



CPEC and the Narratives of States and Media: A Study of Pakistani and Indian Chronicles

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Abstract

The CPEC is the centrepiece project of the Belt and Road Initiative from China to Pakistan. The way the CPEC influences the Pakistani media coverage is linked to popular views of the project and can potentially affect Pakistan's success or failure. This research investigates CPEC coverage in Pakistani and Indian media by building and analysing semantic news networks. We identify the emotional polarity of the CPEC news coverage with the terms used in the news and how the media portrays the CPEC in Pakistan. We then build semanticized networks of negative, neutral and positive papers. The network analysis is utilised to identify the features of the distinct sentiment networks, the meaning of the words and how the negative key ideas describe anxiety about CPEC-related hurdles and barriers. The results reflect a favourable attitude towards the CPEC in most coverage. Negative feeling to CPEC is shown by more different messages which show a stronger cohesion than the bigger positive network, which is less linked. Indian, security, regional, party, conflicts, Cashemira, Afghanistan, debit, credit, the situation, disputes, costs, resistance and peace are the major negative subjects highlighted, which is defined by anxiety and scepticism of the CPEC and the stability of its structure. In contrast, advancement, support, benefit and prosperity, improvement, improvement, stimulation, and prospective returns and governmental assurances are the main terms in the positive network. Semantic network analysis of Pakistani media opinions on CPEC can increase our awareness of Pakistani views on the CPEC. Our research combines quantitative and qualitative evidence for the coverage of the media in Pakistan, which gives insight into communication used to increase trust in the CPEC and also enables us to better comprehend the Belt and Road Initiative.



Keywords: Pakistan, China, CPEC, India, Media.

Introduction

This study explores how Pakistan's news media ideologically shape China discourses with particular reference to the Economic Corridor between China and Pakistan (CPEC) in order to counter the Indian narrative of derailing and undermining the project. The study is based on the approach of the corpus-based critical discourse in order to examine how China's enormous economic endeavour appears via the field of journalism in Pakistan and India. In expanding on the CDA's fundamental purpose, Richardson claimed that CDA builds a bridge between language and society, social outlook and social problems (Richardson, 2006, p. 26). Researchers have argued that media – TV, the press, and internet resource – play an important part in bringing the world's events to the people. In such situations where viewers have no first-hand knowledge or experience, they are particularly dependent on the media to inform those (Happer & Philo, 2013). Van Dijk (1998) CDA has demonstrated, as is apparent in numerous studies such as Baker (2010), Richardson (2006), the concealed ideological purpose driving media speech. Corpus-based discourse analysis involves the necessary insight into the media discourse to offer the hidden position of the many authors. Baker (2010, p. 20) says that corpus linguistics provides the finest approach to analysing the incremental effects of speech. It unlocks the bolt of ambiguities and creates a clear overview of the text to convey the right and the wrong.

The speech analyst finds the parameters in how speech is used, employing a variety of techniques to uncover the riddle of speeches. Baker et al. (2008, 13) claim that language usage strengthened speech in a number of ways in our culture (Baker et al., 2008). CDA is referred to as 'attitude discourse analysis' by Wodak and Meyer (2009, P. 33), but occasionally the borders between DA and CDA are fairly brittle (Flowerdew, 2008). The CDA idea is explained by Van Dijk (2007, pp. 63–85) mentioned in Wodak and Meyer (2009) and underlines that there is no single analytical framework but rather conceptual and numerous theoretical frameworks incorporated in it (Motion & Doolin, 2007). He (Baker, 2006) also suggests "how do (more) strong organisations influence the discourse," "how such a discourse controls the spirit and behaviour of CDA" (less). In the examination of speech, corporations use strong groups and what are the social effects of such controls, such as social inequality? (Baker, 2006). Action. Van Dijk (2015) believes that "many aspects of discourse interaction are strongly connected to grammatical, semanticization, pragmatics and other discourse dimensions" (Van Dijk, 2015). The genuineness of the merge of Corpus Linguistics with CDA was emphasised by Biber and Jones (2005). The study of CDA documents made a significant contribution from Corpus Linguistics. It assists the researcher in small scale analysis to discover designs, lexical



objects and collocations of regularly occurring patterns. Such patterns of language can help shine a light on discourses that are not observable otherwise (Biber, Conrad, & Reppen, 1998). In his work Baker (2010) more details as;

“Speech, written, or computer-mediated texts to uncover ways language is employed to build specific world representativeness in connection to ideologies, attitudes, or power relations, in contexts such as advertising and media, politics, the workplace, or privacy. A range of language characteristics might be investigated (lexical choice, agency representation, involved etc.). Some scholars in this subject employ argument theory in order to investigate how different topoi (strategies used to create an argument) or errors are utilised to argue for a stance.”

