



Gradual Shifts in India's Nuclear Doctrine: Theoretical Analysis of Contributing Elements

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Abstract:

This article serves few purposes, main argument of this contribution is to describe theoretically by analyzing the contributing elements in doctrinal shifts. Unpacks the aspects those are the main matter of concern, by situating the literature that specifically deals with prevailing issues and by outlining the main approaches that how all these factors particularly playing utmost important role in worsening environment and in boosting prevailing challenges. The bellicose history, the background of mistrust and enmity that has been the variant factor even at present time, moreover after the showdown of nukes in 1998, intentions along by keenly analyzing the Kautliya thoughts by determining the foundation of realism decades ago. Today, after decades, countries predominantly India are lesser concerned about peace initiatives and for solving long lasting issues that are lagging behind. Finally, it throws light on the future under such circumstances as these states relations affecting the regional security. Likewise, in viewing of contemporary ground realities it will have chances to compel India-Pakistan to expand more nuclear arsenals, technological advancements for deterrent purposes which are blurred but maybe the reality is far behind from it, unresolved underlining conflicts might be take two states towards war crisis in future.

Keywords: Nuclear Weapons, India, Pakistan, Threat perceptions, Nuclear Doctrine.



Introduction

In order to understand through the lens of IR theories, many scholars presented their view points about it that conventional and nuclear weapons both have changed the overall concept of warfare. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz also agree on same point that these nuclear arms hold destructive capacity and are unique in nature. It is a big thing to discuss from learning to leverage that how does it influences states behavior after holding nukes and which might change over time. Although acquisition of nuclear weapons might be different in understanding its purpose either for to fulfill the desire of status quo particularly for security challenge or it might be related to some aims regarding enduring rivalry or dispute (Horowitz, 2009).

The sustainability of South Asian region and strategic stability has always been an important matter of concern for United States National Security Council along with it regional nuclear learning project was conceived to examine its nuclear based experiences after its tests the year 1998. In the context of this region it is not easy to discuss the road of learning by including some parameters that who learns, what does really matters and what is it; learning in general meant about the result of observation and interprets those experiences. Nuclear learning simply inserts complexities of nuclear weapons into the discussion, before delving in this region nuclear experiences it is of utmost importance to discuss some conceptual level insights in which new nuclear weapon states comes with no experiences and that lack of experience tends them to complicate towards learning process and that further provides opportunities at various levels during learning process. (Khan, Jacobs, and Burke, June 2014)

Indo-Pak relations are determined by various factors includes perpetual conflicts, the history of distrust along with it the ideological differences. Since the time of inception the positive engagements of both states has still been missing and have aggravated hostility. Full scale three wars resultantly leading both states towards the nuclearization of this region, in sum the relations in 21st century by and large, remain under the past shadow. Nuclear deterrence has minimized possibilities of full scale war



but couldn't prevent them from indulging into low intensity crisis which gradually takes to high scale crisis. However, history of relations unresolved clashes illustrates about the cause of deterioration, worthwhile progress is still indivisible despite of a number of Track-II initiatives.(Waqar-un-Nisa, 2017) The study will discuss about the main root cause of threats and such realities as the contributing factors from past under the realm of realism and theory of deterrence. The gradual arms modernizations of India's deterrent forces are contemporary prospects of interest within their nuclear policy shift need to be closely examined as for the reason of its implications for neighboring state of Pakistan.

Threat Based Nuclearization

Nuclear proliferation in South Asia is in part consequence of security dilemma prevailing in this sub-continent mainly. A security dilemma arises when a state increases its security mechanism for its own safety purposes and that in return threatens and impacts on the other state security as well. In India's perspective threat from China is of utmost importance therefore India's weapon development program geared so that to counter Beijing in response with secure deterrent. In return all this also affects Indo-Pakistan equation either the main focus is on China for gaining more nuclear arsenal but naturally it enhanced its capability with neighboring state of Pakistan as well. Threat perceptions in general based on long-standing disputes which also shape nuclear doctrines and other proliferation dynamics as well, as both states have been bitter rivals since partition of sub-continent in 1947 that led to the creation state of Pakistan, when it came into being as an independent state on world geography. (Sharad Joshi, 2007)

