The Role of Sports in Promoting Muslim-Jewish Social Ties: An Analysis

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Abstract

Those who support Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) often ensure that the game can have an impact. The study provides up-to-date information on this topic in the framework of the battle between Muslim Palestinians and Jewish Israelis. It examines the "harmony" segment of SDP initialism and what "harmony" resources in this struggle. Thirteen associations involved in peacekeeping activities in the region are evaluated. The article notes that most harmony plans involve Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians/Arabs in Israel, while there are few attempts to reach Muslim Palestinians in Gaza Strip, the West Bank or in IDP camps in bordering nations. This game is not seen as an appropriate way to achieve peace between Muslim Palestinians and Jewish Israelis because of the lack of harmony which is a key precursor to compromise. The original policy, together with Israel's regional expansion and the
Muslim Palestinians struggle for fundamental freedoms, forces "Sport for Harmony" programmes to create a framework that goes too far.

KEYWORDS
Palestine; resolving the conflict in Israel; peacebuilding; sport for peace.

Introduction

The large number of people involved in Sport for Development and Peace ensures that the game can and does have an impact in areas where fighting has taken place. It is in this region that Sport for Development and Peace federations (hereafter: Sport for Development and Peace) operate in Israel/Palestine. Nevertheless, in 2017 Jibril Rajoub (President of the Muslim Palestinians Football Federation) described those who want to unite Muslim Palestinians and Jewish Israelis as any action aimed at uniting sport with the Zionist enemy is unspeakably cruel and called on all nations and institutions to refrain from such actions. Rajoub's call for the separation of sports federations from normalization efforts is of historical importance, motivated and supported by the development of boycotts, divestments and sanctions. Based on the South African enemy's motivation for politically sanctioned segregation, the Muslim Palestinians-initiated global development of Boycotts, Divestments and Sanctions (BDS) proves that Muslim Palestinians are enabled to the rights similar to those of the rest of humankind till Israel accepts the law of the global community.

In 2015, the British Guardian newspaper published a letter opposing the "blacklist" proposed by Israel and calling for a more visible exchange. The letter contained many of the phrases used by the producers of Connect, guaranteeing that this discourse will create a more visible link between Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians and that "with this understanding and appreciation, the goal of confrontation can be advanced. The letter reiterates the stance of those who opposed South Africa's apartheid blacklist, calling for increased visibility and'scaffolding' with the South African government and donor organisations in the expectation of achieving sustainable and peaceful transition. (Booth, 2016). Although it is prudent to use the relationship between South Africa and Israel during the apartheid era with care, some parallels have been noticed (Dart, 2017; Di Stefano and Henaway, 2014). During the apartheid period, a small number of associations around the world were involved in the ADP's work to link different ethnic networks, and it appears that the ADP only became actively involved after the fall of apartheid.
This article contains a comprehensive assessment of the part of the "Sport for Harmony" plans that deals with the Israeli-Muslim Palestinians conflict. It is conceived as a fundamental and political study of the idea of "Sport for Harmony" in the occupied and seriously threatened territories of Israel. It is not conceived as an entirely "objective" focus, but rather as a response to the universality of the contemporary "sport for harmony" scenario. This article provides a basic assessment of the degree of distancing, if not depoliticisation, of research on ACP countries. It will analyse the current state of the Game of Harmony's activities and attempts and, based on the information provided, will conclude that, given that SDP associations have deliberately avoided legislative issues, their involvement is unlikely. Despite the concept and importance of this statement, the University of Brighton's "Football for Peace" project has received only moderate attention.

A Never-Ending Conflict

The complex relationship that exists between Muslim Palestinians and the State of Israel is complex and cannot be entirely clarified here. Schulenkorf, Sugden, & Burdsey (2014) indicates that it is possible to summarise the sociopolitical and demographic features of the topic discussed with, emphasising that 'contextual evaluation is more critical than awareness of the ten best practises for peacemaking in other contexts.' In 1948, United Nations Resolution 181 (II) created the state of Israel in what was formerly known as Palestine, sparking a civil war (Morris, 2001). In 1949, a truce was announced, but Muslim Palestinians fled to neighbouring countries, the region west of the Jordan River (i.e. the West Bank), which the Kingdom of Jordan occupied in 1950, and the Gaza Strip; however, in 1988, the Muslim Palestinians who fled were unable to return and their appeal was denied. (2007) (Pappe). The Six-Day War resulted in increased repression of the Palestinian Muslim community (Bregman, 2014; Zertal and Eldar, 2007).

