



HYBRID WARFARE AND STATE RESILIENCE IN MOLDOVA AFTER THE RUSSIA–UKRAINE WAR: A QUALITATIVE, MULTI- DOMAIN ANALYSIS OF THREAT AND RESPONSE

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Abstract

The full scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 transformed the Republic of Moldova from peripheral post-soviet concern in to a frontline case of contemporary hybrid warfare. Positioned between Romania and Ukraine, hosting an unresolved separatist enclave in Transnistria, and dependent on Russian energy flow well into current decade, Moldova has since 2022 absorbed a sustained campaign of disinformation, electoral interference, illicit financing, and coercive diplomacy while simultaneously constructing an unusual assertive architecture of institutional and societal resilience. This article undertakes a qualitative analysis of Moldova post 2022 trajectory, situating it within the theoretical literature on hybrid warfare and state and societal resilience.

Drawing on a narrative analysis of policy documents, think tank assessments, and open source reporting produce between 2022 and 2026. The article identifies three principal domains of hybrid pressure, namely the informational electoral domain, and traces the corresponding institutional reforms through which Moldova has sought to convert external vulnerability into what this article terms scaffolder resilience.

The analysis argues that Moldova experience refines existing resilience theory by demonstrating that small state resilience under hybrid pressure is rarely self-generated but is instead co-produced with external partners a finding with implications for other post-soviet and frontline states.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, state resilience, societal resilience, Moldova, Russia–Ukraine war, Transnistria, disinformation, European Union accession

Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 Feb 2022 didn't merely shaped the military balance of



Eastern Europe. It also shaped the vulnerabilities of every state sitting on the periphery of the Russian space, among these state is the Republic state of Moldova which occupies rather a singular position. A small landlocked state of roughly 3.5 million people. Moldova shares an eastern border with Ukraine and has since the collapse of the USSR. Lived with an unresolved separatist enclave in Transnistria in which Russian forces maintain a so called peacekeeping that violates the country's own constitutional neutrality clause.¹

The question matters for two reasons. Firstly, Moldova's 2025 parliamentary elections held under the condition of intense external interference, were widely read as a referendum on whether hybrid warfare can in fact be defeated through institutional adaptation rather than hybrid warfare studies and resilience studies, that have developed largely in a parallel and rarely brought by a sustained qualitative case analysis of a single frontline state across a defined post invasion period.²

This article will proceed in six sections; firstly, it will foreshadow the analysis within the domain of theoretical literature on hybrid warfare before turning to the parallel literature on state and societal resilience. It then sets out the qualitative research design underpinning the analysis. Substantively, it evaluates Moldova's historical vulnerability and its post 2022 escalation. Before examining three domains of hybrid pressure in terms of institutional architecture. The discussion draws these threads together into a conceptual contribution, and considers the implementation of the Moldovan case for the post-soviet and frontline states emphasizing on the same pressure contested under the European security order.²

Conceptualizing Hybrid Warfare

The concept of hybrid warfare owes its modern currency to Frank Hoffman whose 2007 monograph for the Potomac institute for policy studies argued that contemporary adversaries no longer confine themselves to discrete categories of conventional or irregular tactics terrorism, and criminal behavior into single, adaptively coordinated campaign directed at achieving political objectives (Hoffman, 2007).³

Hoffman's original concept was developed with non-state actors such as Hezbollah in mind, but the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent pattern of Russian behavior across the Russian space shifted scholars' attentions decisively towards the use of hybrid methods by the revisionist state actors. In this state-centric situation, hybrid wars denote the deliberation, a sense of threshold blending of disinformation, cyber operations, economic coercion, proxy and separatist manipulation, and conventional or collective defensive response.

The European center of excellence for countering Hybrid Threats identifies twelve interlocking domains through which Russia has sought to exploit Moldovan vulnerability, spanning infrastructure, cyberspace, the economy, defense, culture, the societal sphere, public administration, the legal system, intelligence, diplomacy, politics, and the information space, with the weakness of Moldova's public administration identified as the single most consequential vulnerability.

¹ Carolina Bogatiuc, 2025 *Russia Intentions and Actions Toward Moldova*. Transatlantic Leadership Network.