In accordance to India, it has two rivals in this region Pakistan and China, and has differentiated orientation towards both in accordance with their powers and problems posed by each these two states. India by keeping lessons from KARGIL WAR and Operation Parakram changed its nuclear policy which relies from counter offensiveness for deterrence to pro-active strategies, specifically used term; "cold start doctrine" with reference to Pakistan, where-as towards China, India's high investing on



building up of conventional capabilities, moving its posture from *defensive* defense to *active* defense. (Nuclearisation of India: Following the Rat Race, 95-135)

India's unclear motive behind possession of nuclear weapons but it was alleged to have it since its nuclear test in May 1974 and with-in short span of time by conducting its another test in 1998 demonstrated the world about having de facto nuclear power. At first glance India's motive to acquire nuclear weapons seems unclear before it but after nuclear testing by China in 1964 and acquisition of same capability by Pakistan, both factors pushed India for developing of nuclear weapons. Major threat India got from his big rival state China, which boosted him to conduct underground nuclear test for its own security but various domestic politics and technical constraints at same time appeared and affected the decision to conduct nuclear tests.

India victory in the war of 1971 with Pakistan, but its actions were constrained by China, US and USSR the three super nuclear powers and parliamentary debate started, on which the Indian Prime Minister Gandhi gave the reason to go-ahead for boosting nuclear weapons so that to gain domestic popularity. On the other hand after nuclear explosion of 1974 in response to which India received criticism for Pokhran-1 which they characterized as "peaceful nuclear explosion". India just retained it as they have now owned this power and demonstrated it not, another intention to make more depicted that will depend on future which they called it as "option policy". Whole scenario got changed after the border clash with China in 1962 which pushed India to think about. (Marie and Shinichi, The Nuclear Policy of India and Pakistan, page 62)

Threat Perceptions; India's Perspective

Richardson's arms race provides insights to understand about why contemporary nations purchasing staggeringly rapid paces and his seminal arms race model provides treasure of best insight to prevailing problems. World armament policies offers a deep understanding about the interface



between domestic and foreign policy at one hand while the other about political and economic choices. Study of arms policies thus provides a crucial piece in several matters to solve puzzles in the discipline. Three major types of influences are salient in military expenditures first; 'self-propagation' means about tendency of military expenditures to accelerate over time. Secondly about perceived threats and its potentialities in which external threats impinge in resource allocation question mainly which include what type of weapons are necessary and how many are required for security purposes. And the third about purchasing intensity that how fast they should be purchased, this relates with domestic political economy stemming directly from two things about *finance* that how they pay for military establishment and *costs* of equipment's and personnel.

Richardson's framework captures "threat" in two ways; the well-known and ignored "grievances" and other deals with the reaction of one nation to military expenditures of the opponent which shows threat is however operationalized. Though it is greatest at level when nation-states perceive more about spending on defense, more than it is in real. (Ward and Mahajan, 1984) Early 1990's was the period of dilemma for India for some reasons, it got threatened mainly by US preponderance and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) capacity by using that power in Third World countries after the ideological collapse of Soviet Union even. Apart from it, another element which increased difficulties for India was from Russia because of its military and diplomatic support.

Moreover, United States of America pressurized India for signing of Non- Proliferation of Treaty (NPT) which also compelled Indian government to think upon. India's major threat to its security conceives from its neighbor states due to their continuous proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles and nuclear collaboration between China and Pakistan. Concept of nuclear deterrence as a factor of military and political restraint had come under study after war of KARGIL. (Budania, 2003) India faced threats to them, in variety of different domains including conventional, sub-conventional (insurgency and terrorism) as well as in nuclear. With its land frontiers it faces dispute boundaries and competing



territorial claims by both states China and Pakistan, with China on unmarked boundary contentious for decades. Whereas with twin state of Pakistan on de facto boundary the Line of Control (LOC).