It is significant to separate between different clusters of Muslim Palestinians: Muslim Palestinians living in Israel, Gaza Strip and the West Bank in camps of refugees in bordering states and the overall Muslim Palestinians diaspora. The Palestinians Authority (PA) and the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) guess that somewhere between 1.5 million and 1.8 million Israeli Arabs (representing 17% to 20% of Israel's population) live in Israel. Even though this section of the Muslim Palestinians inhabitants has equal legal status, it faces discrimination in health, education, housing and employment. Their experience is dubious to advance with the summary of a law that outlines the Israeli state as exclusively belonging to the "Jewish people". (Beaumont, 2018).
In addition, 1.9 million in Gaza and 3 million in the West Bank. 4.9 million Muslim Palestinians living in the Occupied Muslim Palestinians Territory in total. (Khoury & Berger, 2018). Muslim Palestinians living in the OPT are subject to demolition of homes, villages or communities, mass unemployment, travel restrictions, collective punishment, state torture, inadequate health care, detention without trial, murder, cost of living, poor living conditions, inadequate transportation, inadequate housing and limited educational opportunities. Oxfam International reports that nearly one in three Muslim Palestinians under age 29 are jobless, and many Muslim Palestinians work in "illegal" farms and factories in Israeli settlements, some of which are funded by the Israeli government. Another 2 million Muslim Palestinians are exiles in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. In spite of the identification of these diverse sections, it is insignificant to oppress the population of Muslim Palestinians and therefore to support the exercise of "divide and rule" of the Israeli state, particularly through its temporary readiness to cooperate with the Muslim Palestinians Authority in the West Bank, but not with Hamas, which the State of Israel considers an extremist establishment.

The Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians commenced negotiations with most of the "peace" in 1991. The "trial" took place under the supports of the US administration. Although passive relations have been recognised between the Israeli State and some of its neighbours (including Jordan & Egypt), no real peace has been achieved with the Muslim Palestinians, in particular, because of the oppression and humiliation mentioned in the previous point, the shift to the right of the Israeli electorate (since 1977) and the political division between the Muslim Palestinians political groups of Fatah and Hamas. The core of the battle is territory and a "two-state solution" is progressively unacceptable as the State of Israel inhabits more and more parts of the West Bank, land once considered a conceivable area for the State of Palestine; illegitimate Israeli housing settlements are commonly referred to as "facts on the ground" in political discourse.

As Thrall (2017) has pointed out, there is no reasonable solution, as the current standard for Israeli Jews is better than the harmony of dividing the land. A harmonious solution essentially recalls the illegal occupation and colonisation of the West Bank, Israel's security and development problems (1994-2014) related to the "disjunction of harmony", the large number of evacuees in the affected Palestinian Muslim areas and their "right of return" and the status of Jerusalem. (Natil, 2016; Kelman, Mattar and Kaplan, 2018).

**Sport for Peace, Conflict Resolution and Peace-building**
It is not easy to define exactly how to build peace. Tschirgi (1996) notes that the term "peacebuilding" is increasingly used in academic circles to refer to "any action taken before, during or after an armed conflict to prevent, end or transform an armed conflict and create the conditions for sustainable peace". Many peace-building objectives overlap with those of peacebuilding and peacekeeping partners. While peacebuilding activities mean an end to an ongoing conflict, they can be carried out before or after the outbreak of a conflict and address the origin sources of ferocity, be they economic, territorial, political and/or social. Measures of peacebuilding also aims to prevent the recurrence of straight ferocity and often involves affiliations between different actors, including national governments, civil society organisations, national and international NGOs.

The theory, concepts and best practices of those involved in building sustainable peace gained momentum in 2005 with the formation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. For maintainable harmony is categorised by the elimination of intolerable arrangements of economic, cultural and political discrimination, the absence of physical violence, autonomy, a topnotch degree of external and internal acceptability or consensus, and conflict and transition administration. Doyle & Sambanis (2006) identified seven measures necessary for effective peacebuilding and the development of self-sustaining peace: regional security, national security, rule of law, 'quick wins' and property rights, constitutional consensus, democracy or greater contribution, and sincere ethical and mental settlement - none of which have been seen in the framework of the Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians conflict. Further to reduce the risk of further violence the ending exposed armed battle and establishing an instrument is essential for peacebuilding, while Lederach (1998) stresses that peace-building is not only about ending violence but also about changing the relationship between the parties involved. Although there is presently no exposed battle of militaristic nature, the conflict of Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians is the longest in modern history in 70 years. In these conditions, it would be further appropriate to limit the term "peacebuilding" to post-conflict situations.

