



A HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE INTIFADA MOVEMENTS IN PALESTINE

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Abstract

Even before Israel's independence, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a divisive issue. In 1987, the war entered a new period, despite the fact that the severity of the conflict fluctuated over time. It's now or never time for the Intifadas and the Peace Process to take over. For those who don't speak Arabic, the term "involuntary shaking" is defined as "the involuntary shaking of someone who is sick or attempting to shake off something, such as a dog, trying to shake off its tick" in Arabic. The term "shaking off" came to be associated with Arafat's rebellion, which he used to define this new phase of the battle. There had been prior revolts in Egypt and Lebanon, and Arafat borrowed the phrase from those events. Many people believe that the Al Aqsa Intifada, which began in 2000, is a continuation of the first Intifada, which began in 1987. It is a common misconception that the Al Aqsa Intifada is only a continuation of the first Intifada since they have the same name, in Arabic, "Intifada." To demonstrate that this misconception is widespread and to highlight the fact that the two intifadas employ quite different strategies and agendas, I shall make an



attempt in this article. The outcomes of each Intifada were also very different. It will analyse the tactics, plans, and policies of each side to explain each Intifada. A comparison of the two Intifadas, as well as the different consequences of each, will follow.

Keywords: Intefada, Gaza, Palestine, Israel, PLO.

Introduction

The Erez Crossing in the northern portion of the Gaza Strip was hit by an IDF tank transporter on December 8th, 1987, killing five Palestinians. Four Palestinians, three of whom were refugees from the Jebalya refugee camp, were killed when a truck hit them as they returned from work in Israel. Crowds in Gaza demanded vengeance after hearing of the Israeli army's premeditated killing of four Palestinians. In what appeared to be yet another revolt led by the Jebalya refugee camp's local youth, the unrest quickly extended to other parts of Gaza and even the West Bank. The occupied areas were a 'barrel full of explosives ready to go off at any time, despite the ostensible rationale for the Intifada. A group of Israeli soldiers killed two students from Birzeit University back in December of 1986. This sparked a large-scale protest in Gaza's streets. It was the Army's response that brought a stop to the demonstrations at the end of this month. (Harms, 2017).

When the Al-Aqsa revolt began, it was September 29, 2000. Israel used fatal force to disperse Palestinian protests, which were often violent. As of September 2001, Israel's security forces had murdered more than 570 Palestinians, the great majority of them unjustifiably and while no one's life was in danger. Palestinian armed groups and individuals were responsible for the deaths of more than 150 Israelis, including 115 civilians. One hundred and fifty-three Palestinian and thirty Israeli kids were killed in the conflict. Thousands more were injured, many of them permanently. Palestinian demonstrators, police officers at checkpoints, and soldiers at the border have all died as a result of Israel's response to the intifada and the deaths of Israeli citizens. (Bunton, 2013) Israeli soldiers have blasted Palestinian villages in reaction to attacks on Israeli settlements, leaving thousands of houses unusable. Military checkpoints and physical barriers made of soil, concrete blocks or metal fences isolate nearly every Palestinian town and hamlet from the outside world. Curfews have been imposed on villages and sections of Palestinian cities and villages, preventing Palestinians from leaving their homes or going to work for days, weeks, or even months at a time. More than a thousand Palestinian homes have been demolished in the Occupied Territories in the name of security, and Palestinians have been prohibited from travelling on specific highways. More than three million Palestinians live under Israeli occupation in the Occupied Territories, and they have all



been punished as a group. Everyday existence is rife with violence. Israel's settlers have been virtually completely unchecked in their attacks on Palestinians. There have been a number of incidents in the Occupied Territories when Palestinians have purposefully targeted Israeli-registered vehicles, as well as bombed shopping centres and restaurants. Israelis are now afraid to walk through busy streets, sit in cafés, or drive in the occupied territories because of this. At checkpoints, where troops might be anxious, irresponsible, or incompetent without an obvious cause, Palestinians have grown terrified of walking or driving in their own homes or neighbourhoods. The allegations and counterclaims in the Occupied Territories continue to resonate since no killing has been fully probed. (“Oslo Accords”, 2020).

