



RUSSIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AFTER 9/11

Dr. Faisal Javaid
Assistant Professor
Department of International Relations
Federal Urdu University of Arts, Sciences & Technology
Karachi –Pakistan
faisal.javaid@fuuast.edu.pk

Dr. Asghar Dashti
Incharge,
Department of International Relations
Federal Urdu University of Arts, Sciences & Technology
Karachi -Pakistan
masghardashti@gmail.com

Dr. Muhammad Arif Khan
Assistant Professor
Department of International Relations
Federal Urdu University of Arts, Sciences & Technology
Karachi –Pakistan
arifkhan756@hotmail.com

Abstract

This paper investigates the relations of Russia with the Central Asian Republics (CARs). The early linkages between Russia and Central Asia go date back to the 18th century, which gradually resulted in the conquest of the whole Central Asian region by Russia in the first decade of the 19th century. The region has been durable important for Russia throughout history because of its strategic importance and natural resources. Contextually, Central Asia has been remained a cornerstone in the foreign policy of Russia generally and in the post 9/11 era particularly, as Moscow wants to strengthen its sphere of influence in Central Asia and keep a naked eye on the activities of the US and other players in the landlocked region during 2001-2016. It intends to have the final say in the affairs of its former colonies.



Keywords: Russian Interests, Central Asian States, CSTO, United States, 9/11.

Introduction

The situation of the Central Asian states fluctuated in the last two decades. Since their independence in 1991, these nations had been dependent on Russia not only in political and military but also in energy and economic spheres. On the other hand, Russians largely ignored them by keeping in mind, that Central Asian Republics (CARs) are dependent on Moscow because of the absence of options and the indomitable historical linkages between the Kremlin and CARs. However, Russia ricocheted go deep into the area under Putin's authority (Swanström 2012).

Russia had close multilateral relations with the states of Central Asia. Thus, the Central Asia States occupy an amazingly imperative place in the foreign policy of Russia. Russia had wanted to maintain the Central Asian region in its sphere of influence. In this lieu, it was growing its authority on this region's energy resources on one side and forming regional organizations, and deploying its troops in Central Asia on the other. Furthermore, Russia has also taken three evils with an iron hand. Russia had maintained its grip on the region by promoting autocratic and fragile regimes in the region. In terms of migration, Central Asia was still home to just under 7 million Russians and nearly half a million Ukrainians; and the number of migrant workers from Central Asia in Russia was reckoned to be over 4 million (Oliphant 2013).

Russian Interests in Central Asia Region

Russia had substantial interests in political, security, and economic in the CARs. It was on the getting end of worldwide dangers that originated from Central Asia such as terrorism, crimes of transnational, smuggling of weapons, and trafficking of narcotics. Russia was continuing its existence in the region and to keep this area in its domain of influence. Russia is very clear about its long-term interests in the region. Russia had to keep away from any overflow impacts and was required to continue stability in this area. There had created a power vacuum after Central Asian conflicts that grew for Russia's challenges of security. Regional stability was also essential for the smooth import of gas and oil from these states. Russia wanted to ensure their cooperation and to continue its domination in this region didn't only in energy supply, but also in additional areas of tactical importance (Bhatty, 2008).

Its strategic interests were to prevent threats, deal with risks, and enhance regional security. The specific interests refer to maintaining, restoring, and developing a security



infrastructure in Central Asia (through military presence, defense cooperation, arms transfers, and the like) (Rumer et al 2007). Its principal interest in Central Asia was to ensure a modicum of stability in the potentially volatile region. The main threat was the prospect of political destabilization in one or several states of Central Asia, important toward the overthrow of the existing regimes and replacement by radical Islamist rule, or sheer chaos (Rumer, 2005). Russia had also dominated interest in regional ethnic peace. Currently, millions of ethnic Russians have their centuries-old connections with the Central Asian States but the big amount of there had reduced significantly afterward the end of the USSR (Trenin, 2007), and made up an important minority in several states of Central Asia. To a great extent, Russia was supporting the language and culture of Russian, as well as the population of native Russian.