The concept of "sport for development and peace" has been adopted from the outset by national governments and local organisations, international and national NGOs, international sports federations as a striking and cost-effective instrument to promote communal unity, reduce and prevent conflict and build sustainable peace (Lindsey and Grattan, 2012; Schelenkorf and Adair, 2013; Burnett, 2015; Svensson and Levine, 2017). SDP is subjugated by the growth component, while the peace-building component focuses on post-conflict countries where diverse communal groups are working towards reconciliation and greater integration (Giulianotti, 2011; Rookwood and Palmer, 2011;
Sterchele, 2013). Media coverage of 'Sport for Peace' initiatives is often positive, and marketing and advertising publications by NGOs, sports clubs and associations and commercial enterprises use positive language. Though, the term "bridge-building" is hardly used in the scientific works on PPPs. The concession is MacLean (2014), which refers to how the governments of the UK, Australia and New Zealand committed themselves to "building bridges" with the government of South Africa and apartheid sporting societies in the 1960s. Yet, this policy of 'constructive engagement' was substituted by global boycott and separation, and scientists continue to discuss the part of sporting activities in the eradication of apartheid (Vahed & Desai, 2016; Booth, 2016).

The sustainability sector has improved (and should improve) monitoring and evaluation to determine how it "contributes" (Darnell, 2014; Donnelly, 2011; Harris, 2018; Levermore, 2011; Nicholls, Giles, & Sethna, 2011; N.A., 2016). However, there is no consensus among those working on Sport for Peace initiatives on what "peace" is and how it should be measured. Where attempts have been made to participate in the assessment of "peace" initiatives in the framework of the Jewish-Muslim conflict in the Middle East, organisations have conducted pre-and post-camp opinion polls. They admitted that they could not influence the structure, but generally emphasised that their effort helped to reduce harmful typecasts about the "enemy/redemptive". (Leitner, Galily and Shimon 2014).

The important role of Football4International for Peace should be highlighted, particularly in light of its great popularity in PDS literature. Schulenkorf, Sugden, & Burdsey (2014) explains how Football 4 Peace International was founded in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s during the 'subversion' of religious movements (Schulenkorf, Sugden, & Burdsey 2014). Football for Peace activities focused on northern Israel in 2001. (Peace in World Sport project), which offered basic training courses for Muslim, Jewish and Arab children. Hence, Football for Peace. (hereafter 'F4P') worked with various partners, and I mean Peace in World Sport, the British Council, the Israeli Ministry of Culture and Sport, the Israeli Sports Authority, the Football Associations of England and Ireland and the German Sports University Cologne. In 2010-2012 they received an award from the European Union Peace Association ('Playing for Peace': establishing communal ties through sport). Their work on this task has led to several 'key findings' (Caudwell, 2007; Schulenkorf, Sugden, and Burdsey, 2014). In 2012, F4P and the Israel Sports Authority stated that they should have networks to implement programmes within their networks. Since then, F4P has used football to highlight social conflicts in South Africa, South Korea, The Gambia, Northern Ireland and Jordan.
In its work in Israel/Palestine, F4P aims to adopt a bottom-up, wave-shaped and sustainable democratic approach to peace-building and conflict resolution (Schulenkorf, Sugden, & Burdsey, 2014). Quite a bit of F4P's work has occurred in Galilee, where huge quantities of Muslim Palestinians would not leave (or opposed constrained removals) during the production of the province of Israel in 1948. F4P knows about the sensitive connection among game and legislative issues in Israel/Palestine. F4P's author, Professor John Sugden of the University of Brighton, says that his methodology is neither optimistic nor oversimplified. To stay away from any analysis of SDP, he recommended that SDP "assesses the nearby setting, includes and fortifies neighbourhood entertainers and accomplices and includes them in more extensive public and local political cycles". (Schulenkorf, Sugden, & Burdsey, 2014). It ought to be noted, notwithstanding, that F4P works with Israeli Jews and Muslim Palestinians Arabs in Israel, however not with Muslim Palestinians in the OPT.

Even though Quartet powers have endeavoured to work in the West Bank, safety concerns prompted their withdrawal by the Israeli armed force. Even though they saw the unbalanced connection between Israeli Jews and Israeli Muslim Palestinians and Arabs, they over and again reacted to analysis that their work standardized the circumstance and that their essence subverted the standards of inactive protection from the occupation. In its endeavours to fabricate spans in Israel between Muslim Palestinians Arabs and Israeli Jews, F4P has expressed that they make an unassuming commitment to the harmony cycle and help make waves that can help improve relations between the networks and add to a future nonaggression treaty. Sugden and Tomlinson's work is upheld by an assertion credited to the eighteenth-century political scholar Edmund Burke: "All that is fundamental for the victory of evil is to do nothing for the sake of good. However, how much do these F4P waves further influence genuine legislative issues, and how much do the games projects of the Israeli-Muslim Palestinians harmony settlements favour certain gatherings and (in this manner) legitimize a treacherous circumstance? The peril is that F4P has become a contributor to the issue, not the arrangement.