Background

The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians dates back decades and is not a recent development. Against the backdrop of the Jewish colonies in Palestine, a revolt began in 1921 and has continued to this day. The conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians has taken on a variety of shapes and tactics. Anti-Jewish protests and strikes took place in the 1920s and in 1936 when the "Arab revolt" occurred when the British army and Jewish communities were targeted by Palestinian militants. The general public took involved in a very active way. The Jewish Yeshuv reacted with a strong sense of defensiveness. To safeguard Jewish towns and villages, Yeshuv founded the 'Shomer' (the guard) organisation at the outset. The 'Hagana' was renamed once the organisation expanded into a military force for the Jewish settlements and became known as the 'Hagana' (the defence). (Klein, 2008) After the United Nations voted to establish Israel as a sovereign state in 1947, the conflict entered a new chapter. At this point, the Arab governments around Israel were engaged in a conventional war, which they waged with the assistance of Palestinian armed organisations. As a result, there was little place for public engagement and the Arab Armies ran the show. Many Palestinians living within the newly established Israeli border areas emigrated to neighbouring countries after the conclusion of the insurgency. People did this out of dread of the Israeli authorities and the expectation that they would return soon. The Infiltration phase began when Israel declared that it would not allow anybody back into its borders. Other political motives included retaliation against the Israeli Arabs and the IDF for backing Israel, as well as a desire for retribution. Terrorist groups in the surrounding nations, including Egypt's Fadayuns, were also taught to undermine the new Israeli administration. Resettlement and regaining ownership of stolen goods, robbery, and intelligence were further factors. (“Oslo Accords”, 2020).

As compensation, Israel erected a mine-laden fence along the Israeli side of the border. Retaliatory attacks against Palestinian camps and military sites were launched by Israel in



response to Palestinian raids that continued to occur. The most well-known insurgency unit was Unit 101, commanded by Ariel Sharon and established in 1953. (Elshobake, 2019) The creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 marked a turning point in the Palestinian struggle. Terrorism was the brand-new strategy adopted by the government. (Authors, 2014) There was an attempt to blow up Israel's main water supply in 1965, airline kidnappings, and the most well-known act: the 1972 Munich Olympic Games murder of Israeli Olympic participants. The PLO and other organisations began undertaking terror activities. In the 1970s, the PLO relocated to Lebanon and began attacking Israel with rockets and border incursions. As a result, Israel invaded Lebanon and PLO-Israeli guerilla combat began. There have also been instances of terrorists infiltrating via the northern border, such as the takeover of a school in Ma'alot in 1974, which resulted in the deaths of 22 Israeli pupils and instructors. The Israeli response was two-fold. One method was to find and kill the terrorists who carried out the Munich incident. The second reaction was a series of operations and raids in Jordan, Gaza, and Lebanon targeting Palestinian camps. Israel/conflict Palestine's entered a new phase in 1987, known as the INTIFADA, or the popular struggle in Arabic. (Harms, 2017). It was a regional rebellion that quickly extended throughout the conquered regions. Palestinians in the West Bank took a huge step forward in their fight against Israel with this demonstration. The peace process began after the Intifada and lasted until the Al Aqsa Intifada began in 2000.

The First Intifada

Intifada conjures up images of a toddler hurling a stone at an Israeli soldier with his gun pointed in his direction. There were many more instances like this during the first Palestinian uprising, subsequently known as the First Intifada, than this one. A wide range of people from all walks of life in the occupied territories took part in the Intifada, which expanded across both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Erez Crossing in the northern portion of the Gaza Strip was hit by an IDF tank transporter on December 8th, 1987, killing five Palestinians. Four Palestinians, three of whom were refugees from the Jebalya refugee camp, were killed when a truck hit them as they returned from work in Israel. Crowds in Gaza demanded vengeance after hearing of the Israeli army's premeditated killing of four Palestinians. In what appeared to be yet another revolt led by the Jebalya refugee camp's local youth, the unrest quickly extended to other parts of Gaza and even the West Bank. The occupied areas were a 'barrel full of explosives ready to go off at any time, despite the ostensible rationale for the Intifada. A group of Israeli soldiers killed two students from Birzeit University back in December of 1986. This sparked a large-scale protest in Gaza's streets. (Dolphin, n.d.) It was the Army's response that brought a stop to the demonstrations at the end of this month. In January 1987, Muhammad Dakhlan, a 20-year-old leader of the Fattah youth organisation known as the Shabiba, was deported by