If the Central Asian pipelines that transported gas and oil from the regional countries connected with regional countries as like with China, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey it would wound long term of Russian interests both in economic and strategic fields. For example, if the region of Central Asia increased in shipping their resources of energy through Iran, Pakistan, or Turkey, without Russia, it would result in huge foreign exchange, which they would consume in forming their established economies and sovereign forces. Then, the dependency of the Central Asian region on Russia would decline and Russia will not continue to support these kinds of growths. Russia desired to stand against any penetration from the United States, as a part of its long-term policy; U.S. dominated institutions like NATO and regional powers (Bhatty, 2008).

The economic interests of Russia, since the disintegration of the USSR, were likewise truly functional in the region. It was interested in emerging mutual collaboration with the states of Central Asia, especially in transportation and energy. The economic engagement of Moscow with the regional states was another multi-featured, surrounding areas such as agriculture, transport, telecommunication, the military-industrial complex, infrastructure, and mining. There were immense and different mineral resources, for the most part, uranium stores, oil, and natural gas, and over the top work resources that could be utilized both through engaging work transients to Russia and making local labor-intensive production services focused on item supply to Russia from the central Asian countries. (Ivanov, 2013)

Russian Relations with Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan was Russia's most important ally and tactical partner in the region. Though the energy was the premise of Russia's relations with Kazakhstan, the security and political angles were likewise extensive. Russia considered Kazakhstan as a region's powerhouse



that could help to meet the energy and security collaboration of the region. Kazakhstan is a significant country of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and took a dynamic stance in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Both nations had signed a variety of military collaboration treaties that encompass to the extent of a joint arrangement of military force. Russia still leased seven military amenities on the Kazakh domain, basically comprising of radar establishments and test reaches (Paramonov & Stokov, 2008). This Kazakh resource, inherited from the Soviet Union, is likewise an open door for Kazakhstan's own particular innovative work aspirations.

In 1991, Kazakhstan announced its independence but maintained its relationship with Russia. On 25 May 1992 Governments of Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement of amity, collaboration, and joint assistance. Lately, President Vladimir Putin met his Kazakh partner Nursultan Nazarbayev during his official visit to Astana in July 2012; both consented to revive the relations by setting up another treaty to the good neighborhood and strategic partnership, which was sanctioned in June 2013. In a joint proclamation, the two presidents pronounced, Russia and Kazakhstan were fabricating their relationships on the principle of huge scale collaboration and common trust, respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence, and non-obstruction in interior issues, inviolability of frontiers, equality, and common advantage, and quiet settlement of disputes (Kroth, 2012).

They cooperate inside the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and through more than 60 reciprocal treaties that legalize military specialized and defense collaboration. The Defense Ministers of both countries marked the Plan of Cooperation for the period 2008-2012 in Moscow on 8 December 2010. Moreover, as a part of the CSTO, Kazakhstan had profited from particular terms in buying weapons and frameworks manufactured in Russia, which was by a wide margin the biggest supplier of military supplies to the region of Central Asia (Rosseau, 2011).

Russia gave supplies of its produced weapons to Kazakhstan and also helped in the advancement of Kazakhstani military equipment. Kazakhstan had hosted four Russian military testing grounds on the lease; i) assessment places Emba and Sary-Shagan; ii) military matters and battlegrounds of the fourth State Central Testing Ground; iii) State Flight Test Centre #929 iv) the Baikonur space center. Kazakhstan's military force got training in military training schools of Russia.

Russian economic policy in Central Asia, commanded by the energy area, hubs on Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan; the cooperation building arrangement, thus offered need to Kazakhstan and auxiliary regard for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Among the region's energy-rich state Kazakhstan and along these lines conceivably an accomplice in Russia's



drive to turn into an energy superpower. The Russo-Kazakh treaty to partition the Caspian strengthens Moscow's position opposite the other littoral countries (Blank, 2011).