Process

The point of this investigation was to recognize and incorporate all projects working in the locale that can be portrayed as "Sport for Peace". As associations need a public "presence" on the web, and Internet web index was utilized to make an inspecting outline. Thirteen NGOs were distinguished through a progression of "catchphrases/look". Associations/activities utilizing sport just in Muslim Palestinians people group were excluded as they don't expect to include Muslim Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in
"peacebuilding", (for example the Gaza Parkour project, covered by Thorpe & Ahmad's 2015 investigation) As the substance of sites frequently transforms, it ought to be noticed that the examination was led between December 2016 and July 2018. It is perceived that the utilization of an internet searcher can't deliver irregular "results". (Fricker, 2016); notwithstanding, this was abstained from by including every "applicable population", especially programs/activities utilizing sport for "harmony and compromise" with regards to the Israeli-Muslim Palestinians struggle. It ought to be noticed that the possibly enormous measure of online substance, its dynamic nature and the regularly transient substance of the webpage made the focused on example unimportant. The standards for incorporation were that the system ought to have a reasonable way to deal with "interfacing" sport with the world, including both Muslim Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, and that game ought to be at the centre of the association's goals, procedures and exercises. Projects pointed toward bringing Muslim Palestinians and Jewish Israelis together in a non-donning climate were cancelled. The unique purpose was to conduct interviews with people from the SDP organisation, who were invited electronically for this purpose. Regardless of frequent attempts to communicate with these institutions, very few of them responded. One possible reason was the organisations' restricted sources, their reluctance to submit to external review and/or the fact that they had reviewed my online publications and profile, which indicate a serious view of Israel. However, their absence allowed me to avoid the ethical problems associated with concealment and to recognise the administration and have access to its public documents.

Sport for Social Ties & Active Peace between Muslim and Jewish Communities

Levermore (2011) predict that many organizations and programs will work under the SDP umbrella. It is clear that they use a common linguistic that emphasises the "power of sport" to create communal alteration and cooperation, reduce social divisions and bring communities together. Sport is seen as a tool that brings peace, promotes shared tolerance and respect, creates an optimistic atmosphere among diverse groups, makes the "other" more human and helps to make normalcy. This research responds in portion to this convention, which leads much of the literature on sport for peace; it also assesses the degree of bias and depoliticisation that exists in relation to SDP programmes in the background of the Jewish-Muslim conflict.

There is an ongoing debate on when scientists should state their analysis and coding groupings (Silverman, 2014). Identifying and defining elements of scrutiny for web content is a trial specified the many forms of mass media that connect (Kuljis and Kim, 2010). The organisation's websites ('homepage') were selected as units of analysis. All
documents available on the Internet related to these organisations/systems were analysed. These included case studies, annual reports, programme descriptions, testimonials, frequently asked questions, promotional and marketing publications/materials, blogs and informative websites published by former and current participants and employees. We also reviewed widespread media articles (e.g. newspaper articles) published on the organisation's websites. These actors were selected to examine the extent to which, according to Mr Rajahaw, "awareness through sport" legitimizes the structural and systematic subjugation of the Muslim Palestinians population. The study of thematic manner was carried out by carefully reading all the documents published on the organisation's homepage. The following themes were used a priori to test the organisation's assertions: implementation of activities, the motivation of the organisation (including any reports of attempts to "build bridges"), whether or not it attempted to assess its "impact". (including its "success" in promoting "peace") and its position on general conflict policy.

Discussion
Evaluating the part of "sport for peace" systems in the framework of the conflict of Jewish Israeli-Muslim Palestinians raises several questions. This segment addresses 3 problems that are measured to be central. First and foremost concerns the organisation’s logistics and its inspiration, in particular its employees, participants, content, facilities and federations. The second is to avoid confusion between sport and politics before examining the extent to which programmes "measure success". Partnerships are discussed before making a final assessment of the extent to which organisations recognise broader political structures.