As previously mentioned, Pakistan's finest economic game changed is the CPEC—the latest two-sided economic cooperation scheme with the huge \$46bn energy growth and infrastructure expansion in Pakistan. The objective of the mega project is to link Kashgar to Gwadar, Pakistan, directly as the doorway to the states of Central Asia, Arab countries, Africa and Europe. During his first address on his first visit to Pakistan, the Chinese President highlighted that "when I was young, many moving stories we had heard about Pakistan and the two countries' friendships. We learnt, to mention a few, that Pakistani people have worked hard to construct their beautiful nation and that Pakistan offered an air route to the globe for China to help China in recovering its rightful United Nations seat. I was very impressed by the stories.

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

As noted before, the CPEC is a combined mega-venture between China and Pakistan, which is driven by partnership in business, cultural, and economic stability in the area. Since CPEC opening, other nations such as India, the United States and several European countries have not been publicly acknowledged. China shares the Indian-Pakistan border, but there are also numerous disputes between Pakistan, India and China arising from the mutual relations between China and Pakistan. This initiative is viewed by India as part of a political and military alliance while the US views China as an economic adversary.

CPEC is the centrepiece of One Belt One Road (OBOR), which the Chinese National and Reform Committee announced in March 2015. (NDRC). China committed \$46 billion in investment. The corridor would link Kashgar in China to Gwadar Port in Pakistan. The CPEC also covers several additional connectivity projects, including rail connections, highways, IT parks, energy projects. In about 15 years, beginning in 2015, the project will be done. For Pakistan and China, CPEC is extremely important. Only by taking into



account its space, temporal and geo-strategic environment can its relevance be assessed. CPEC frequently referred to as a "changer of games," is designed to transform the whole area into a more sustainable economy. For Pakistan, it is therefore vital that it is completed and enforced promptly. It is generally seen as an initiative for Pakistan that changes its games. As it also has included various infrastructures, multiple highways, upgraded to a Karakoram Highway, are to mention but a few 2700 kilometres from Gwadar to Kashgar. The surrounding nations that potentially join the initiative later will also benefit from this link. Therefore, several economic zones have been formed to stimulate trade throughout the corridor. However, in terms of energy generation which will rise to 10,000 megawatts, including today's power supply capacity of 16,000MW, the most immediate help would be given to the energy-deprived nation.

The friendship between China and Pakistan in relation to strong bilateral commerce and economic cooperation is described as "all-weather friendship." Since the very beginning of its diplomatic connections, Pakistan and China have had good relations; it is nevertheless necessary to look at elements like the political and economic ones that might influence the CPEC's long term execution. These include Pakistan's policies and policies and Pakistan's economic prospects. The present policies in Pakistan indicate that every political party is on a single page on CPEC and looks forward to its achievement. Five regional parties wish to continue to maintain good bilateral relations with China, apart from the nationalists of Baloch. Because of their military and economic collaboration, Pakistan Army also seeks strong relations with China. Every administration created in Pakistan demonstrates its Chinese partners' readiness to continue strengthening relations in terms of regular diplomatic commitments of high level. The same is true of the high-level military officials' bilateral interactions.

The CPEC will function largely as an effort for regional connectivity, as well as for the energy and commercial requirements of China. It covers many economic areas, highways and rail linkages along the corridor that will enhance trade and economic cooperation further. In the future, the initiative may include Afghanistan and India, which could lead to regional peace and unity along with economic cooperation. Gwadar in Pakistan, both sides, while Chabahar in Iran, largely at the hand of the nationalists, are suffering enormous security problems. If the proxy conflict in the area is not ended by India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, the security consequences for the area might be exacerbated and the development initiatives will be hampered. Pakistan criticises India for aiding its territory's rebels, while Iran blames Pakistan for its porous frontier and unrestricted movement. Some, however, feel that Chabahar can begin working before Gwadar because Iran can simply deal with insurgency on its side; Pakistan will in future be busy with combating insurgency. The regional alliances on the subcontinent will



mainly be reinforced in terms of strengthening regional commerce dependent on their relationship with the CPEC. The disputes between others and Pakistan will have little or no impact on the CPEC and Gwadar development. But only time can tell if, in an area encompassing Afghanistan and India, economic coordination and cooperation are to be realised, as was initially envisaged.