India felt threatened by both states in conventional sphere, poses military threats in continental frontiers along with its maritime domain as well, as strategic nexus is militarily challenging for New Delhi, collusion between China-Pak the interoperability between their militaries which includes doctrines, force structures and further operational planning's among them. (Pant and Bommakanti, 2019) In terms of New Delhi security matters, threat perceptions by means of Kashmir geo-strategic importance means that abandonment of Kashmir would mean reducing of external line of defense which is close to their capital by giving chance to enemies through which rival states could be able easily to attack by direct strikes. (Misra 2001)

Both states facing serious threats in various forms, likewise poverty, mismanaged socio-economic, political institutions and the lack of consciousness at political level. Moreover, threatened by both externally-internally, their security perceptions are matter of serious concern because of historical rivalries and contradictions at three levels: socio, political and at economic. To identify security noticing of threats is important, first; as security in general terms could be defined as "freedom from danger, fear or attack". Security conceptualization and structural notions are dissimilar regardless of any threat. One may take security as defensive while other could interpret it as the potentially threatening. Alexander Went political scientist, according to him threat notions may lead people to behave differently in particular situation or to an object. It may measure the "degree of escalation" for one state whereas for other it takes as "reckless" behavior or might be possible that it all may lead them towards an "all-out war". (Khan, 2020)



India's Strategic Culture: Difference of Interpretation

Subject of strategic culture deeply matters, as for the reason it raises questions about its roots of, influence upon including its strategic behavior. The basic strategic thought propounded by Kautliya (also known as Vishnugupta) in ancient times (300-400 BCE) but before him proposed thought by Manu Samriti and still Hindu laws administered by Indian courts based on Manu principles which they are following. The tradition of India's strategic culture doesn't begin with Kautliya though oldest civilization as like Vedic one of oldest civilization. Pakistan's post-independence and those lessons taken from history India started following secularism as internal policy and anti-racialism as external policy, moreover India's political strategy also based on democratic ideology which is the concrete strategic element. (Wan, 2016, November 21)

Threat intensity from past few years has been added under Bhartia Janta Party (BJP) rule which is allied with Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) militant Hindu organization, both promoting specifically Hindu culture values by using Hindutva concept. This toxic combination of Indian hegemonic ambitions fully based on Kautilya teachings and bringing an expansionistic character to the prevailing culture and that is posing a serious threat for Pakistan. (Hussain, 2019, January 28) Realpolitikers by contrast are pragmatic and dismiss both Nehruvian and Hindu nationalists' obsessions with the status distractions which shows difference, that they want India as "normal" power and wielding military power same like other states acquires.

Regarding modern India Buultjens discusses five points; one is about its diversity continuously growing, then the depth of culture its newness of nation according to present form mixture of consciousness about past and of present time producing abrasive reaction. Thirdly, land of minorities where Hindus population are 80 per and rest of includes others, fourthly about the future depends upon interaction between two worlds that if urban and rural India will not meet together the results might go against them while making bond of both can make India strengthened



and strong. Lastly, concluded that India's poverty, spirituality and its mix modernization coexist here by mentioning signal about prospect provides improvement. (Ralph Buultjens, 2020)

British geopolitical theorist Colin Gray, states about structural layers and cultural strategy that no one and none institution can operate beyond culture. Furthermore, added about the nature and all functions that are not changing and are in a constant form hence in the content of culture. India is inclined to reconsider its strategies both in terms of military and strategic. National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon, also confers some stress on the point about the need now to develop "new" vocabulary and concepts which could be able to replace old 19th century issues. Despite of opportunities provided by growth in India but main central line of strategic cultures will remain unchanged though it is indigenous construct over a millennium and are changing by last two centuries and own experiences are the reason to get modified (Bajpai, 2002).

