C. (2016, January 16). *Taiwan's Election Results, Explained*. Retrieved from Brookings : <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-election-results-explained/>
- Bush, R. C. (2016, January 16). *Taiwan's Election Results, Explained*. Retrieved from Brookings : <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-election-results-explained/>
- Bush, R. C. (2016, January 16). *Taiwan's Election Results, Explained*. Retrieved from Brookings : <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-election-results-explained/>
- Bush, R. C. (2016, January 16). *Taiwan's Election Results, Explained*. Retrieved from Brookings: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-election-results-explained/>
- Bush, R. C. (2016, January 16). *Taiwan's Election Results, Explained*. Retrieved from Brookings: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-election-results-explained/>
- Bush, R. C. (2016, January 16). *Taiwan's Election Results, Explained*. Retrieved from Brookings: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-election-results-explained/>
- Bush, R. C. (2021, January 22). *Taiwan's democracy and the China challenge*. Retrieved from Brookings: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-democracy-and-the-china-challenge/>
- Campbell, C. (2016, December 5). *Donald Trump Angers China With Historic Phone Call to Taiwan's President*. Retrieved from Time: <https://time.com/4589641/donald-trump-china-taiwan-call/>
- Chanis, S. (2012, November 4). *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*, by Tonio Andrade (2008). Retrieved from Not Even Past; The past is never dead. It's not even past: <https://notevenpast.org/how-taiwan-became-chinese-dutch-spanish-and-han-colonization-seventeenth-century/>
- Chhabra, S. (2024, February 2). *The Non-consensus Consensus of Taiwan's Election*. Retrieved from The Diplomat: <https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/the-non-consensus-consensus-of-taiwans-election/>
- Colby, E. (2022, August 10). *America Must Prepare for a War Over Taiwan; Being Ready Is the Best Way to Prevent a Fight With China*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs : <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/america-must-prepare-war-over-taiwan>
- Colby, E. (2022, August 10). *America Must Prepare for a War Over Taiwan; Being Ready Is the Best Way to Prevent a Fight With China*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/america-must-prepare-war-over-taiwan>
- Colby, E. (2022, August 10). *America Must Prepare for a War Over Taiwan; Being Ready Is the Best Way to Prevent a Fight With China*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs:



- <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/america-must-prepare-war-over-taiwan>
Colby, E. (2022, August 10). *America Must Prepare for a War Over Taiwan; Being Ready Is the Best Way to Prevent a Fight With China*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/america-must-prepare-war-over-taiwan>
- Davidson, H., & Lin, C.-h. (2023, May 24). *Taiwan’s choice: who will replace Tsai Ing-wen as president amid China tensions?* Retrieved from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/24/taiwans-choice-who-will-replace-tsai-ing-wen-as-president-amid-china-tensions>
- Davidson, H., & Lin, C.-h. (2023, May 24). *Taiwan’s choice: who will replace Tsai Ing-wen as president amid China tensions?* Retrieved from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/24/taiwans-choice-who-will-replace-tsai-ing-wen-as-president-amid-china-tensions>
- Davidson, H., & Lin, C.-h. (2023, May 24). *Taiwan’s choice: who will replace Tsai Ing-wen as president amid China tensions?* Retrieved from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/24/taiwans-choice-who-will-replace-tsai-ing-wen-as-president-amid-china-tensions>
- Davidson, H., & Lin, C.-h. (2023, May 24). *Taiwan’s choice: who will replace Tsai Ing-wen as president amid China tensions?* Retrieved from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/24/taiwans-choice-who-will-replace-tsai-ing-wen-as-president-amid-china-tensions>
- Davidson, H., & Lin, C.-h. (2023, May 24). *Taiwan’s choice: who will replace Tsai Ing-wen as president amid China tensions?* Retrieved from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/24/taiwans-choice-who-will-replace-tsai-ing-wen-as-president-amid-china-tensions>
- Ehsan, M. A. (2023, August 20). *The leaders whom greatness is thrust upon; The true measure of a leader is not their potential to do something but their ability to deliver*. Retrieved from The Express Tribune: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2431519/the-leaders-whom-greatness-is-thrust-upon>
- France-Presse, A. -A. (2003, November 29). *Chen vows Taiwan ‘sovereignty’ vote*. Retrieved from Al Jazeera: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2003/11/29/chen-vows-taiwan-sovereignty-vote>
- Ger, Y. k. (2012, October). *The Significance of 2012 Taiwanese Elections and its Impacts on Cross-strait Relations*. doi:<https://www.jstor.org/stable/i40179520>
- Glaser, B. S., Weiss, J. C., & Christensen, T. J. (2023, November 30). *Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence; Why America Must Reassure, Not Just Threaten, China*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwan-china-true-sources-deterrence>
- Green, M. J., & Glaser, B. S. (2017, January 13). *What Is the U.S. “One China” Policy, and Why Does it Matter?* Retrieved from CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies): <https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter>
- Harrison, M. (2017, July 26). *The End of Martial Law: An Important Anniversary for Taiwan*.