The commercial partners since 1963 have been China and Pakistan. The "Free Trade Agreement" further consolidated bilateral commerce between the two countries. The agreement was formed in 2006, with trade multiplying since then; data show a 124 per cent raise. Where China's export proportion grew just 1%, compared with 400% in Pakistan; 10% of Pakistan's total exports were made to China in the fiscal year 2013–14. The CPEC represents the best example of reciprocal economic collaboration between both countries. From Kashgar to Gwadar, the CPEC extends. The Chinese PM "Li Keqiang" in 2013 was initially planned. It has always accomplished several milestones since then. As the Port of Gwadar would cut the distance from Chinese ports by 12,000 kilometres covered for oil supply to China, China and Pakistan will profit from each other mutually; for this reason, the Port of Gwadar is undergoing a major amendment. First, this article addresses the basis of the subject by giving some information on CPEC in general, including Pakistan's ties with China, including the economic impasse of both countries. This report also demonstrates the relevance for the country of future economic development and prosperity of the CPEC for Pakistan. The investigation also reveals the existing interior and local order in which the fundamental concerns that might adversely affect the success of the project can be classified. This study uses the data to derive prospective consequences by project implementation to project the projection of CPEC in Pakistani journals as a game-changer.

The Stance of Indian State and Media

CPEC was refused by the Indian state. Indian media and the State alleged that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of CPEC is violated. Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated during the Raisina dialogue that "regional connectivity corridors can only fulfil their promises and prevent conflicts and disagreements by respecting the sovereignty of all the participating countries." Indeed, in July 2018, Chinese officials in Beijing reminded India Secretary of State Jaishankar that "The CPEC is part of that specific effort. The CPEC breaches Indian sovereignty since it passes through the occupied Pakistani Kashmir (POK)." New Delhi argues that the CPEC crosses the Gilgit-Baltistan region and breaches India's territorial integrity. Indian attitude is premised on Kashmir's Maharaja's fully surrendering Kashmir to India, including Gilgit-Baltistan.



A STAR study claims that the Indian antagonistic campaign and media campaign against CPEC arises out of its fear of the globalisation of the issue of Kashmir. The International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is a thought tank located in Sweden. "In India, which has been neutral in Kashmir since 1963, there are major fears today that the economic and security interests of China are on the rise in those areas," explained the opposition further. The report. India does not wish to mediate China's participation in the Kashmir issue according to the report. "India doesn't want to internationalise the Kashmir issue, but with the arrival of Pakistan, Chinese and CPEC," said Suchitra Vijayan, a New York-based Indian borderland lawyers, including Kashmir. There is also an underlying concern in India that the CPEC may, in the short and medium-term, provide remarkable economic development for Pakistan and, in the long term, re-form the regional order in favour of China with its geopolitical repercussions.

As part of the state of J&K, India continues to link the area of Gilgit Baltistan. However, this alliance is not satisfied with the people of Gilgit Baltistan. "The people have tried to distance their destiny from the destiny of Kashmir, arguing, according to Anthropologist Shafqat Hussain, that they have no cultural, ethnic or linguistic relation to the people and that therefore, the Gilgit-Baltistan final status is to be settled separately from the Cashmere settlement." Likewise, "the people of Gilgit Baltistan stress that their area has a separate status throughout history as opposed to Kashmir," states the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Parliament (GBLA), which adopted resolutions requesting Gilgit-Baltistan as a constitutional province of the Pakistani government,' on the basis of these arguments? Pakistan defends its claim to the subcontinent's division history as well. Gilgit-Baltistan has been controlled partially by the State of Kashmir and somewhat by the United Kingdom.