Evolution of Nuclear Doctrine: Historical Outlook

India's concerns were raised following its territorial conflict with China in October 1962 and the stakes rose when China holds the nuclear power in 1964, to which many observers thought it that India after seeking power would definitely respond to it. War of 1965 further angered India and that was the outspoken support while they were clashing with Pakistan and that disappointment according to them which they showed to Western world so that to take step for this insecurity needs. (Battle, 2017) History between both states is almost inextricably linked, fought a series of wars since gaining independence before the time of freedom from Great Britain over Kashmir region on which India and Pakistan laid their claims on it.

History of wars started right after the partition of subcontinent from August 1947. From October 1947 to January 1949 both states began war on the invasion of Kashmir in result cease fire line established on 1st January 1949 and to which now called it as Line of Control (LOC). The second war of 1965 a series of clashes broke out in august and ended in



1966, third war broke out in 1977 when Pakistan divided into two parts East and The West and after which Bangladesh came into being. In May 1974, India tested its first nuclear weapon, code name as *Operation Smiling Budha* which took place at the place Pokhran Range, closely linked to border of Pakistan (Abby Pokraka, 2019); in return that test pushed Pakistan into nuclear arena after India's gaining nuclear power which seems like India's intentions for power consolidation in the region.

Kargil war of 1999, historians may record it as the actual cause of nuclear weapons because notion of nuclear shield by both states led them to a breath taking adventurism in Kashmir. On 13th December 2001, when Islamic militants attacked an Indian parliament in response to which Prime Minister Vajpayee exhorted troops in Kashmir and alarmed the situation about to take decisive victory, though cleared about intentions of India that they are preparing for "limited war" against Islamic militants based in Pakistan administered Kashmir. By taking advantage of global climate, India ruling party of BJP started efforts to sought to echo the U.S, by raising slogan of "war on terror" to wage a military campaign against it by gaining global support. (Pervez Hoodbhoy and Zia Mian, 2002)

According to Indian security establishment, India had major threats from regional states to contend with them, felt isolated and unsure of its place on global forum. Throughout the years 1964 to 1965 Homi Bhabha, military officials and leading nuclear scientists raised the point of weaponisation to be kept on the table. All arguments based on perceived threats not only this but failure of India's guarantee to its security policy but the thing to ponder was that all threats were not based on rationale strategic thinking. India's most important threat to its national security during the time of 80s and 90s was from the rise of freedom movements all over state. Some of them were and are still indigenous but some of them also aided by Pakistan (for India) but Policy makers of India adopted strategies to quell Pakistan rather than against domestic insurgencies (Qureshi, 2017).



In terms of changings in Indian official policy terms used mainly “First use” or “First Strike” which was covered by saying it that these official often used such terms interchangeably and have not indicating any hint. Highlights and signaling of such policies in nuclear doctrine are very important and needs clarification so that not confuse others and even in the sense that could destabilize regional situation. (Rishi, 2019) Though India has faced internal security challenges from 1950s and serious threat among all others includes “Maoist” and “Naxalite” insurgency that affected country but they were not considered as serious threats. Still movement continues but the internal rebellions have never been given serious attention to them.

India’s response to such problems likely to continue all existing policies which includes a warranted military pressure so that to reduce rebellious activities by restoring normalcy and adoption of strategy towards it that military is not the solution for domestic issues. Whereas in return to Pakistan policies are different after the terrorist attack on India’s parliament, state raised serious innovation as the consequence of military mobilizations which military termed it as “cold start” doctrine that suggests a rapid response to such terrorist acts. Despite of all wars with Pakistan the possibility of war with him cannot be ruled out because of revisionist claim over Kashmir by Pakistan. India doesn’t produce any official statement about its nuclear doctrine just a brief statement they made in 2003 but those appears do not properly coherent in terms of to form any suitable strategy. (Einhorn, R., & Sidhu, 2017)

Nuclear arsenals of both states pose a great threat considering volatility of their relationship because over the past couple of months conflict in Kashmir region has worsened and the conflict erupted in horrific violence and it might could lead them into situation of hotbed nuclear attacks by using their powers. (Ahmed, 2010) Tensions rose due to such acts and steps taken by both sides the tit for tat strategy and shot down of each other jet fighters, continuous issues in this mountainous region of Kashmir are not new but from the time of British colonial rule, now situations changed in accordance to cognitive dissonance which



Prime Minister stated through statement that a befitting reply will be given to them those who are responsible and patrons of those perpetrators. (Choudhury, 2019, March 1).