Israel. (Later, Dakhlan was appointed by the Palestinian Authority to lead the primary security forces in Gaza.) This led to an increase in protests throughout January and February. When an Israeli lieutenant was shot dead in the middle of Gaza during the day in mid-August, Palestinians realised the army was losing control of Gaza, particularly the refugee camps. Until December 8th, the fighting remained localised despite the fact that both sides continued to launch attacks. Despite the fact that no one could have predicted the enormity of the Intifada, the Israeli policymakers ignored the warning indications that were there in front of them. The number of incidents of public disorder in 1987 was higher than the year before. As a result, confrontational protests such as torching tyres, hurling rocks, and closing roads became all too prevalent. The difference was that, up until December 8th, the protests were almost exclusively attended by students from local public schools. (Pike, n.d.)

There was little difference in the West Bank's condition from that in Gaza. Under Israeli control, life for Palestinians was growing increasingly difficult. As a result of the local Palestinians' discontent, on December 8th, riots broke out in Gaza, spreading to the West Bank, where on December 9th protests began in places like Balata camp. UNLP (Unified National Leadership of Uprising) issued its first statement on January 8th, 1988, which was composed of local Palestinian leaders. This was the first formal step that established the Intifada as a distinct phenomenon from the daily cycle of violence that had prevailed previous to December 8th. This study aims to show that the first Intifada was about much more than fighting between Palestinians in the occupied regions and the Israeli army. The resistance against Israeli rule was well-coordinated and included people from all walks of life. Gaza and West Bank were "in flames" for almost a month of fighting, and the frustration of the last twenty years was on display. The Palestinians fought with everything they had against an Israeli army in disarray. Using massive groups of people on the city's main thoroughfares, they threw rocks and petrol bombs. (Authors, 2014) The Palestinians' behaviour went much beyond stone-throwing and rioting once the conflict became hot. In the end, it became a more complex battle that affected many facets of Palestinian everyday life. While initially, the working class took the lead in the battle against Israeli occupation, it became an all-Palestinian effort after it became a long-term event like those preceding December 8th, in which each and every Palestinian group had a role to play.

Palestinian Organisations in the First Intifada

All previous attempts at communication between Israelis and Palestinians were met with Palestinian claims that Israel should only negotiate with the PLO since it is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. After the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, the PLO began the Intifada in Tunisia. The Intifada surprised the PLO



leadership. Because it was based in Tunisia, the PLO was deemed weak and an outsider. The Fattah, PFLP, Democratic Front, and PLOCP constituted the PLO. Yasser Arafat, the Fattah's founder and PLO's first leader, led them all. The PLO considered this the most important event in Palestinian history and carried out a terror assault in Dimona to support it. It backfired. The leadership knew then that the Intifada must be nonviolent for the rebellion to succeed. Fattah, the PFLP, the National Front, and the PCP all had members in the West Bank and Gaza who carried out the orders of their foreign masters, while the PLO provided external backing for the Palestinian cause. Four factions created the UNLU as the uprising's local leadership. Most decisions were taken with PLO consent. Israel recognised the PLO as a terror organisation responsible for the Munich Olympic Games incident and struck it severely. (Authors, 2014) Abu Jihad's killing fueled the revolt as Palestinians wanted retribution. Although the UNLU recognised the PLO as the sole Palestinian leadership, local Palestinians and the leadership abroad had power struggles. On certain occasions, the UNLU went against PLO's decisions to continue the battle. Although these disagreements were minor and the PLO was still viewed as the Palestinians' main organisation, they proved that ordinary Palestinians were leading the resistance. This was especially true after the leadership had returned from exile and settled in Gaza and the West Bank.