Kazakhstan's known energy reserves at 85 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and demonstrated oil reserves were assessed at 30 billion barrels. Russia entered Kazakhstan's gas market in 2002 when Gazprom started a 50-50 joint venture with KazMunaiGaz. KazRosGaz has been buying Kazakhstan's natural gas and selling small portions to Western European customers (Dhave, 2010). The Russian corporation Lukoil was dynamic in upwards of seven oil and gas inland undertakings and three seaward investigation ventures in the Kazakhstan part of the Caspian sea. Kazakhstan represented pretty nearly 40 percent proven reserves of Lukoil's; ventures in Kazakhstan gave more than 90 percent of oil and over 40 percent of common gas created by Lukoil outside the Russian domain (Gorst, 2007).

Both states signed an interstate treaty on 9 October 2010 in the field of economics and trade collaboration for delivery of oil and other resources which extended for the period until 2025, duty-free imports from Russia oil and light oil items toward Kazakhstan was been limited by quotas, and the supplies of light oil products from Kazakhstan to third-party countries are prohibited, as well as the supplies of dark oil products from Russia to Kazakhstan. The volume of mutual trade between Russia and Kazakhstan for January to July 2013 increased by 18.8% compared to 2012 and reached US dollar 13.1 billion. Russian goods improved by 12.6% equal to US dollar 7.9 billion, whereas imports by Kazakhstan increased by 29.7% equal to US dollar 5.2 billion (Russia-Kazakhstan, 2014).

Russian Relations with Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan acknowledges Russia as a huge financial, military, and political accomplice. This additionally played to Russia's particular geopolitical enthusiasm for the area, because Kyrgyzstan had some energy-rich areas. It was right in the focal point of Central Asia and it shares a border with China. The two countries had signed nearly 100 bilateral agreements for cooperation, including security and military areas (defense of Kyrgyz air space by Russian forces, supply of military hardware, cooperation between military-industrial establishments of both the countries, etc.), on economic and industrial cooperation, education and cultural cooperation, collaboration toward science and technology, etc (Stobdan, 2014). In June 1991, Russia established bilateral relations with independent Kyrgyzstan, while Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a treaty on the principles of political relations between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Kyrgyz Republic (Плоских, 2001).



In the same way as other of the previous republics of Soviet, Kyrgyzstan understood that autonomy brought with it a few difficulties, including national defense and regional security. President Akayev supported not structuring a military, coveting rather turn into the Switzerland of Asia, since independence. He confidently expressed that it didn't need an armed force, didn't expect to go into any military alliance, and was for an impartial Kyrgyzstan. He defended aggregate security measures as a substitution for a national armed force. He was readily tossed his backing to the Russian security umbrella as the solution for his military situation and was quickly attracted to the CIS. Accordingly, in 1992 under the CIS, Kyrgyzstan was an energetic supporter of the foundation of the Collective Security Treaty (CST), accepting that any security agreement was superior to none whatsoever (Bugubaev, 2013).

Russia designated for the parties of the CST to agree on the formation of quick response militaries to fight against terrorism in April 2000, and the members of CST approved the establishment of the Central Asian quick response force in 2001, it's headquartered in Kyrgyzstan. The members of CIS similarly agreed on the formation of an Anti-Terrorism Center in 2001, in Moscow. They established a subdivision of this center in Kyrgyzstan, though it provided Russian to sway over the gathering of the region's intelligence (Nichol, 2010).

Russia was assisting Kyrgyzstan to modernize its armed forces, it provided a military package of \$1.2 billion in 2013 to Bishkek. It also functions four military installations in Kyrgyzstan (Farshori, 2014). The installations were the following; i) radio-seismic laboratory in Mailuu-Suu; ii) military communications center in Kara-Balta; iii) underwater testing of weapons in Karakol; and iv) include the Kant Air Base near Bishkek. Kyrgyzstan had expanded the military amenities of Russia at Kant will take this arrangement through to 2032, with a conceivable augmentation past that for more than five years and the new treaty will start after 2017 (Official: Russia To Expand Kyrgyzstan, 2013).