For two reasons, Modi cannot continue to stick with it and they are, rising of domestic pressures (public demand for adopting harsh measures towards Pakistan and surging pressures from the ruling party) and secondly includes the Pakistan's isolation at regional and global level which compels India to play more proactive role in regional affairs by adopting some aggressive measure through diplomacy by taking advantage of such an environment. (Al Jazeera Center for Studies. (2016, November 17).

Revision of India's Nuclear Doctrine; Concept and Relation

Indian Nuclear Doctrine, when India perceived its all-azimuth threat from China-Pakistan, further their Defense Minister George Fernandes added into that this compelled them to test nuclear devices. While in making India draft doctrine, BJP government did their best effort to shift India's nuclear weapon status from ambiguous to overt and asked a group of advisors in order to make such recommendations in it. NSAB was formed which gained momentum few months later because of "first ever" strategic defense review but not as an official nuclear doctrine. (Chari, 2000) After the discussions and approved by full Board finally NSAB accepted the sub-group report and on 17 August 1999 census released the document.

India released Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) in August 1999 which was prepared by semi-official National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) which was formed in mid-December 1998 quickly disowned by government of India even though many details were followed by previous government about DND which included all other authoritative statements by Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) in the Parliament regarding credible minimum deterrence and No-First Use (NFU). In 2003 January, Indian government released official doctrine which was itself based on



DND along with some changings and differences in it, which contains India's retaliation towards attacks by using its chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and , additional that any respond to nuclear attack would be massive. (Rajagopalan, 2016)

In 2003 January, India's official nuclear policy released after updating DND of 1999 which contain several inconsistencies in it. Statements were made by few officials about NFU while other argued for nuclear first strike mainly against Pakistan which made it difficult to interpret the content. Not only has this but indicated the effect on states credibility to their own posture of deterrence. India started its nuclear pursuit from 1950s when they had no existential threat to its security just they wanted to acquire potential to building up weapons. Involvement of political elites also was an element, in 1974 test which was also guided by domestic political considerations to help PM Indira Gandhi in achieving level of trustworthiness at domestic front. After declaring India as nuclear power at global platform and then after making defensible commitments regarding NFU policy and minimum deterrence in 1999 draft, subsequently in 2003 doctrine as well thus the states reflected priorities about to gain nukes as matter of *prestige* rather than for just *deterrence* from any outside threats. Though "prestige" seems as overriding factor on the other hand "domestic politics and security" may also contributed a lot in changings but they were not as such primary drivers (Sultan 2018).

Existing nuclear doctrine policy has been argued by critics to be a normative policy that it may fails in serving state national interests. India conventionally did not feel inferior from China if not superior to him but have capabilities to deter as gained military strength's for covering gap. Utility of NFU raises question which is of utmost importance and need to be addressed, similarly strategy of massive retaliation also received criticism as they argued that not to be the credible deterrent posture specifically against back drop of new technology of TNW's (Tactical Nuclear Weapons) introduced by Pakistan. (Arka Biswas, p-9)



Defense Minister Rajnath mentioned about moving posture in his speech that India strictly adhered to it but policy of NFU in nuclear weapons is not *sacrosanct* and Pokhran is the area which witnessed Atal Bihari Vajpeee firm resolve to make our state as nuclear power. In addition to it, regardless of their commitment to NFU it but what else will happen in time to come depends upon circumstances, though adhered to it yet. India's nuclear doctrine was purely being retaliatory in nature and they would definitely avail the option nuclear if in case attacked by adversary which would be massive. In 2016, Manohar further added that India cannot "bind itself" to existing old policy of no first use only for its eternity. (Joshi, Harsh V.Pant and Jogesh, 2019)