Hamas is Muslim Brotherhood's offspring. Its ideology is to control the state by Islamic law and fight any secular administration. Hamas disagreed with the PLO's decision to recognise Israel as a legitimate state; one of its goals is to remove Israel and establish Palestine on the entire land. First-year, they fought three methods. (Harms, 2017). First, join the insurrection. Hamas called on its followers to attend UNLU protests. The second is an uprising organisation. This phase began with Hamas' fourth communiqué. The communiqué sounded like UNLU calls for widespread strikes, resisting Israeli authority, fasting, and impacting daily life. Hamas focused on mosques as an alternative to shuttered schools and supported religious leaders like Ahmad Yassin. (Pike, n.d.) Hamas has also infiltrated Gaza and West Bank colleges to preach its ideology. The third stage was handling portions of the rebellion; around May/June 1988, Hamas began to arise as an alternative to the PLO and UNLU. Hamas produced a 40-page ideology paper in August. As a show of force against the PLO, it released a separate timetable from the UNLU's. In August and September, it extended from the Gaza Strip to the PLO-controlled West Bank. Hamas launched 10 small strikes against Israeli soldiers throughout the first year of the uprising. Shooting at army patrols and detonating explosives. In the next year, Hamas perpetrated 32 attacks, including kidnapping and murdering two soldiers inside the green line. In response, the Israeli army detained Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and other leaders. This slowed Hamas down, but it was too late. Hamas was too big to ignore, and the Israeli army couldn't stop it. The biggest winner of the uprising was the Islamic movement, which grew



from small religious groups that didn't have much of an impact on the fight or the Palestinian people to become a key part of the resistance. There was also a fight over who ran the streets, the PLO or Islamic movements. This becomes essential when the PLO enters the peace process and Islamic forces oppose it. (Dolphin, n.d.)

The Second Intifada

Ariel Sharon, a member of the opposition in the Knesset, arrived at the Temple Mount in Jerusalem around 7:45 a.m. on Thursday. The 45-minute visit was calm, yet it resulted in disastrous consequences. This was interpreted by the Palestinians as an effort to inflame them, which it certainly did. Around 1400 Palestinians had gathered atop the hillside to await Sharon's departure when an altercation broke out between the Palestinians and Israeli police. Injuries to scores of Palestinians caused many to believe that the revolt had come to an end. But some, like Fattah leader Marwan Barghuti, believed that the failure of PM Barak and Arafat's discussions at Camp David one month earlier provided a chance to launch a fresh uprising. Despite the fact that Sharon's visit was the catalyst for the revolt, the Mitchell inquiry determined afterwards that it was only a pretext. (Grabar & As'ad, 1996) The first Intifada was a civil revolt with the addition of armed clashes, but it spiralled out of control and became a low-intensity war between the Palestinian Authority, various armed factions, and the Israeli army. Disobedient acts like this were seen as vocal and anti-Palestinian, leading to retaliation by Palestinians and the Second Intifada, an uprising that lasted for over two decades. The Israeli Defense Force deployed tanks and combat helicopters in Palestinian towns and villages while Palestinians used roadside explosives and conventional weaponry (Harms, 2017). As a result, the intifada's level of violence increased.

Though he was no longer directly involved, George W. Bush's support for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's decision to build a secure separation barrier to prevent another attack from Palestinian supporters was viewed as powerful in the fight against the violence because they both held Arafat responsible for the outbreak (Harms, 2017). Bush pushed the envelope on the conflict resolution front on June 24th, 2002, asking for a change in Palestinian leadership as a precondition. Neither he nor Sharon expected the situation to improve under a new administration because the dominant party would be replaced; however, the Palestinian Authority quickly disapproved of this negotiation because it believed Arafat should be treated with respect by President Bush and that he had been duly elected by the Palestinians (Harms, 2017). The British prime minister ultimately persuaded President Bush to come up with three steps to assist ease the tensions on both sides of the war. Not only did the three stages serve as a reminder to Palestinians that they must restore their homeland, but the Israelis' non-humanitarian actions were also criticised (Harms,



2017). In this way, the three nations' collaboration looked to revitalise the state of affairs. Over the course of these decades, massive amounts of human capital, financial resources, and other intangibles have been expended in the midst of ongoing battles. De-escalating tensions could only be avoided if the two countries took a step back and engaged in proper dialogue.

