Vol. 7 No. 3 (2024): Pakistan Journal of International Affairs
Articles

NUCLEAR POLITICS IN SOUTH ASIA: DETERRENCE NUANCES OF INDIA-PAKISTAN CRISES (MUMBAI TO PULWAMA)

Adeel Kazmi
Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad – Pakistan

Published 2024-09-20

Abstract

This paper adopts an explanatory framework to study the evolving dynamics of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan with focus on strategic crises such as Mumbai (2008), Pathankot/Uri (2016), and Pulwama (2019). It posits that nuclear deterrence which took its roots from Cold War bloc politics has prevented full blown wars in dyadic nuclear equations. Nonetheless, the recurrent strategic crises in apparently balanced nuclear equations have exposed the limitations of nuclear deterrence at lower levels of conflict spectrum precipitating the concept of stability-instability paradox. In South Asian security milieu, India’s strategic shift towards an incremental and assertive nuclear posture vis-à-vis Pakistan highlights the growing complexities of crisis management in a nuclear context. Pakistan has responded to growing threat perception by diversifying its response strategy by introducing novel concepts like full spectrum deterrence and quid-pro-quo plus as part of its nuclear posture. Within this paradigm the paper reviews the traditional deterrence theories, and emphasizes the need for a nuanced understanding of how deterrence functions in a quintessential India-Pakistan dyadic scenario. The increased frequency and severity of crises coupled with technological advancements create a highly unstable strategic environment in South Asia. The study concludes that achieving lasting strategic stability will require addressing core disputes, fostering diplomatic engagement, and reevaluating security doctrines to mitigate the risks of future crises spiraling into broader conflict.