² European Commission. (2025). *Moldova 2025 report / Commission staff working document*. European Union.

³ Hoffman, F. G. 2007. "Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars". Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.



underpinning the other.(European center of excellence, 2024).⁴ This multi domain framing is agnatically valuable precisely because it resists reduction to a single sector; it treats hybrids warfare not as a discrete campaign but as a conditions that seeps into ordinary governance, economic dependency, and everyday information consumption alike.

Research Questions

- Why the post 2022 Russian Ukraine war has affected the Moldova's exposure to hybrid warfare, and how has the Moldovan state developed resilience mechanism to respond to these threat?
- What are the political, economic, informational cyber security vulnerabilities that enables a threat trap effect on Moldova?
- In What extent the Moldova state resilience mechanize and adapt to the changing hybrid threats associated with the Russian & Ukraine war?

Theorizing State and Societal Resilience

If hybrids warfare describes the modes of attack, resilience describes the capacity of the targeted states to absorb, to adapt & to recover from attacks without a fundamental loss of functions or legitimacy. Within NATO adjacent operations societal resilience has increasingly displaced narrower, purely military conceptions of national defense, precisely because hybrid threats are designed to bypass conventional deterrence altogether.

Yanakiev, Dimov, & Bachvarov 2018 argue that no single instruments can counter the diversity and complex of hybrid threats and the effective response instead requires strengthening the resilience of the state, its intuitions and its society understood collectively and the information environment, mirroring precisely the multi domain character of the threat designed to counter.

For the purpose of this article resilience is understood as the process rather than a fixed attribute one that can morph into either a genuinely endogenous societal capacity or amore externally scaffolded arrangement in which international partners supply the instructional financial and technical resource that a small state can't generate unilaterally.

Research Design and Methodology

This article adopts a qualitative single case study design a method well suited to the study of hybrid warfare precisely because the phenomenon resists quantification and justify the argument by qualitative analysis. The case selected Moldova between feb 2022 and 2026 is the best understood as a critical case in which theoretical relation between hybrid pressure and resilience building is expected to be unusually visible precisely because Moldova sits at the maximum point of exposure among European states short of Ukraine itself.

The empirical material consists of a secondary analysis of documents, eBook, articles, blogs and news produced under study, including Moldova own national security strategy documents assessments published by the European center of excellence for countering hybrid threat, journalism

⁴ European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. (2024). *Title of the specific report or handbook. Hybrid CoE.*



covering the 2025 parliamentary election cycle and aftermath.

Two limitations should be stated plainly. Firstly, the analysis relies entirely on secondary and open source material rather than filed interviews with Moldovan officials or citizen a constraint that future research will include a just data spectrum. Secondly because the period under study remains on going at the time of winning rage resilience trajectory reconstructed here should be read as a snapshots of an unfinished process rather than a settled outcome.

Literature Review

Hybrid warfare has become a central preoccupation of the contemporary security scholarships. The terms describe the blending of political military economic informational and cyber instruments in pursuit of strategic ends. Parts of its significance lies in its multi-dimensional character a state seeking the weakens a rival needs not a resort to conventional force at all. it can instead work through existing political fault lines, economics dependencies informational gaps and instructional weakness an approach that complicates attributions and often stays below the threshold that would trigger a conventional military response.⁵

In Russia case hybrid warfare has typically combined disinformation political influence operations cyber activity economic pressure and military or security instrument's. Moldova is an especially instructive case because so many of these instruments interacts with vulnerabilities that already exist within the state.

Moldova's Geopolitical Predicament: Historical Vulnerability and Post-2022 Escalation

Moldova's vulnerability to Russia hybrid pressure did not begin in 2022. Since the collapse of the USSR, Moscow as sustained a separatist enclave in the Transnistria and deployed a range of statecraft and coercive tools to discourage Moldova's drift towards Europe or domestic political liberalization. (Stimson Center, 2026).⁶With Ukraine itself under direct assault Moldova found itself positioned as the next logical target of Russian revolution, a small neutral state whose accession trajectory toward the European Union formalized through candidate's status in 2022 directly threatened the sphere of influence logic underpinning Moscow's wider war aims, goals, structural weakness inherited from the post-soviet compound this exposure. Beyond the persistence of the oligarchic capture within Moldova politics the most serious long term threat s to successful democratic and European transformation has been identified as systemic deficiency within the state apparatus itself, and it is precisely these vulnerabilities of political military economic informational and cyber instruments. (European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2024).⁷