Palestinian Organisations in the Second Intifada

After Friday prayers, Palestinians confronted Israeli soldiers and police. Although the Palestinian Authority and the Fattah movement coordinated the protests, its leaders feared losing international support for their cause if it escalated into a fight against the army. As the insurrection persisted, both sides showed moderation despite using weaponry often. The killing of Muhammad A Dura and his father, caught in the crossfire by opposing sides, was taped. This action symbolised the Palestinian cause and stoked the audience. Many Palestinian leaders said they lost control at this moment and the resistance became armed. The PA hoped a few days of violence would aid in discussions. (Grabar & As'ad, 1996) However, things spiralled out of hand when people began openly carrying firearms in public. Dr Boaz Ganor argues that the PA never made a "real" effort to quell the violence, making the claim that it lost control implausible.

Despite the unrest, Israel and the PA still had some hope for collaboration. A few days later, a Palestinian mob stormed the tomb of Joseph in Nablus, injuring an Israeli soldier who remained trapped for five hours before succumbing to his wounds. During the first several weeks of the uprising, Palestinians went on strikes, closed schools, and destroyed automobiles. Since these regions were under PA authority, it was soon understood that this wasn't affecting Israel and just hurting the Palestinians. (Bunton, 2013) The PA issued a proclamation to halt stealing and shift to a more organised war against Israel, which entailed arm conflict against the IDF. All looting and violence against the local community ceased, proving the PA still had some control and could channel the violence in their favour.

The Fattah movement of the PLO, a major PA organisation, claimed responsibility for the East Jerusalem shooting at the end of October 2000. The communique claimed that the "Al Aqsa Brigades" were to blame and were actively engaged in military conflict with Israel. Since the Fattah movement organised rallies and protests but avoided terror activities, this is another phase in the low-intensity struggle. (Elshobake, 2019) There was no prior consultation with the local population before the brigades opened fire on Israeli settlements from Palestinian houses.



Hamas' operations grew increasingly successful, and more Israelis were killed by suicide bombers, including more than 20 at a Tel Aviv nightclub. The Fattah movement saw this as they lost street support. Near this moment, there were demands to strike Israel, but others like Barghuti opposed it. (Armstrong, 1997) With no instructions, this was heeded until June, when a bomb was detonated at a military pick-up site. This was the first Fattah act in Israel, despite claims it was an individual act. Two months into the conflict, Occupied Territories' streets were chaotic. Gunmen took over the streets. These groups started collecting "taxes" from residents to fund their goals, even if they weren't supporting the battle. Groups intimidated and occasionally violently attacked anyone who didn't pay. Rapes and deaths were regular, and local Palestinians were compelled to let gangs shoot at Israeli cities from their homes. In Beit Hanun outside Jerusalem, they shot at Gilo.

Israel's assassination of Tanzim commander Ra'ed Carmy in Tul Carem in 2002 caused the worst escalation. Fattah vowed retaliation. "No gloves" was their interpretation. All movements soon launched devastating suicide strikes on Israel. This led to the 'Deadly March' when 133 Israeli citizens were slain, and the suicide bombing at the Park Hotel during Passover, when 29 people perished and 150 were injured. Israel retaliated by seizing the West Bank and all PA-controlled cities in "Defense Shield." Urban warfare. The army sent soldiers and tanks. The Palestinians didn't give up lightly, so they booby-trapped pals and set ambushes. 15 Israeli troops died in one day of battle in Jenin's refugee camp. Due to a large number of IDF losses, many Palestinians considered this a win. (Pike, n.d.) They sheltered in Arafat's Ramallah offices and Beit Lehem's major church. This was the worst escalation since the 2nd Intifada; the troops fought house to house as local armed factions concealed among civilians.