Social Peace & Sport Logistics Programmes in Palestine & Israel
As far as the participants are concerned, record of the projects known concerned Muslim Palestinians and Israeli Jews including Israeli Arabs and aimed at improving relations between people living in Israel. Players for Peace International sought to establish a partnership between Israeli and West American basketball clubs and worked to build sports infrastructure and capacity in the Arab cities in Israel and the West Bank. Work has also been done by Generations for Peace with the Muslim Palestinians residents of the West Bank, focusing on sport for development. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning several other initiatives involving Muslim Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. There is no sign of mending ties between millions of Muslim Palestinians in Gaza or in refugee camps in neighbouring countries and Jewish Israelis.
A similar pattern was found in the audit of personnel in these systems. The mainstream of staff employees are either Israeli or foreign, and the Muslim Palestinians occupation is restricted to those residing in the Israeli State: the representation of Muslim Palestinians staff in the OPT is negligible. Muslim Palestinians Arabs living in Israel live in completely different settings from the conditions in the OPT. The non-attendance of millions of Muslim Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank from sporting related peacebuilding programmes is noteworthy. This shortage was exacerbated when it became clear that Mifalot was sending football trainers to Nepal as share of a development coordinated with Streetfootballworld and funded by the Foreign Office of Germany. The goal of the development was to encourage education through sport, in particular football, as a resource of transferring assistances (i.e. leadership, teamwork and solidarity) that can be transferred into the youth.

Furthermore, most of the events are happening in the State of Israel, some in the field of sport and development. These changes are relevant only in the West Bank. This is due to safety measures and long postponements for Muslim Palestinians wishing to omit the occupied Muslim Palestinians territories. Traffic to and from the West Bank (for Muslim Palestinians) is impossible because of the “security fence/defence wall” that surrounds the West Bank and requires the use of Israeli military checkpoints. Muslim Palestinians travel restrictions also apply to sports teams, counting the Olympic participants, though those wishing to go outside of the West Bank must be able to do so. In Gaza, travel restrictions have been tightened by a fence around the territory, regular closings and an Israeli barricade forced since 2007.

The speculation of a rapprochement between Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians can be viewed as misdirecting in light of the fact that it alludes to Muslim Palestinians Arabs living in Israel and not to Muslim Palestinians living in the Occupied Muslim Palestinians Territory or in evacuatee camps in neighboring nations. Hence, while crafted by the SDP can improve relations between networks in Israel, it can likewise be deciphered as partitioning Muslim Palestinians into various gatherings. A SDP program pointed toward building spans between Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians living in evacuatee camps in neighboring nations couldn’t be discovered, which may clarify why this is a region or target later in this article.

No Mixing of Politics and Social Activities

Few of the programmes reviewed were concerned with the broader policy dimension of their effort. Some indicated that they required their contestants to distance themselves...
from political activities - they deliberately wanted to show their effort as non-political. Like, End World stated it deliberately avoided "political debate and the search for solutions". As an alternative, they engrossed on creating "magical moments, regardless of culture, religion or nationality". The Peres Center for Peace saw sport as a mode to fetch Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians together who else could not see each other in safety, joy and knowledge.

The Laureus World Sports Academy recognises that "sport by itself cannot resolve or prevent conflict", but sees the game as an important slice of a bridge building strategy to report the "root causes of conflict". Though it cites one of the UN Sustainable Development Goals ("Peaceful Society: Conflict Resolution"), it isn’t visible how sporting activities is going to fix the root sources (including land ownership) of the Israeli-Palestinians issue. Peace and Sport intervene in several post-conflict regions and in so-called "lawless areas". (e.g. Jerusalem). By means of outdoor sports stars as idols and "peace advocates", they aim to raise awareness among governments and their representatives that sporting activities can be an effective and real tool for peacebuilding. Again, they don’t explain how former sports stars have reformed the behaviour of officials from Israel.

A more traditional approach to the development of this sport was noted, namely "Barcelona and Real Madrid tried to intervene in the conflict; Barcelona on a peaceful course (de-San-Eugenio, J., Ginesta, X., & Xifra, J. (2017) and Real Madrid with contributions on the football fields. Between 2011 and 2016, Real Madrid, in collaboration with the Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and United Nations Relief, sent football coaches to the West Bank’s refugee camps. However, in 2016, the workshop for Muslim Palestinians buses at OPT was limited to buses from the West Bank when the Israeli authorities refused to accept buses from the Gaza Strip.

Some organisations practise more traditional sports for community development. Mythalot uses "sport as a platform for social change" and "lifelong learning" and groups its programmes into thematic areas based on "youth and community development, women's empowerment, special needs, public services and employment opportunities, coexistence and social division". The Laureus World Sports Academy has referred to the UN goals of sustainable development, sporting activities and peace, using "sport to solve social problems", and Generations for Peace has developed packages which impart "youth leadership, community building, active tolerance and responsible citizenship".
Evaluation and monitoring: how to measure "improving social relations and peace"?