India who believed on its warhead and has been producing for so long time since 1963 its (Pu) plutonium with two of the research reactors Dhruva and CIRUS, adding into more its intermediate range ballistic missile tests proved it to be developed country which they started from the 1994, even before it in 1988 the development of Prithvi until 2004. India enrichment of uranium under the code name "Rare Materials Project" which they started to increase nuclear stockpiles for new gas centrifuge facility, not yet finished. For peaceful purposes started therefore, and by mentioning such decisions to keep them in private and ambiguities in it regarding commitment of NFU mentions about the implementations, that would maybe in political hands rather than military. (Ali Murat Gürtuna, 2020)

According to economic development definition: "*Progress in any economy, or the qualitative measure of this, economic development usually refers to the adoption of new technologies, transition from agriculture based economy and general improvement in living standards*" McCarty, (n.d). Ironically, discussion of economic matters and environmental consequences all lead to further analysis of energy policy, not only the host of economic issues related to India but other concerns also exists. India today became the exclusive member of nuclear club who got attention by attracting international community in 1960s by rejecting opportunity of signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and



subsequently conducted its test later in 1970s the “peaceful” one. Not only has the nation demonstrated its strength in nuclear realm but also in overall terms of military might, shows moving posture from regional force to global power.

Economic opportunity not only based on the obstacle of gender issues but also highlights nation's poverty, another factor which needs political concerns on health care and on population growth, level contributing into poverty and inadequate facilities to meet the demands McCarty, n.d. During the time of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh government took various measures for the expansion of country nuclear energy's program. Some communities got affected by Indira's growing nuclear power plant and activist like “Talwar” (Monamie Bhadra, 2012) were prominent in it. Some places were included, Haripur where resistance to such energy turned violent, because these affected communities comprised of common people who were largely concerned with democratic issues, citizenship and about government responsibilities.

Criticism on existing order tends to be focusing on the lack of progress towards disarmament where those states who had acquired nukes are interested to achieve more. Many states also criticized growing restraints in the matter of accessing peaceful technology that it will impede in their economic development what they believe. (Dalton, Kassenova, & Williams, 2016) Indian nationalist leaders speculated about acquiring of nuclear technology even before the period of its inception, their first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru justified it by saying that *every country will have to devise and use such devices for their protection and that I've no doubts in it that India will conduct its scientific searches on it and will use this atomic energy for constructive purposes as well hope so for it. But if our state gets threatened, India will definitely defend itself by all means at his disposal* (Pillalamarri, 2019). India is less reliant on threat issues from Pakistan mainly, but more focusing on the improvement of its military capabilities which includes naval and Himalayan land based capabilities. In addition to clear, India's remain focusing on economic development rather who doesn't feel existentially threatened (Pillalamarri, 2019).



Nuclear Deterrence VS Realism: Theory and Practice

There is a deep chasm which divides worldwide nuclear experts, the one group of nuclear deterrence strategists perceives goal of nuclear disarmament to be utopian at best and at the same time dangerous at worst as well. On the other hand group of nuclear abolitionists argue about the existence of such arms as a threat to survival of human civilization. To understand the concept clearly Kenneth Waltz constructs two main components about power. First one about not only 'effects' one is able to achieve but rather in terms of whether or not about 'affects' other states but in the sense in which other states affect that state. While the second component includes about the means-ends clear distinction between two things power and its resources means about the change in ontological status of power, in which one transforms it from experience to something more akin to an object which other does not have or may be one have. Affect basically is the impact of one has on another whereas effect is response to it.