Defense Shield's arrests decreased terror attacks in Israel while fighting amongst the troops continued. Along with the West Bank barrier, Israel contained terrorism. New methods resulted. Armed groups attacked West Bank and Gaza forces. Snipers or head-on attacks surprised Israeli barriers. Outposts were raided with the intention of losing one's soul. In Gaza, tunnels were built under outposts, packed with explosives, and exploded. Roadside explosives were set off by army convoys. (Klein, 2008) Armed organisations turned to guerilla warfare against the army since they couldn't enter Israel.

Mortars are used against Israeli settlements in Gaza. This strategy reduces casualties but boosts morale. Weekly bombings of communities frighten the population. After mortars came Qassam rockets. Short-range rockets with minimal amounts of explosives can be fired from Gaza toward Israel. The Palestinians' capacity to strike Israel from its own territory changed everything. Israelis still face this dilemma since these rockets may be fired from a backyard and terrorists leave the place minutes after launch. Israel and the PA



cooperate since Yasser Arafat's death and the new Palestinian government. (Grabar & As'ad, 1996) The PA is fighting the Islamic organisation that is shooting rockets. This divides Occupied Territories groups.

Discussion

In the early 1990s, the Palestinian people were starting to weaken because they lacked the intestinal fortitude to keep up with the prolonged conflict. The Palestinian people lost part of their will to resist as the number of armed terrorist attacks rose. The 1st Gulf war was the catalyst that finally persuaded the two parties to sit down and talk, saving the Palestinian cause in the process. With the Madrid talks in 1991, the first Intifada began to wind down, and with Israel's recognition of the PLO in the Oslo accords in 1993, the peace process began and autonomy for Gaza and Jericho was established. (Armstrong, 1997) Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation is ongoing. To begin, Islamic groups have never shared the PLO's position on the peace deal, which includes the rejection of Israel's right to exist, and have always advocated for the continuation of the struggle against Israel. Secondly, there were times when Palestinians and Israeli soldiers clashed.

After the PLO joined the peace process with Israel and was no longer able to fight against Israel, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad took the lead in the conflict. Islamic organisations seized the opportunity in a series of attacks against the Israeli military and civilians to sway the opinion of ordinary Palestinians and rally them in opposition to the secular PLO. Several further vehicle bombings in Israeli territory in 1994 prompted Jewish extremist settler Baruch Goldstein to carry out the murder at the Cave of the Patriarchs, which resulted in the deaths of 40 Palestinians. So, Hamas decided to step up its battle against Israel and dispatched suicide bombers. It was the first in a string of bombers who didn't use cars and instead mingled in with the throng. Yikhia Ayash, widely known as "the Engineer," planned and executed these assaults. During this period, the Palestinian Authority (PA) did nothing to discourage these movements from taking action and may have even found it advantageous that they were conducting the fighting on their behalf. Israel killed Ayash in 1995, and Hamas vowed vengeance by sending multiple suicide bombers, killing more than a hundred Israelis between the signing of the joint proclamation with the PLO and the time of the bombings. This string of suicide bombings occurred just days before the election between Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu. Hamas, which opposed the peace process, sought to undermine Peres' electoral chances, and their efforts ultimately benefited Netanyahu, who had been behind Peres in the polls. The election outcome was swayed in Hamas' favour, and they were able to celebrate a big win. (Bunton, 2013)