Russian energy corporations' interests in Kyrgyzstan were described principally from Gazprom which through its related arrangements had domination of these countries' oil item marketplaces. Russia was centered around the production of hydropower and the two states were agreeable on a substantial scale for investment ventures. Kambarata hydropower station was one of the primary hydropower plant ventures in Kyrgyzstan by Russian. Russia had been reserved \$2.1 billion for another Kambarata power station, to add to a current one officially operational, yet policymaking was at first deferred (Cooley & Laruelle, 2013). In September 2012, President Putin visited Bishkek and was reached a



treaty, as a result, Russia moved ahead in the development of a further four hydroelectric power stations by 2016 (Olga, 2012).

Russian Relations with Tajikistan

The lone Persian-speaking country in the Central Asian region is Tajikistan. Tajikistan's lengthy, and bloody civil war (1992-97) was ended through joint efforts of Moscow and Tehran. Its longtime president Emomali Rakhmonov was a nominal Russian ally since Russia and Tajikistan were the main strategic partner and natural allies. In the last few years, a series of high-level visits of Russian and Tajikistan Premiers had taken place during which they discussed topical issues of bilateral collaboration in the range of border and military, security in this county, growth of economic and trade relationships, labor migration, several treaties on their application of two-sided large-scale monetary schemes in non-ferrous metallurgy and hydropower, mining, minerals, gas, and oil were signed between Tajikistan and Russia (Relations of Tajikistan with Russia, 2014).

On 8 April 1992 Russia and Tajikistan have signed the protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations in Dushanbe (Hamroboeva, 2007) as a premise for the foundation of a new kind of relationship in the states of autonomous advancement served. The Russian Federation inaugurated Embassy in Dushanbe on 4 May 1992. The Soviet-era permanent mission of Tajikistan in Russia was changed into a diplomatic Mission of it's in Moscow on 8 June 1993 and Tajik Embassy in Moscow on its base was opened on 18 December. (Relations of Tajikistan with Russia, 2014).

Moreover, on 25 May 1993, the agreement of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance was signed between Russia and Tajikistan. More than 230 interdepartmental, intergovernmental, and interstate, treaties regulating collaboration in cultural and humanitarian, military, economic and political, and other ranges (Ibid) were signed. Dynamic relations in a political circle, including top-level contacts, were kept up. Heads of states routinely met inside of the state visits, working together at different universal forums.

Moreover, Russia prevailed with regards to showing up at an arrangement with Tajikistan on 4 June 2004 to change over Russia's 201st division into an enduring armed force establishment started in 1999 anyway closed in 2004 and picked that Russia would use Tajik bases without time condition and expense (Buszynski, 2005), which with its 7,500 soldiers, Russia's greatest external sending of the military. The Tajik Government could like Russia to pay lease for the base something Moscow had continually declined to do instead of offering material focal points, for example, arms manage the Tajik Army at



neighborhood Russian expenses, and preparing military Tajik staff (Paramonov and Stokov, 2008). The 201st furnished Division, now a part of the Rapid Collective Deployment Force, was positioned in Dushanbe, while motor rifle battalions and tanks were conveyed between Kurgan-Tyube and Kuliab provinces. Tajikistan had likewise been permitted to Russia involve the Aini airbase near Dushanbe, which stations Russian helicopter regiments, and the Okno space observation station, near the border of China (Jonson, 2006).

In 2008, Tajikistan and Gazprom signed an agreement to conduct exploration work on potential gas and oil, their total gas reserves may amount to 70 to 80 billion c.m. in the zones of Tajikistan (Tajikistan, 2014). Sergei Shmatko, Russian Energy Minister, and Tajik Deputy Prime Minister Murodali Alimardon signed an intergovernmental program for economic cooperation in 2011-2014. It was designed to take a systemic basis for cooperation into the economic sphere. Both countries signed a treaty in 2013 on the supply of petroleum goods to Tajikistan and relating to employment and the construction of small hydropower plants in northern Tajikistan. By 2011, Russia and Tajikistan signed more than 70 agreements and memoranda in different fields and also operated more than 100 individual Russian and Tajik joint ventures (Trade and economic cooperation, 2014). In 2012, Russia was Tajikistan's main trading partner. Bilateral trade volume amounted to more than \$1 billion (Tajikistan's foreign trade, 2013). However, since the start of 2013 Tajik-Russian trade declined nearly 17.7 percent.