Public administration in particular has been identified as the weakest links, lacking a fully consolidated rule of law framework and remaining, in important respects, subordinated to a fully

⁵Mogildea, M. (2026a). *How can Moldova's resilience to security threats be enhanced in the context of the EU accession process?* Martens Centre for European Studies

⁶ Stohl, R., & Yousif, E. 2026 ,Wine, hybrid warfare, and democratic resilience in Moldova. Stimson Center. <https://www.stimson.org/2026/wine-hybrid-warfare-and-democratic-resilience-in-moldova/>

⁷ European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. (2024). Title of the specific report or handbook. Hybrid CoE.



consolidates rule law framework and remaining important respect subordinates to the political power rather than functioning as an autonomous professionally insulated bureaucracy (European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2024).

Russia's Short- and Medium-Term Goals for Moldova

Russia objective in Moldova are anchored in historical ties, strategic priorities and security calculation that together defines Moscow eastern European posture. In the short run the Kremlin concentrates on preserving political leverage through party financing, media manipulation, disinformation and vote Russian speaking population and reinforced by ties to organized criminal networks and oligarchs particularly during elections all in services of an anti-European agenda.

Moldova also occupies a strategic position within Russia broader black sea calculations where Moscow seeks to reserves both economics and political leverage by retaining over Moldova Russia strengthen its regional expansions more broadly. Moldova is thus not merely a target of Russian influence but a strategic asset that helps Russia push back target of Russian influence and secure its Black sea position. (Bogatiuc, 2025).⁸

Tools and Instruments Russia Uses in Moldova

a. Political Influence

Russia political leverage in Moldova rest chiefly on its alliances with pro-Russian parties and politician who campaign policies aligns with Moscow interest. The party of socialist of republic of Moldova has served as the primary vehicle for influence for this influence, consistently advocating closer ties with Russian and resisting EU integration former president Igor dodon backed by the PSRM ran on self-styled balanced foreign policy between the EU and Russia during the 2020 presidential race a platform that closely tracked Russian interest.

Alongside formal party politics, Russia has also relied on more covert channels A 2024 investigation by RISE Moldova exposed an elaborate financial network Moldovan oligan ILan sor has set up a number of Moscow based companies with backing from Russian states owned entities and that 25 million was funneled through these countries into Moldova during EU accession referendum in an effort to sways publics opinion against an integration. The funds reportedly moved through Russian banks and were distributed via encrypted channels.

In 2023 Moldova was a target of Russian language disinformation campaign designed to turn public opinion against the western institutions framing the EU and NATO as destabilizing force. These narratives found particularly tractions among Russian speaking communities portraying EU as economically extractive and culturally intrusive.

b. Economic Leverage through Energy Dependency

Russian control over Moldova energy supply particularly to links to Transnistria, remain one of the Moscow most potent lever. Moldova has made real progress in cutting its direct reliance on Russian gas yet it still depends on the electricity generated in Transtrain, where Russian gas continues to power the bulk production. Gazprom demonstrated exactly this in the late 2022 cutting gas supplies amid rising political tensions an action that triggered a severe energy drop of 220 percent, and

⁸ Bogatiuc, C. (2025). Russia's intentions and actions toward Moldova. Transatlantic Leadership Network.



contributes 34.5 percent inflation in the early 2023. The resulting economic sprint continued in 2024 when a backdrop happened due to Russian strikes at Ukraine gas transit agreement, where transnistria gas supply and electric outcome of Moldova were made depended via Russian controlled routes. Moldova almost hit an energy crisis in the January 2025 when gas deliveries' transnistria stopped following the expiry of the transit agreement. electricity become a halt in Moldova and more than 51 thousand households and 15 hundred apartments and household went without gas prompting many unsafe survival tactics among the residents.⁹

To guard against future shocks Moldova has accelerated infrastructure investment aimed at energy conservation. chief among these is 400KV overheard transmission line linking Strassen substation to Moldova to the Guitus station in Romania, a 190 Km interconnecting line construction in the late 2025 and become operational by 2028.