Deterrence is not about controlling what the adversary state does but it is about the affecting phenomenon in which one affects decision-making calculus due to this reason it is pretty difficult to measure about deterrence effectiveness. A group of nuclear realists includes Gunther Andres, Luis Mumford, John Herz and Bertrand Russell shared common rejection about 'Pentagonal Platitudes' of nuclear strategist as mentioned by Van Munster and Sylvest in their article about rhetorical and a conceptual move by 'nuclear realists', in which they resisted about cultural and political engagements which resulted from instrumentalists views about technology those expressed under theory of deterrence, instead of mentioning about connection between horror and deadly combo of science, technology and rationality in the Holocaust and Hiroshima. Furthermore, they argued about advancement in such capabilities which altered human condition and coming quickly on the conclusion also states that it would also need a political reorganization at global scale. (Harrington, 2016)



Adding more, branch of classical realism further divided into many and leading proponents of political realism which includes Hans Morgenthau, Herz and Henry Kissinger, as political realism evolved by Thucydides which based on the premises firstly about state actors and then about power which is an end in itself. Main themes of this branch are states quest to pursue their national interests, power maximization and anarchy. Anarchy breeds insecurity and further compels them to rely on self-help system along with it also presents the other side of robust economy in which it is necessary to raise stature and sustain military modernization because powerful economy helps states to acquire hegemony or in acquiring great power status at world platform. According to Morgenthau it is human nature which leads him towards conflicts because inheritably power hungry statesman desires to take control over resources, by giving support to his argument he mentioned the reason for why World War II broke out in Scientific Man versus power politics in which he laid the foundations of realism. (Ahmed, 2017)

In the context of deterrence, it was also the thing to note that after cold war it had even changed new complex environment of deterrence, by making the success of deterrence difficult. New situations characterized by those asymmetries and combination of all indirect strategies, and the element of nationalism made deterrence harder even to achieve. However important for understanding individual cases in which deterrence fails and that success leads to misleading conclusions, hence to understand deterrence needs detailed a long term perspective because after understanding phenomenon it will help in solving two problems, security dilemmas and the other in bringing stability. Deterrence must be contextualized from the aspect of the nature of the long term rivalry where those cases rooted, and maybe can only be understood through learning from past failures. Credibility matter is much greater and complicated as compared to conventional weapons. The military calculations of balance of power and assessment of such military effectiveness in modern nuclearized world is also very difficult task. (Sanjeev Kumar, 2014)

Deterrence and Realism theory both are closely related to each



other in the paradigm of International relations theory. In the context of India nuclear behavior towards Pakistan do not confirm about expectations in terms of both theories. India first nuclear test in 1974 which came after ten years when China tested did not resulted in further advancement as one had expected threat from nuclear deterrent China and also had border skirmishes and war too. On other side, by following immediate nuclear threat from Pakistan mainly on four occasions (Kargil May-July 1999, early in 1987 the Brasstacks Crisis, May 1990 Crisis and the border mobilization in 2000) despite of them India adopted slow and steady process in rapid progress of arms race.

Though hard again to explain about recessed deterrent approach and the non-weaponized along with it adoption and development of further compelling one capability in nuclear arms perspective, hard to explain logic behind such confusion in theoretical paradigm. (Sridharan, 2005, p.103-124) As Morgenthau refers, “interest defined as power” and in global sphere state leaders generally will, to the feasible extent, maximizes power in response to perceived threats or the anticipated one. Thus role of political leaders matters which they must place national survival and power increasing tools as their top priority goals to the end which includes the international norms and legal codes. (Keith B Payne) In the context of realists by giving example of Woodrow Wilson views about realistic approaches that realists put faith too much on leaders that they will behave rationally in time of crisis. Far from being realists further explains about logics and their enthusiasm for technology in which exaggerates significance of nuclear weapons in global affairs and imbued it by giving under the name of nuclear deterrence.