The UK government was compelled to lease the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir from the Gilgit agency in anticipation of Russian intervention. Gilgit and the neighbouring territories were under British administration from 26 March 1935 and 15 August 1947. After the announcement of the division of India, the British Government delivered the Gilgit agency to the Maharaja. Brigadier Sing arrived at the Gilgit Agency as a new manager on behalf of Jammu & Kashmir's Maharaja, along with General Scott. The inhabitants rallied after the split against the administration of Dogra and declared Pakistan's admission. India maintains it was only Gilgit Scout who rebelled, not regular people, against the authorities. But there is little room for the Indian administration to substantiate the argument: How could a revolution be successful without popular support? The instrument of accession gave the princely States the rare prerogative of freely accession or independence to both India and Pakistan. But, considering geographical and ethnic difficulties, they were recommended to adhere to the



neighbouring region. The 'Accession Instrument' was signed on October 26, 1947, against the wishes of the Maharaja of Kashmir. The United Nations legally does not ratify the membership of Kashmir in India. And so, how can India claim Gilgit-Baltistan sovereignty? In addition, the Kashmir conflict is a controversial topic for most countries. The UN SCRs 'recognise the inalienable right of Kashmiris to self-determination by a democratic free and unbiased referendum under UN supervision.' UN Security Council resolutions (UNSC) The inhabitants of Kashmir have continually been denied this privilege since the conflict in Kashmir began. On the other hand, the UN resolutions on Kashmir continue to be respected in Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan has not included Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan as formal portions of Pakistan under Pakistan's administration. This area has a different status from the rest of Pakistan since the split. Kashmir is a contested area for the international world. The remark by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi strongly supports Pakistan's claim on Kashmir status. "This is not a third party who does not deal with conflicts over territorial sovereignty, and it does not impact Chinese attitude with regard to the question of Kashmir," he countered the Indian requests. Why does India resist an even-handed plebiscite for a peaceful resolution of Kashmir when it is true to its position? This can also justify his claim to Gilgit-Baltistan. The international community has repeatedly called for a referendum to settle the destiny of Kashmir since the Indian occupation of Kashmir. The Indian Government is unfortunately consistently denying the people of Kashmir self-determination and rights. Everything runs against India's narrative on Gilgit-Baltistan from the instrument of accession to local and international opinion. Therefore the Indian argument that CPEC infringes on its "sovereignty" in Gilgit-Baltistan cannot provide any real validity. India seems to adopt this approach mainly to rationalise its discrepancies with China. Otherwise, India has no legitimate complaints with CPEC.

The major criticism of the Indian media to CPEC remains centred on the Gilgit-Baltistan sovereignty claim. But substantial economic cooperation between China and Pakistan is equally worrisome for India in the wider geopolitical environment of South Asia. India claims that this reciprocal reliance on the economy may transform the standing of Indians in the area into a powerful antithesis. The objective of this section is to analyse the perception and veracity of India's economic threat with regard to CPEC, either accurate or just exaggerated. Contemporary Indian literature and government pronouncements rely mostly on India's Gilgit-Baltistan sovereignty claim to deny the CPEC. But the CPEC also reverberates Indian media apprehensions as an economic counterweight. In the following areas, the expected financial impact on India of the CPEC may be summarised: The first aim is to introduce the strong economic integration between China and Pakistan. The second worry, the CPEC, may put Pakistan at the centre of the regional financial system. Pakistan will probably play a key part in CPEC-related regional commerce



networks since it integrates South, central and western Asia with Pakistan by rail, road and telecommunications. Gwadar's growth as the trade centre of the area is the third predicted economic worry that India holds about CPEC. CPEC's spine is the port of Gwadar in southern Pakistan. Pakistan aims in the future to make Gwadar, with China's aid, a regional economic centre. The port at Gwadar, which has strategic importance for oil transit, is located near the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

Indian media's campaign against CPEC

CPEC is the corruption corridor called by Indian media. The report says CPEC is a dismal account of corruption, connivance and political affairs, of course. Pakistan is now an 'interest' in Beijing at many levels, including personal profit, business profile and governmental power, ranging from power firms to airport builders to roads and safe city projects. Money and intelligence must be made, both in India and in the United States in Afghanistan and Iran. The existing strong connection was long established since Pakistan's PKR 818 million creditors for Pakistan's Kargil conflict to the latest budget year when Pakistan owed China approximately PKR 506.062 million (RE 2019), without counting the "concessions" included in talks. In sum, Pakistan owes China more than the International Monetary Fund is responsible for \$6.7 billion in trade lending (IMF). This is from Handwara to Pangong for India. Pakistan has a variety of additional doubtful 'awards' in the CPEC for all projects within the 'Free Zone' of Gwadar, such as a 23-year fiscal exemption. However, for two reasons, corruption allegations have stopped. One is that, following continuous reporting of the bribery, China threatened to stop funding for road projects like the Karakoram highway.