Russia Relations with Turkmenistan

The diplomatic relations between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan were established on April 8, 1992, as a foundation for the establishment of a new type of relations in the conditions of independent development served (States with Which Turkmenistan, 2014). This relationship is based on mutual respect and friendship in the spirit of a strategic partnership. The bilateral relationship between Russia and Turkmenistan was concerned mainly with the identification of a common platform of advanced political, economic, and military ties.

The two nations formally settled strategic relationships. Not just they drawing nearer commemoration of the development of the political connections yet the different State visits of President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov to the Russian Federation offered an event to think about the collective experience of diplomatic, cultural, economic, and political, contacts between Turkmenistan and Russia. In 1992, the two states signed a Friendship and Cooperating Treaty containing security provisions and in April 2002 the Russian and Turkmen Presidents further extended it, which covered political, economic,



social, and humanitarian aspects as well. The new friendship and cooperation treaty stated that Russia and Turkmenistan would not permit their lands to be utilized against the interests of either state (Jonson, 2006).

After autonomy, Turkmenistan advertised the making of its border forces. They marked a treaty on joint activity to make the Turkmen Armed Forces with Moscow responsible to ensure Turkmenistan's security on 31 July 1992. In their relations it has also been agreed that all outskirt units under Russian-Turkmen authority for a time of 10 years, amid which Moscow needed to help monetarily to the improvement of the Turkmen border military. This bound together charge was, be that as it may, broken off after 1994, even though Russia kept up a delegate in the Turkmen Defense Ministry and an alternate on the National Security Council. Until this date, Turkmenistan had facilitated around 15,000 officers under joint Russian-Turkmen summon, who were accused of guarding the outskirts with Iran and Afghanistan. A social event of extraordinary activities for the Russian line administration office, made in 1994 and numbering somewhere near 2,000 and 3,000 men, really focused on the protection of the borders, furthermore, the maritime line guaranteed by two escort ships with Russian-Turkmen gatherings (Boon, 2012). In 1995, an operational gathering of Russian border officers on the domain of Turkmenistan was secured to back the Turkmen troops. With the quick disintegration of strategic relations in the middle of Moscow and Ashgabat, two-thirds of these military facilities left the nation in 1996, leaving just 5,000 officers staying in position (Peyrouse, 2012).

The Russia-Turkmenistan collaboration had immense potential for extension in all ranges, particularly, technical and energy equipment supplies, machine-building, energy and fuel, automaking, education and science, and collaboration between businessmen and areas from both states. Turkmenistan's proven natural gas reserves of 17.5 trillion cubic meters (1 January 2013 est.) were amongst the highest on the planet and its confirmed oil assets were 600 million barrels of January 2013 (Turkmenistan, 2014). Turkmenistan signed 25 years operational treaty with Gazprom to ship gas through Russia to Ukraine and Europe. Gazprom additionally procured true control of Turkmenistan's ship courses till 2009. Turkmenistan exported its gas toward Russia through the Central Asian (Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-Russia) gas pipeline (Gas purchases: Strategy, 2014).

Russia had basically completed the process of controlling framework on gas exchanges from Turkmenistan and considered any obstacle into gas conveys a quick test to its specific position. Gas exchange from Turkmenistan provided Russia's family market at low expenses, enabling Russia to offer its Western Europe at a lot greater expenses.



Russia was Turkmenistan's greatest trade partner. Particular exchange created 12 % step by step from January to November 2012, to \$1.227 billion. Russian energy beast Gazprom purchased 10 billion cubic meters of trademark gas by Turkmenistan consistently (Dvorkovich Optimistic , 2013). In excess of 190 endeavors maintained by Russian capital executing in excess of 240 hypothesis planes, were enrolled in Turkmenistan. One of the indispensable direction of the association is the gas region.