In parallel, Moldova has ratified an agreement with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to build a second 400kV line between Balti and Suceava. Together, these projects reflect Moldova's determination to strengthen the security of its energy supply and blunt Russia's ability to exert pressure through critical infrastructure.¹⁰

c. Military Presence and Security Leverage in Transnistria

Russia military footprint in transnistria Moldova breakaways separatist region, remains a crucial source of leverage. Around 500 Russian troops operate there as a legally recognized peacekeeper under the 1992 ceasefire agreement alongside 1500 operational groups of Russian forces, which have no legal basis whatsoever. In march 2023 president Maia sandu condemned what she described a provocation in transnistria accusing Moscow of stocking tensions to undermine Moldovan stability and Moldovan official have since called for international support to address the security risks posed by the unresolved conflict. Transnistrian authorities themselves, who clarified that no such request had been made and that they had instead appealed to the wider international community, underscoring Moscow's broader pattern of manipulating the region while avoiding outright escalation.¹¹

Since 2021 the EU has committed 87 million pounds across three European peace facility assistance packages to help the Moldovan armed forces acquire non-lethal equipment and services for medical support, engineering, logistics, tactical communications, unmanned aerial surveillance, command and control mobility and cyber defense. The Moldovan armed forces number just 6500 personnel, organized under a land forces command and air forces command still largely equipped with soviet era weaponry. EU supports has freed up domestic funds for bilateral procurement form western partners, including a GM 200 radar system form France Piranha IIH armored personnel carriers from Germany alongside drone's ammunition and other equipment form various suppliers. it has also helped and a long period of underinvestment: the defense budget by 68.2 percent in 2023 to around 85 million pound, still only 0.55 percent of GDP, through the new security strategy

⁹ Reuters (2026a) 'Moldova's parliament approves 60-day state of emergency for energy, water supply'.

¹⁰ Reuters (2026b) 'Moldova's parliament approves 60-day state of emergency for energy, water supply'

¹¹ Reuters (2026) 'Moldovan leaders decry Russian move on citizenship for separatist region',



envisages a gradual climb toward 1 percent climb toward 1 percent GDP by the end of the decade.¹²

Building a Strategic Vision for Moldova's National Security

Since Russia full scale invasion of Ukraine Moldova has steadily reworked its strategic approach to national security and defense. In December 2023 the authorities adopted a new National Security strategy that names Russia as the most persistent threat Moldova sovereignty. Warning that Moscow's aim is to force open a land corridor to Moldova and destabilize the country through a range of malign instruments, cyberattacks, disinformation, energy blackmail, illegal financing of political parties and interference in elections. (Moldova, President of the Republic, 2023).¹³

The strategic planning places a heavy toll on Moldova's EU accession and ambition. Its expanding role in EU and operations including the EU & Ukraine solidarity lanes, while calling for closer alignment with the EU common Foreign and security policy and its climate agenda. As part of the accession process, Moldova has committed to the objectives and action plan of the EU strategic compass for stronger security and defense over the coming decade.

Military and hybrid threats from Russia are examined in further depth in the National Defense Strategy for 2024 to 2024 which calls for a defense budget of 1 percent of GDP by 2030 and expanding multilateral partnerships with countries and international organizations to consolidate Moldova defense capacity. The strategy is explicit that the neutrality principle act of article 11 of the constitution does not bar continued cooperation with partner countries and organizations on security defense. In issuing it, the government has committed to advancing security sectors reform and pursuing wider cooperation with western partners across defense, energy, cybersecurity, democratic resilience and counter disinformation.¹⁴

Domains of Hybrid Pressure 2021-24

Hybrid pressures emerge with particular clarity from the post 2022 era. The foremost extension documented is the informational and electoral domain. Moldova's September 2025 elections was corrupted by Moscow via allotting 100 million pounds to operate and distort the election process, suppressing turnout and eroding trust in democratic institutions with the real figure likely higher given the opacity of illicit financing networks and cryptocurrency flow. (Stimson Center, 2025).¹⁵