Brodie mentioned, main purpose of military establishment now has been to win wars but now victory over enemy or defeating him changed the concept of deterrence. Specifically, theory of deterrence is now grounded on political realism as propounded by Brodie, which enriches the thought process and comprehends the potential character of such weapons. By taking into account Waltz views’ regarding anarchic environment classical realists argues that states seek to maximize power



which further encourages them to revisionist policies and compels to adopt more offensive. Realists help in understanding the slogan raised by Nehru "Greater India" which amalgamates the initial stages philosophies of cumulative Gandhi and Nehru which reckons concept of deterrence. Following such philosophy state of India emphasized on normative posture in the early stages and mentioned it in draft doctrine. Another vision behind such notion was to maximize political influence by adopting soft approach so that to be able to show its legacy which they sought to preserve their image at global level by demonstrating such normative approach. (Dr Rizwana Abbasi, 2019)

Conclusion

From learning to leverage, desires for status quo and the calculations of costs-benefits has now been changing, particularly in the context of two nuclear weapon states of this region, where the parameters of nuclear learning are quite different (who learns, what does really matters and what is it). Security dilemma which is the main component and nuclear proliferation is its consequence due to which three main states in a triangular form are perceiving threats from one another, India mainly. In shaping of nuclear doctrine there is much contribution of historical perspectives in the context of Indo-Pak. Global security concerns changed a lot and even challenged after cold war era that had changed the threat perceptions.

In South Asian region, the political elites have much contribution and had done a lot in increasing conflicts. Despite of worst internal dynamics of both states, still they have threat perceptions which are deeply rooted in deterrence theory by time which is changing its meaning. Not enough, roots belong to strategic culture as propounded by Kautilya and the toxic combination of such hegemonic ambitions of BJP along with RSS now aligned with Kautilya's thought in prevailing culture. Unresolved conflicts erupted a lot in horrific violence as both states now have holding nukes and that could lead them to hotbed situation by using their powers. Acquiring of nuclear weapons states like India who shows



interest in achieving more are now creating trouble in worsening the environment and depicting threats for neighbor state of Pakistan. Nations though trying to adopt best practices in safeguarding their national interests, India's continuity in its progress towards nuclear domain since the time of its becoming nuclear power, focused critique is necessary to ensure about New Delhi's posture's remain relevant and efficient in protecting their sovereignty by all means. Leader's understandings of technology and of its implications for deterrence and warfare are decisive inputs into the equation of decisions either to go for war or for peace. Thus, Theory of deterrence in its true means changed and now grounded on realism in current century.

Instead of devoting their resources on economic development now both states are heading towards competition in terms of modernizing their states military, in a true sense measures taken by current Indian government are compelling Pakistan to strengthen its military and to be ready for any sort of action regarding state security. Imagining a conflict environment spectrum ranging from low belligerency to high will have pose serious consequences for the regional stability but Pakistan in particular. Moreover, India should realize that use of force is not the solution to any problem no doubt will also come up with risks of massive destruction. Change is evident in the course of India's response and in their behaviors or to be prepare for to suffer destruction in the case for any war crisis if happens in the future. The problem has been further exacerbated due to the difference among stakeholders who are moving on different trajectories, due to their perpetual dissonance among its strategic enclave, India need to bridge the growing void between what it is actually declaring and of its nuclear capability, so that to restore the credibility of deterrence posture.

To resolve issues such like on Kashmir, Asian power role or global community is of importance in this regard because both states have had failed in making and if they shows willingness they can't resolve it by their own. Above all, if the brink of military escalation if sustained in the region, and in the near future if the war led between two foes none would



have to be able to bring back peace to this region. For change, progressive steps are necessary in a meanwhile by letting go the past animosities which are the actual root cause for creating hindrance in making good relations between these two states. And for this Pakistan had already proved its best efforts in reduction of tensions, now India should have to show some good gestures for the sake of this region as well as for its own state survivability or else implications would be far away from expectations in terms of if India would still commit to its likewise practices. In view of the seriousness of the current situation efforts need to be made from the beginning without awaiting the resolution of conflicts. Indian policy makers are well aware of the consequences of all these presentable war scenarios and of arms race. Breakthrough in the area of their relations will contribute greatly towards lessening tension as well as conflict in the region. As seen from the historical perspective, both states must realize that a more rational pattern of relationship can only be achieved if both states try hard enough to find solutions to their outstanding disputes and differences. India and Pakistan will have to get rid of their war phobia as they have already been facing similar domestic issues. As another round of hostilities between both states would be the disaster for people of India and Pakistan.



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