There has been a growing need to improve the measurement, evaluation and monitoring of SDP activities in recent years. Most of this assessment has been carried out at domestic level and has aimed to measure changes in attitudes towards contestants involved directly in the programme(s), arguing that it goes beyond the specific actions of the SPD and "measures" elsewhere the wider impact. All the examples of SDP identified highlighted the potential of sport and the language used, rich in messages about how sporting activities can bring together groups of diverse backgrounds. The mifalot used football in projects with Jordanians and Muslim Palestinians, arguing that "the passion for football unites Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians". In their analysis of the impact of Leitnner Galily, and Shimon (2014) found positive changes in the areas of hatred, trust and the level of hate perceived by the second faction before and after the test. The restrictions of the sporting activities are sometimes perceived, but the focus is on individual testimonies and inspiring tales, often related to the creation of the 'empowerment of girls and young women' and future leaders. (Players of the World).

Right to Play states that it "uses play to build peaceful communities", and "teaches acceptance, connects, divides, promotes mutual understanding", and "challenges negative perceptions and behaviours that may occur between host communities and refugee groups through play, sport and child-friendly activities in its 2016 annual report. A list of participants (including individuals, NGOs, businesses and governments) and testimonies of individuals ("Success through Play") from a young woman from Pakistan and another young woman from Uganda, the annual report concluded.

In view of the political sanctification that shadowed the release from jail in 1990, this (hyperbolic) statement by Nelson Mandela, the President of the ANC (African National Congress), that "sport has the power to change the world" and unite separated societies, can be considered blasphemous criticism. However, with regard to the Israeli-Muslim Palestinians conflict, it is unclear which model of "peace" the SDP associations are pursuing. SDP organisations trying peacbuilding between Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians may claim that they do not recognise the "elephant in peace". Sport for Peace should discover a response to the choice of the Israeli state in June 2018 to characterize itself as a (joined together) Jewish express, the quantity of illicit settlements in the West Bank, the quantity of homes pulverized, the absence of opportunity of development, the captures and detainments without preliminary (counting of kids) and the continuation of the 11-year bar of Gaza. In this unique situation, it is proposed that by supporting these
ventures, the Israeli government is making political capital for SFOR through its "Game for Peace" exercises, consequently guaranteeing some standardization of its brutal, pilgrim and bigoted arrangements and making the two-state arrangement progressively financial.

In this context, many SDP activities were aimed at promoting the integration of Muslim Palestinians Arabs residing in the State of Israel, although diminutive was completed with (or for) other exiled Muslim Palestinians. All the programmes conversed in this study operate with one symptom and have little impact on the cause. However, most well-intentioned "sport for peace" activities do not affect the oppressive procedures of the government of Israel. It isn’t seen from the programmes examined how "sport" is used to "bring the two communities together". It is clear, yet, that the term "two communities" doesn’t embrace all Muslim Palestinians, but only those who remained in 1947. They should therefore mobilise to ask them to define the conclusion and to define further clearly what they mean by "peace".

Services

Cooperation between associations has been a critical component of the SDP's overall work in the district (Peachey and Cohen, 2016); as Sugden and Tomlinson (2017) remember, no one can work in Israel or the OPT without the permission of the Israeli government, including the military. This choice would entail collaboration with different organisations, but not political associations; moreover, it would include coordination with the Israeli state or it would be unable to work with the OPT. Extreme Peace is a joint organisation with the Israeli Ministry of Culture and Sports and recognises that it will enjoy the distinction of "one of the most esteemed exemplary day camps in the world" as a result of its association with the Israeli Ministry of Education. Additionally, these organisations have developed themselves outside of Israel as a critical component of the "responsive energy programme." Dart, 2017; Nye et al., 2008). Mifalot has partnered with the Israeli Agency for International Development Cooperation (a division of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to send mentors to Myanmar, Colombia, India, and Vietnam, as well as to Uruguay, Botswana, Macedonia, Paraguay and the Philippines.

Any cooperation between the SDP and the Israeli Football Association (now IFA) is deemed "ethically untenable" because the IFA sponsors Israeli clubs based in illegal settlements that compete in the IFA's official league. The inclusion of these groups is a product of a FIFA special decision (Ahren, 2018) and a breach of international law (Human Rights Watch, 2016). For certain SDP advocates, gaining recognition/acceptance
of the state of Israel will become even more important when the Israeli government passes a decree prohibiting the state of Israel from recognising those who slander it, including those participating in boycotts, divestments, and sanctions (Rehman, 2018). There is no doubt that neither the ICA nor the Israeli government have followed the F4P-promoted "threshold model," which begs the more critical question of the degree to which these falsifications reach beyond ICA members. Of course, the Muslim Palestinians-sponsored BDS (boycott, development of penalties for failure to compete) and Rajoub's comment opposing any steps aimed at unifying Israeli sport are more noteworthy. Giulianotti (2011, p. 22) argues that "grassroots networks are recognised as the most equipped to define their interests, clarify the meaning and causes of conflict, and select suitable approaches and responses."