Moldova also broke from Russian gas dependence in the late December of 2022. until then the country relied on Gazprom for nearly 100 percent gas supply. Moscow weaponized against Chisinau and Gazprom and raised its tariff six folds between October 2021 and November 2022. In the early 2023 backed by 300-million-pound loan from the European Bank for reconstruction and development on the state energy company Energocom built up 300 million cubic storage facilities in

¹² Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies. (2023). Strengthening resilience in Moldova following Russia's invasion of Ukraine (SCEEUS Report No. 12). SCEEUS. <https://sceeus.se/en/publications/strengthening-resilience-in-moldova-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/>

¹³ Moldova, President of the Republic. (2023). National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova.

¹⁴ Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. (2024). National defense strategy for the years 2024–2034. Government of the Republic of Moldova

¹⁵ Stimson Center. (2025). Moldova's 2025 elections: A test case for Russia's hybrid warfare. Stimson Center. <https://www.stimson.org/2025/moldovas-2025-elections-a-test-case-for-russias-hybrid-warfare/>



Romania and Ukraine. Moldova however remains exposed to Russian energy pressure and threshold.

Secondly with the ability to import electricity from the Eu folloeing Maldovas connections to the Eruopean grid in March 2022, allowed Chisinau to adopt a noticeable frim stance towards Tiraspol, evident to not only trade gas transit policy but hancdling the separatist itself as seen in the new separatism law adopted in Feburary 2023. Chisinau had previously been reluctant to press Tiraspol for fear of provoking Moscow, but this newly found assertive was aided by Ukraine to close its border with transnistria shortly after the invasion, which left the self-declared separatist authorities, more isolated and more economically dependent on Chisinau.

The third concern limits the reach of Russian propaganda and disinformation within Moldova by Chisinau response to ban signs including V and Z & St George ribbons as an invasion signal of Russian aggression in the early 2022. Chisinau has blocked access to several Russian websites and radios and television broadcasts and revoked the license of Moldovan channels that had been rebroadcasting Russian programming. Outside on the turf separatist transnistria, pro-Russian sentiments in strong autonomous territorial units of Gagauz in the south as well as in parts of north Moldova.

Architecture of Resilience: Institutional Reform and Societal Mobilization

Against this three domain pressure campaign, Moldova has constructed a resilience architecture that is notable and less novelty than for the speed and coherence of its institutional consolidation. Chisinau national security and intelligence service has assumed consolidated responsibility for counter intelligence measure aimed specifically at investigating the activity of Russian proxies within Moldova, while the role of the presidentially led national security Council whose membership spans relevant public institutions has been correspondingly upgraded to provide a coordinating apex for the wider reform effort. (Winfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2026).¹⁶ Moldova national security strategy has in turn committed the government to advancing security sector reform and to exploring deeper cooperation with western partners across defense energy cybersecurity democratic resilience and the countering of disinformation. (Winfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2026).

This institutional consolidation has been complemented by a more explicitly societal register of resilience building. A plan for Strengthening Democratic Resilience approved by the national security council has been characterized by the regional analysts as an important step toward defending digital democracy a step that experts have urged should be shared proactively with other European Union member states ahead of the 202 to 2027 election cycle across the continent (Radio Moldova, 2026).¹⁷ Commentary accompanying the plan approval has been candid about the limits of unilateral state capacity in this domain there is no single effective formula for countering Russian hybrid tactic even among long established western democracies and Moldova advances during the 2024 -25 era attributed to the scale of supports form its European partners rather than to indigenous

¹⁶ Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. (2026). Title of the specific report or policy brief. Martens Centre.

¹⁷ Radio Moldova. (2025, December 3). Experts call Moldova the EU's "laboratory" for building resilience against Russian hybrid warfare. <https://radiomoldova.md/p/64822>



capacity alone. (Radio Moldova, 2026).