Secondly, in Pakistan the media are now so muzzled, the previous brave reports almost stopped. While most of South Asia cannot avoid corruption, these CPEC projects are government-to-government agreements, with a study from the World Bank stating that corruption is part of the discussions. Applications are made for any three firms that are Chinese-only. Contracts allow these companies to choose the scale of local supply. The respondents said that local benefit was limited as they desired practically everything including work to be imported. The pre-offering meetings have often led to the original provisions being diluted. For example, the delay payments have been decreased from 10% to 5%, and the incentive clause has altered from early completion.

The media's assertion in January 2020 that CPEC affects India's sovereignty, by the Indian Marine Chief Admiral Karambir Singh, is flagrantly misleading. The admiral parroted the Indian attitude that as the CPEC runs through Gilgit-Baltistan, partly in alignment with Cashmir at the time of the partition, it crosses the territory of a disputed



area, over which India claims its sovereignty. Earlier in July, the Chinese authorities in Beijing warned S. Jaishankar, Indian foreign secretary that the CPEC reportedly broke Indian rule as it goes into Azad Kashmir. The Indian position was utterly rejected by China. New Delhi worries that once the CPEC is operational, it and occupied Kashmir would weaken its influence in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

There are also concerns in India that the CPEC is internationalising the issue over Kashmir, for which India has rejected the territorial annexation in 2019 following significant international opposition. It believes that the CPEC construction will highlight the region under conflict. The Indigenous peoples also feel that CPEC will damage India's economic progress once fully established. This assertion is also absurd given the Indian economy is enormous and will in no way be diminished by the BRI project compared with Pakistan.

The Indians walk all the way against CPEC and damage the economic growth of Pakistan. Their Chahbahar investments in Iran were a start in that direction, but the port did not set off and Indian investment in the near future will have little promise.

The data show that the CPEC project is an economic corridor of \$54 billion, with an investment of 11 billion in rail and road and energy-generating projects of \$33 billion. India is likewise worried by the prospects of an outsourcing destination for Pakistan. This occurs when new industrial cities grow together with the corridor in which skilled workers are based so that the country emerges as a hub of contract production outsourcing. Indians say Indian textiles and other industries might be harmed by exports. In the masterly terrorist actions in the nation, notably in Balochistan and Karachi, and against the CPEC Kulbhushan Yadhav, an Indian saboteur and spy, took part. At the request of RAW, he acknowledged that "I have conducted several actions in Balochistan and Karachi and have worsened legal and order in Karachi. My aim was to have talks with insurgents from Baloch and work with them. These acts have been criminal and have resulted in Pakistani civilians being killed or maimed."

It has shown that Yadhav and its network have been sponsoring and conducting a number of terrorist atrocities, including IEDs and grenade attacks in Gwadar and Turbat, a radar station and civil boats attack in Jiواني harbour, gas and electric pipelines bombing in Sibi and Sui regions of Balochistan and IED bombing in Quetta in 2015, Hazaras attacks in Quetta and Zairo on its way to the Balochistan Region. Regardless of what happens, CPEC with the relentless backing of China and Pakistan will prove effective.

The Stance of Pakistani State and its Media



The counter-narration of Pakistan represents a distinct scenario to that of India. It argues that India's Gilgit-Baltistan rights may be acknowledged only if the United Nations ratifies the Kashmir Accord to India, which is still not true. As a result of India's second fear, neither China nor Pakistan has demonstrated a clear objective of counterbalancing the rising Indian market through the use of CPEC. Indeed, India does not have any comparable to Pakistan's economic potential. CPEC alone can by no means assist Pakistan in becoming India's equal economic rival. India's third worry of Gwadar being a Chinese maritime port. Pakistan constantly, however, rejects these charges and says that Gwadar is being utilised for trade purposes solely. Moreover, Indian apprehensions over China's military development in the Indian Ocean are not warranted, as Pakistan must have military connections with its chosen nations.