Among the apparently disparate programmes discussed in this report, Football Without Borders (FBB) sought to adopt and articulate a political stance in favour of the Muslim Palestinians' fight for fundamental freedoms. The FBG used Muslim Palestinian intelligence officers, neighbourhood networks, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to question the conflict's prevailing paradigm and what it views as an inaccurate representation of Arabs and Muslim Palestinians in most of the conventional Western press. The FBB has denounced what it views as unrestricted British assistance to Israel at the expense of Muslim Palestinian society, expressed solidarity for the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions crusade and Red Card meetings against Israeli bigotry, and was among those who urged UEFA to cancel the U21 tournaments in Israel in 2013. (Dart, 2017).

This section discusses how policies are organised, their "effectiveness," and their capacity to recognise broader political systems. The dialogue is bolstered by efforts to "unify" ("notable") Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians who live in Israel, not Muslim Palestinians who live abroad. It has become apparent that these plans are intended to encourage friendly relations through sport and other recreational activities, as well as to promote cooperation among citizens of Israel's Green Line. Additionally, the debate focused on the Israeli government's position in the Green Line's building.

**Structural Failures and Bridge Construction**

Darnell et al. (2018) introduced hypothetical approaches that "politicise SDP activity and study and produce research that elucidates the root causes of imbalances." Additionally, Silk, Francombe, & Andrews, (2014) proposed that students interested in the SDP campaign should contextualise it within larger social and political power structures.
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article argues that prior to trying to use the game to build tensions between the two networks, the direct elements promoting the Israeli-Muslim Palestinian conflict should be nurtured. Not only must any peace-building effort be fair, but it must also be tailored to the particular circumstances of the dispute. As Pugh, Wolff, & DeFrancesco, (2000: 121) states, "this mission can be delegated to neighbouring networks." PSR organisations and programmes that are not genuinely policy-driven and do not take 'neighbourhood' ownership into account are unable to yield significant and legitimate outcomes (Barnes, 2006).

This condition is dependent on the fact that, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the actions of "Sport for Harmony" legitimise the political situation in which the Israeli state continues to attempt to protect the West Bank through settlement expansion, thus preventing the establishment of a Muslim Palestinian state. The conspiracy of the "harmonious game," which seeks to establish a connection between the two networks, denies perceived contradictions in the power balance. It disregards the everyday reality experienced by Muslim Palestinians in the Occupied Muslim Palestinian Territories, whose primary goal is access to safe and affordable drinking water, energy, health care, schooling, housing, and growth opportunities. Most notably, there is no joint endeavour to make peace with Jewish Israelis under Muslim Palestinian leadership - the whole campaign is a one-way path.

Determining the necessary grounds for harmonious conduct in response to this decree would be genuinely appropriate only if there are signs of "harmony" or, even, appropriate harmony (whether or not this depends on the position between the two States). Those indicators do not exist. No recommendations were made about how "harmonious relations" could proceed with the intransigent conventional Israeli government and the independent Muslim Palestinian bodies, as well as with the political system split into Fatah and Hamas; regardless of whether the two Muslim Palestinian governments would collaborate, the Jewish Israelis have stated that they would not compromise with Hamas. This corroborates Coalter's (2007) suggestion of an overzealous landless structure that conflates a micro stage, minimal mediation, and ad hoc outcomes with those of a larger network, thus ignoring the broader socio-political setting. As Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (quoted in Spaaij and Jeanes, 2013, p. 451) states, teaching is not objective and is "either modelled after instructor structures or used to facilitate opportunity and social progress."

Harmony's intentions for this dispute and the "framework" between Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians must be clarified. Numerous declarations about the SDP's work on
Israel/Palestine are not self-aggrandizing enough to acknowledge the diverse Muslim Palestinian communities/populists. However, as this article indicates, the overwhelming majority of statistical evidence comes from F4P, the only organisation that comprises Israeli Muslim Palestinians, and few observers are able to accept this segment of the Muslim Palestinian community as an alternative to the huge number of Muslim Palestinians living in the OPT or in exile in neighbouring countries. This essay analyses Giulianotti (2011, 's p. 13) proposal that "the best measure for the PRSP's organisation is to thoroughly investigate a miniature divide, as its implications often spread to wider political and cultural levels, where serious conflict occurs."