- Retrieved from Global Taiwan Institute: <https://globaltaiwan.org/2017/07/the-end-of-martial-law-an-important-anniversary-for-taiwan/>
- Hillie , K. (2023, November 14). *Taiwan says US using 'all possible ways' to support defence against China*. Retrieved from Financial Times: <https://www.ft.com/content/35667ccf-351f-4ccf-9285-c7303e667f4d>
- Hioe, B., & Nachman, L. (2021, September 21). *Taiwanese Presidents Will Not and Can Not Unilaterally Change Taiwan's Status*. Retrieved from The Diplomat: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/taiwanese-presidents-will-not-and-can-not-unilaterally-change-taiwans-status/>
- Huang , C.-J. (2023, November 28). *Taiwan's History and Status: Taiwan Has Never Been a Part of China*. Retrieved from FAPA (Formosan Association for Public Affairs): <https://fapa.org/taiwans-history-and-status-taiwan-has-never-been-a-part-of-china/>
- Huang, I. (2023, April 7). *China vs. Taiwan: The battle for diplomatic allies*. Retrieved from Commonwealth Magazine : <https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=3407>, (Accessed on 10 Jan 2024)
- International Committee , H. (1991, June). *Ending the Period of Communist Rebellion*. Retrieved from Taiwan Communique: <https://www.taiwandc.org/twcom/tc50-int.pdf>
- Lai, Y. F. (2023, December 7). *Who is William Ching-te Lai, the Liberal Candidate in the Upcoming Presidential Election of Taiwan?* Retrieved from Friedrich Naumann Foundation: <https://www.freiheit.org/taiwan/who-william-ching-te-lai-liberal-candidate-upcoming-presidential-election-taiwan>
- Leary, A., & Hutzler, C. (2022, July 22). *China's Xi Warns Biden Over Taiwan as a Possible Pelosi Trip Adds to Tensions*. Retrieved from The Wall Street Journal: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-chinas-xi-talk-as-a-pelosi-trip-to-taiwan-threatens-to-inject-new-tensions-11659013042>
- Lee, P. K., & Heritage , A. (2022, August 18). *China refuses to 'acknowledge' US One-China Policy*. Retrieved from 9Dashline: <https://www.9dashline.com/article/china-refuses-to-acknowledge-us-one-china-policy>
- Li, R. (2024, January 17). *The global significance and implications of Taiwan's presidential election results*. Retrieved from King's College London: <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/the-global-significance-and-implications-of-taiwans-election-results>
- Mack, L. (2022, June 3). *A Brief History of Taiwan; Early History, Modern Era, and Cold War Period*. Retrieved from ThoughtCo.: <https://www.thoughtco.com/brief-history-of-taiwan-688021>
- Miller, C. (2022, October 8). *The Chips That Make Taiwan the Center of the World*. Retrieved from Time: <https://time.com/6219318/tsmc-taiwan-the-center-of-the-world/>
- Mills, R. (2023, March 3). *Why China won't go to war with Taiwan*. Retrieved from Ahead of The Herd: <https://aheadoftheherd.com/why-china-wont-go-to-war-with-taiwan-richard-mills/>
- Nakamura , R., & Moriyasu, K. (2023, December 3). *U.S. to deploy new ground-based missiles to Indo-Pacific in 2024; Intermediate-range fires, previously banned by INF, to counter China buildup*. Retrieved from Nikkei Asia: <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International->