On the day after Yom Kippur 1996, under Netanyahu's direction, the eastern entrance to the cave beneath the Temple Mount was opened. This was done as a demonstration of force and to lure in more tourists to Jerusalem. The Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Defense Force fought fiercely for five days because the Palestinians did not accept the opening of the cave that led under Muslim holy sites. This time around, the Palestinian Authority had it all planned out. The first Intifada was more of a spontaneous outburst. Buses brought protesters from all across the West Bank to the major sites of clashes. The use of firearms was another key distinction between this and earlier incidents; Palestinian police officers were among those shooting at Israeli forces, and on some occasions, officers from joint patrols fired against their Israeli colleagues. The Israeli side lost 16 people in just 5 days of fighting, which is an all-time high. This episode, along with others between the IDF and PA, led to the realisation on the part of the IDF General Staff that the PA could not be trusted and that a more serious confrontation was possible. (Klein, 2008) The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has begun wargame-like drills and exercises to prepare for the next confrontation, with scenarios including the recapture of all Palestinian territory and combat in refugee camps. Though most Israelis may have initially discounted such possibilities as very improbable, they were short to be proven correct. Israel's deployment of tanks to the West Bank and Gaza was also a response to the violence in September 1996. By the time tensions began to rise, the IDF was prepared to handle any crisis that arose.

Conclusion

As this research shows, the first and Al Aqsa Intifadas are very different. Despite sharing a name, the two are extremely different. The Palestinians switched from a peaceful, nonviolent movement to an armed one including gunfire and terror. The first Intifada was characterised by a bottom-up, majority-society rebellion. The second Intifada was different. The leadership's actions sparked the demonstrations, making the prospect of conflict real for the general public. These distinctions led to dissimilar conclusions for the two stories. When the second Intifada turned violent, most Palestinians couldn't participate. Israelis saw two quite distinct Intifadas. In the first Intifada, the military had to face an unarmed population in large rallies, but in the second, it was an armed struggle and the IDF could employ any tactics it saw fit. Looking at the two Intifadas, there are no true victors or losers as there is a continual chain of events and the long-term effects are not yet known. Israel's occupation and the need for a Palestinian solution were brought home to the Jewish state by the first Intifada. As a nationalist movement, the Palestinians of the first Intifada battled for their people in the occupied regions, defending local interests and establishing local governments. The Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority



are the final and most significant steps. Although some Palestinians saw success in the Oslo Accords, others blamed its failure for the Second Intifada.

First Intifada didn't benefit Israel much. The PLO accepted Israel as a legitimate state and stopped fighting against it. Intifada's images and narrative cost Israel worldwide support. Prime Minister Rabin was killed by a right-wing fanatic because public opinion was divided between the government's left and right. At the time of the Al Aqsa Intifada, Palestinians equipped themselves for combat. This reduced the population's usability. Most Palestinians merely attempted to withstand both sides' brutal realities. Arafat's decision to employ violence as a strategy hurt the Palestinians since the world community, notably the U.S., believed he was no longer pursuing peace, isolating them. The second Intifada destroyed most of the Palestinian Authority, leaving a vacuum filled by extremist Islamic organisations. The second Intifada favoured Israel; it seems. First, Israelis reached a consensus. The majority of Israel's citizens thought that the Palestinians drove them into the war and that Israel gave as much as it could but was rejected by Arafat. This consensus preserved Israel's morale during the Intifada when 100 citizens died in a month. 9/11 and Arafat's terror ties reduced international pressure on Israel. Israel was finally recognised as fighting terrorism, not civilians.

Israel grew more effective in preventing terror attacks and eliminating extreme leaders. The assassination policy did not stop these movements from operating. Intifada has also led Israel to act independently. Israeli interests could be pursued independently of Palestinian concerns after Israel was left without a peace partner. The building of the barrier and the subsequent withdrawal from Gaza put an end to this situation. After the first Intifada, the Palestinians were recognised as a state-deserving entity. The second Intifada brought no political advantages. Israel might claim success during the second Intifada because its people remained robust and its military became more effective at battling unrest and terror. Despite this, Israel did lose in several ways. Although the killings were short-term effective, they often generated additional warfare and new leadership. After eliminating most Palestinian administrative structures, Israel's disengagement strategy left a vacuum in the Palestinian territories that Islamic extremists filled, which might be more destructive in the future. Israel's whole generation was psychologically affected. Most of the younger Israeli military population has served in the Occupied Territories, which may have long-term psychological impacts. The Intifadas were diverse in character and consequences. In this fight, there are only losers. The Palestinians' armed effort backfired because it escalated the violence. Israel's measures in the second Intifada may be short-term benefits, but they won't settle the Palestinian issue.



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