This partner dependent character of Moldovan resilience is corroborated from the American side of the relationship. Reflecting on November 2025 visit to Chisinau undertaken shortly after the contested parliamentary elections analyst from the Stimson center concluded that Moldova particular strength lies in its demonstrated ability to translate foreign assistance into concrete operational resilience a strength that positions the country as a substantively useful partners for shaping wider western approaches to hybrid defense and security cooperation and one they argue the United states should take seriously. (Stimson Center, 2026).¹⁸

The same body of commentary increasingly frames Moldova as the European Union laboratory for building resilience against Russia hybrid warfare, a framing predicated less on Moldova having discovering a self-sufficient formula than on Moldova having proven that hybrid warfare can be effectively countered through sustained collaboration between national institutions and external partners. (Radio Moldova, 2026).

Moldova is an important case study of how the Russian Ukraine war has affected a neutral neighboring state. Moldova is not a party to the war but in 2026 it continued to face security, energy and political pressures because of proximity to Ukraine and the unresolved Transnistrian conflict. Transnistria is internationally recognized as a part of Moldova but Russian military personal remain in the regions. This raises questions concerning Moldova serenity and terrestrial integrity. Under Article 2(4) of the Un charter states must respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other states (United Nations, 1945).¹⁹

In 2018 the UN general assembly also called for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of foreign military forces from Moldova through resolution 72/282. In 2026, Moldova continued to support Ukraine diplomatically while avoiding direct military participation, and it strengthened cooperation with the European Union in security, energy and resilience. Moldova also faced energy and infrastructure pressure connected to the regional war leading to emergency measure in 2026. The Moldovan case therefore demonstrates the tension between constitutional neutrality, territorial sovereignty and the security pressure created by a regional war. (United Nations, 1945; UN General Assembly, 2018; Constitution of Moldova, 1994).²⁰

Discussion: Toward a Theory of Scaffolded Resilience

The empirical material assembled above suggest a modification to existing resilience theory rather than a simple confirmation of it. The societal resilience literature following Yana Kiev Dimov and bachvarov 2018, tends to treat resilience as a property that state and society either possesses or builds through its own institutional and civic capacity.

The Moldovan case complicates this picture, across each of the three domains examined here, informational, economics. And territorial, the institutional responses has been characterized less by the autofocus, indigenously generated capacity than by a deliberate, closely coordinated

¹⁸ Stimson Center. (2025). Moldova's 2025 elections: A test case for Russia's hybrid warfare. Stimson Center. <https://www.stimson.org/2025/moldovas-2025-elections-a-test-case-for-russias-hybrid-warfare/>

¹⁹ United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. un.org

²⁰ United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. un.org



fusion of Moldovan states authority with European union and to lesser extent American technical financial and diplomatic support.

Moldova resilience, in other words has not simply been built, it has been co-produced in real time with its external partners to the point where the resilience itself functions simultaneously as a domestic governance achievement and as demonstration project for the European union own defensive learning ahead of its 202 and 2027 cycles.

This article terms this pattern scaffolder resilience a condition in which a structurally vulnerable small state, lacking the administrative depth to absorb hybrid pressure unilaterally convert its very exposure into a source of external investment thereby closing at least part of the gap between vulnerability and capacity through partnership rather than through purely domestic institution building.

The concept rather than displace existing resilience theory .it retains the multi domain whole of society emphasis central to the societal resilience literature while adding an explicitly relational dimension that acknowledges the asymmetric power position of small, externally dependent state within contemporary hybrid conflict. (European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2024).

Conclusion

Moldova experience since the outbreak of the Russian Ukraine war offers a productive case through which it examines the relationship between hybrid warfare and state resilience. across the informational and electoral economic and Transnistrian domains, Russian hybrids pressure has consistently exploited long standing structural weakness in Moldovan public administration and constitutional design.

Yet Moldova response consolidated through reformed intelligence and security council architecture and through an explicit, EU anchored democratic resilience plan has proven sufficient robust that September 2025 election s reaffirmed the country pro-European course despite an unprecedented scale of external interference. The analysis suggest that this resilience is best understood not as a purely indigenous achievement but as co-produced scaffolder arrangement built jointly with Moldova European and trans lentic partners a finding that both extends existing societal resilience theory and carries practical implications for how other frontline states might approach their own hybrid defense.

Last but not least the very fact that Moldova has increasingly been described as a laboratory for the European Union's own reliance building suggests that the boundary between case and precedent is itself dissolving, with Chisinau experience feeding directly back into the continental security architecture form its resilience.



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