- relations/Indo-Pacific/U.S.-to-deploy-new-ground-based-missiles-to-Indo-Pacific-in-2024
- Nathan, A. J. (2022, June 23). *Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan; Why China Isn't Poised to Invade*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-23/beijing-still-playing-long-game-taiwan>
- Nathan, A. J. (2022, June 23). *Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan; Why China Isn't Poised to Invade*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-23/beijing-still-playing-long-game-taiwan>
- Nathan, A. J. (2022, June 23). *Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan; Why China Isn't Poised to Invade*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-23/beijing-still-playing-long-game-taiwan>
- Ni , V., & Agencies. (2022, September 19). *Joe Biden again says US forces would defend Taiwan from Chinese attack*. Retrieved from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/19/joe-biden-repeats-claim-that-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-if-china-attacked#:~:text=Asked%20in%20a%20CBS%2060,there%20was%20an%20unprecedented%20attack.%E2%80%9D>
- Niou, E. (1996). *Salient issues in Taiwan's electoral politics*. doi:[https://doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794\(95\)00031-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794(95)00031-3)
- O'Hanlon, M. E. (2019, December 2). *Focusing on quality over quantity in the US military budget*. Retrieved from Brookings: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/focusing-on-quality-over-quantity-in-the-us-military-budget/>
- Ogasawara, Y. (1998, December). *Constitutional Reform and Democratization in Taiwan*. Retrieved from Ogasawara Homepage : <https://www.tufts.ac.jp/ts/personal/ogasawara/paper/epaper2.html>
- Perlez, J. (2022, July 29). *Why Pelosi's Taiwan Visit Is Raising US-China Tensions*,. Retrieved from The New York Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/29/world/asia/china-taiwan-pelosi-explained.html>
- Policy Brief. (2022, October 13). *Avoiding War Over Taiwan; Policy Brief by the Task Force on US-China Policy*. Retrieved from Asia Society - Centre on US-China Relations: <https://asiasociety.org/center-us-china-relations/avoiding-war-over-taiwan>
- Report. (2015, January 5). *China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei*. Retrieved from EveryCRSReport: <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30341.html>
- Reporter . (1975, April 6). *Chiang Kai-shek Is Dead in Taipei at 87; Last of Allied Big Four of World War II*. Retrieved from The New York Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/1975/04/06/archives/chiang-kaishek-is-dead-in-taipei-at-87-last-of-allied-big-four-of.html>



- Resar, A. (2022, July 18). *The 1992 Consensus: Why It Worked and Why It Fell Apart*. Retrieved from The Diplomat: <https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart/>
- Rubinstein, M. A. (1999). *Taiwan: A New History: A New History (East Gate Books)* (First ed.). Routledge. Retrieved from <https://www.amazon.com/Taiwan-History-East-Gate-Books/dp/0765614952>
- Rummel, R. J. (2007). *China's Bloody Century*. Routledge.
- Sacks, D. (2022, July 29). *How to Survive the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis; Washington Must Be Ready For a Showdown With or Without a Pelosi Trip*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-survive-next-taiwan-strait-crisis>
- Sacks, D. (2022, July 29). *How to Survive the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis; Washington Must Be Ready For a Showdown With or Without a Pelosi Trip*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-survive-next-taiwan-strait-crisis>
- Sacks, D. (2022, July 29). *How to Survive the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis; Washington Must Be Ready For a Showdown With or Without a Pelosi Trip*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-survive-next-taiwan-strait-crisis>
- Sacks, D. (2022, July 29). *How to Survive the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis*. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-survive-next-taiwan-strait-crisis>
- Shelbourne, M. (2021, March 9). *Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan In 'Next Six Years'*. Retrieved from USNI News: <https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years>
- Shu-ling, K. (2009, April 29). *Treaty confirmed sovereignty: Ma*. Retrieved from Taipei Times: <https://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/04/29/2003442293>
- Staff-Writer. (2015, January 6). *Chen Shui-bian released*. Retrieved from Taipei Times: <https://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/01/06/2003608566>
- Thornton, S. A. (2024, January 17). *The impact of Taiwan's election in 2024 and beyond*. Retrieved from Brookings : <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-impact-of-taiwans-election-in-2024-and-beyond/>
- Tkacik, J. (2008, March 24). *Taiwan's Elections: Sea Change in the Strait*. Retrieved from The Heritage Foundation: <https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/taiwans-elections-sea-change-the-strait>
- Tsoi, G. (2015, July 21). *Taiwan Has Its Own Textbook Controversy Brewing*. Retrieved from FP (Foreign Policy): <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/21/taiwan-textbook-controversy-china-independence-history/>
- Wong, E., & Barnes, J. E. (2020, December 3). *US to expel Chinese Graduate Students with Ties to China's Military Schools*. Retrieved from The New York Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/china-hong-kong-trump-student-visas.html>
- Wong, E. (2020, September 17). *U.S. Pushes Large Arms Sale to Taiwan, Including Jet Missiles That Can Hit China*. Retrieved from The New York Time:



<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/us/politics/us-arms-sale-taiwan-china.html>
Wu, H. (2023, March 21). *Former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou Will Visit China*. Retrieved from The Diplomat: <https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/former-taiwan-president-ma-ying-jeou-will-visit-china/>