CPEC will of course maintain economic integration between China and Pakistan on a strong basis. China-Pakistan bilateral trade volume seems to reach \$15.6 billion for the 2019 financial year according to official sources reported by China Economic Net. Under the 2006 free trade agreement, the two nations' bilateral trading volumes have increased from \$ 4 billion. Although China-Pakistan's bilateral economic activities have recently established solid commercial linkages via the CPEC, they are smaller than those of India and China. In 2018, China-bilateral India's trade amounted to about 95.7 trillion dollars, and trade volume was projected to reach over 100 billion dollars during 2019, according to figures reported by Live mint. In addition, bilateral trade is increasing steadily year. The level of bilateral commerce between two world giants is far higher than in any South Asian country. CPEC is an incentive for increased economic integration between China and the Pak. Nevertheless, China-relative Pak's bilateral trade volume reveals it looks to be much lower than that of India-China. Thus, economic integration between China and Pakistan at least cannot prove to be a losing issue for India. CPEC also reveals conflicts amongst policymakers in India. The Indian government says, on the one hand, that Pakistan is thriving and developed very advantageous to India. Even Indian High Commissioner, TCA Raghavan, speaking at a meeting of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Commerce of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPCCI, in its initials) said, "India is not worried about the 46 billion dollars of the economic corridors between Pakistan and Chinese, as economically strong Pakistan would bring regional stability.

On the other hand, Sarmad Ashfaq says of the apprehensions of the Indigenous people: "If CPEC is operating, Pakistan, India's traditional adversary, would become more strong and stable regional and economic actors. Not just India but America is disappointed that considers BRI and CPEC to be a challenge to their hegemony and their superpower position." Sumit Walia wrote on Pakistan's Indian government policy: "The current



government is right to isolate Pakistan in the world community and pay rewards" Moreover, Sumit suggested that "if there is no industrial growth in Pakistan, lending and Chinese returns would be used to destroy the backbone of its economy. In addition, Chinese investment in Pakistan will be dysfunctional. We have to strive actively to make it more difficult for Pakistan to get loans, both diplomatically and financially isolated." India started building an important port of Chabahar, which is only 75 km from Gwadar Port. To oppose Gwadar Port, India started building. It is expected that India would contribute \$100 million towards the development of Chabahar port. Having invested heavily, the Chinese media argue, the only obvious reason India can challenge the port of Gwadar.

Analysts also say that the timing of the building of the Chabahar port is 2016, only one year after the launch of the CPEC. It also shows that CPEC was to be sabotaged. The debate above validates the notion that CPEC will probably have little influence on the Indian economy. The Indian economy seems by any means far more important and stronger than that of Pakistan with its volume and perversity. However, the major reason behind the Indian aggressivity towards CPEC is a conventional geopolitical strategy. This hostility contradicts the official Indian image of India's flourishing Pakistan. The Indian Government believes that CPEC is a solution for Pakistan's economic difficulties and should reflect this strategy in its practice.

The CPEC is very positive in Pakistani media. The initiative from media sources and officials get regular good attention. Pakistan's Chinese Ambassador Moinul Haq said the media play a crucial role in fostering friendship and unity between Pakistan and China in this digital era. The media properly enlightened the people on the actual importance of the CPEC project, which led to the creation of a national consensus on CPEC. He added that Pakistan was the BRI's largest supporter and supported President Xi's ideology of shared prosperity and future. Finally, he said that Pakistan and China could deepen collaboration in the media by filming more films in China, like in 'Parwaaz hai Junoon,' the first Pakistani film shown in China in the previous 45 years. Moreover, over 300,000 participants, students and researchers, journalists and university students, policymakers, think tanks and business and opinion leaders, participated in the CPEC Media Forum online.

Conclusion

South Asia was an Indian traditional site. South Asia's Indian vision appears to weaken India's dominance by externally encouraging change or growth. CPEC is generally designated as an initiative to switch games. This project will probably lead to major



geopolitical and geo-economic developments in the southern Asian area if it continues with consistency and success. China's ties with minor neighbours in South Asia seem to be at the peak of India. "The view was influenced largely by the geopolitical features of the BRI and not by wider aspects of development, due to the disproportionate emphasis on CPEC in the Indian conversation. The main focus was on the geopolitical effect of neighbourhood and Indian Ocean infrastructure projects." Indian media-based state hostility to CPEC looks heavily affected in maintaining the status quo for India militarily and economically and in the fear of the internationalisation of Kashmir, by conventional geopolitical reasons like China's growing diploma prominence in South Asia. In situations like the sovereignty claim over Gilgit Baltistan, the Indian policy elite skilfully dresses things up.

The research also offers historical evidence and shows that the Indian Gilgit Baltistan application is not approved by the United Nations and contradictory to the historic realities. In addition, Indians are just over-exaggerated, implicit and explicit fears about CPEC. In Pakistan, on the other hand, successive parts of the project were completed quite quickly, and Indian narratives were countered on many worldwide forums. Whatever more this initiative offers, one thing is certain that the Chinese economic expansionism is openly challenging India's imperial goals.



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