Russian Relations with Uzbekistan

According to statistics, Uzbekistan was the Central Asian region's most populated country and was a major regional player. In Czarist and Soviet times, Tashkent worked as the casual capital of the area and passage to the Middle East and South Asia. Moscow's interest is not in Uzbekistan's integration into Russia, but in preventing its destabilization and radicalization. At the same time, a solid association with Kazakhstan was significant for Russia if it wanted the greater capacity to manage the regional condition. Less favored in natural assets however populous and supplied with a surviving industrial base, Uzbekistan was likewise a business sector for Russian merchandise and administrations and an accomplice for joint wanders.

Russia and Uzbekistan had worked almost together and had constantly made individual associations in pretty much all districts . Starting around 1991 around 236 arrangements and deals were endorsed between two states, for example, interdepartmental, intergovernmental, and highway settlements overseeing joint effort in military, monetary, political, compassionate, and different fields (Russian-Uzbek unfamiliar exchange, 2014). The fundamental ones among them in regards to the headway of two-sided correspondence had been marked the settlement on Strategic Partnership on 16 June 2004 and the arrangement on Allied Relationships endorsed on 14 November 2005 (Boboev, 2013). The Treaty of Alliance Relationships appeared to answer the security worries of the Uzbek administration, while it gave Russia a chance to reassert its impact in the strategically critical area.

Russia's relationships with Uzbekistan had quite often been uneven and violent in the wake of the disintegration of the USSR. The former preident Karimov had furiously contradicted Moscow's development of two hydropower dams in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as he was of the view that these dams would stop up much downstream water for farming in Uzbekistan. He even cautioned of wars for water. He was additionally rankled over Russian weapons supply to Dushanbe and Bishkek. Russia didn't have any military base in either Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2013).



In June 2006, Uzbekistan joined the club of Collective Security Treaty Organization. Uzbekistan was the main CSTO partner not to connect the Collective Rapid Reaction Force designed in 2009, given worries that the powers could get to be included in question between member countries (Weitz, 2012). Uzbekistan learned that the CSTO had adjourned its enrollment in the association, because the CSTO was overlooking Uzbekistan's issues on 20 June 2012. Then again, Uzbek authorities expressed that the state would keep on participating in the CIS' air defense framework and other military undertakings. The removal of the region's biggest army from the CSTO showed the association's incapability (Socor, 2012). Uzbekistan's extraction from this organization was connected to situating for a more noteworthy part in the United States and ally's Northern Distribution Network for the travel of goods and gear for Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Russia had consented to hold hands to meet the dangers from Afghanistan after the haul out of American-drove NATO forces from the war disturbed nation in 2014.

As far as the trade relations between the two states are concerned, they signed the treaty on 13 November 1992 which was followed by another treaty signed on 13 January 1993 which paved a way for Exemptions in Trade. As per these reports, Uzbekistan and Russia could direct business over the border under a facilitated trade situation. Russian Federation was the State's biggest economic and trade accomplice, representing more than 30% of the greater part of foreign trade and Uzbekistan was among Russia's main five financial accomplices in the CIS's countries. There had been an amazing development in trade of two-sided, which arrived at a figure of \$7.6 billion in 2012 and expanded by 12.6 percent. It developed by 20 percent in 2013 over the first quarter (Press statements following Russian-Uzbekistani, 2013). Russian corporations worked effectively in Uzbekistan, around 850 joint wanders worked in Uzbekistan, and the licensed extensions of more than 100 Russian corporations, with Gazprom, LUKOIL, and 400 Uzbekistani corporations were working in Russia (Beginning of meeting, 2013).

Conclusion

Conclusively, Russian association with the CARs is based on a long history. The dissolution of the Soviet Union left these states in the lurch because of the moribund situation and political turmoil inside the power corridors of the Kremlin. These states were also neglected in the reign of Boris Yeltsin. However, Vladimir Putin braces himself for bringing back the former colonies under the yoke of Russian influence since the Russia could not bear the brunt of any upheaval in its backyard. The administration of Vladimir Putin took different initiatives to engage these states by offering economic, military, and political incentives. Moscow is aimed to secure its national interests based on security and



economics at any cost and minimize the role of other actors like the US and China in this region.



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