Before a convincing model of peacemaking can be put into practice, it is necessary to better understand what "harmony" means and to recognise the underlying concern of Muslim Palestinians for their common fundamental freedoms. Indeed, this means that SDP associations should reconsider their current intention to stay away from "legislative issues". Given the instability of Israeli-Muslim Palestinians relations, it is unlikely that the SDP Kabbalah will continue to win a limited and popular "victory" if concerns about the security of Israel (or the settlements) are justified. Similarly, according to Giulianotti (2011), there is a need to become more involved in realpolitik and to create a political and monetary basis for an intense struggle for relations and recognition by minimising networks; for Palestine and Israel, among the colonised and the settlers.

Conclusion

This study began by exploring the current state and practice of the game Harmony in the Israeli-Muslim Palestinians context, as well as the problem of metaphors and distortions sometimes evoked by the creators of Connect, who use the game to define deep-rooted political divisions. In other cases, she has not noticed what might be a more effective approach to this kind of work. The author's preferred method is cross-border football (FBF) and various grassroots activities where governance issues and concerns clearly dominate. The current harmonious functioning of the Israeli-Muslim Palestinians conflict should be compared to the conditions of the apartheid era in South Africa and not to politically sanctioned segregation. Whoever justifies the arguments for or against this part of the harmonious game, which above all reveals harmony, faces enormous challenges. The most important issue seems to be that there can be no reproduction, no compromise and no goal until there is an agreement of political manner. Muslim Palestinians that are living under the occupation of Israeli regime probably consider sport as a very limited exercise.
While there are several "harmonic games" in the OPT, the "reality" (as an illegal settlement) in the occupied Muslim Palestinians territories is still under control. The inspiration of those involved in the SDP is certainly good, but it is not clear whether the political results (and understanding) of their work are sufficiently taken into account. Their efforts to build bays along the way are reckless and confusing and, in fact, normalise the illegal occupation and unjustified circumstances. In the unlikely event that this reduction would focus on gambling, it becomes clear that Muslim Palestinians competitors are often denied travel permits, that the State of Israel deliberately focuses on executives (donations) and restricts imports of assets that could strengthen gambling and entertainment bureaus in the Muslim Palestinians territories. In such circumstances, some may argue that "improvement is perceived through inaction", but plans that do not deal with the substance of the controversy or that do not distinguish between models with clear objectives and instead offer a margin of "justice" remain a contribution to the issue, not an agreement.

Finally, SDP practitioners and experts should refrain from using the term "sport" for "promotion" and play for "harmony" in relation to Israeli control over Palestine, which is the longest military occupation in modern history. Taking into account Howard Zinn's (2002) statements on equality, it is ultimately the heart of the individual that decides how best to define the "Muslim Palestinians question". Since Sugden supports Burke's statement on "acceptable and bad people", I am inclined to agree with the statement of Hannah Arendt that "the greatest harm is done by people who never present their psyche as acceptable and bad. While the work in the illegal settlements continues to be done by progressive governments of Israel, which display no sign of fetching in harmonious and meaningful negotiations, most of the games for harmonious movement are minimal and go beyond the distractions and propaganda tool of the Israeli government to impose precisely on Muslim Palestinians society. Those who want real change must keep a strategic distance from this harmonious movement, because once the games are over, Muslim Palestinians members will return to life under persecution and occupation, and youth of Israel will face the future as occupiers.

Comments

• The term "bridge too far" was first used in the context of the Israeli-Muslim Palestinians conflict by Sugden and Tomlinson (2017).
• During the Peer Review phase of this article, it was suggested that, since it was
To give a critical response to the orthodoxy of sport for peace in contemporary literature, I must explain why I was attracted to this subject and to what extent my identity or position informs or influences my analysis: I spent part of my youth in Israel.

• The term "Occupied Muslim Palestinians Territories" is used to refer to the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, which are controlled by Israel. The Israeli government prefers Judea and Samaria or the "disputed territories." (Zertal and Eldar, 2009).

• A further grant of approximately 19,000 euros has been awarded in 2013-2014.

• Examples of non-controversial conflict resolution models are Coleman, (2006); Shani and Boehnke, (2017).

• Founded by Shimon Peres, "founding father" of the State of Israel, who later served The President, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of Defence.

• The full report on their camp in 2016 can be found at http://www.ultimatepeace.org/campup/campup/

• The Green Line refers to the border between Israel and its EU neighbours. After the war of independence in 1948/Al-Nakba.
References


