HYBRID WARFARE AND STATE RESILIENCE IN MOLDOVA AFTER THE RUSSIA–UKRAINE WAR: A QUALITATIVE, MULTI-DOMAIN ANALYSIS OF THREAT AND RESPONSE

Abstract

The full scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 transformed the Republic of Moldova from peripheral post-soviet concern in to a frontline case of contemporary hybrid warfare. Positioned between Romania and Ukraine, hosting an unresolved separatist enclave in Transnistria, and dependent on Russian energy flow well into current decade, Moldova has since 2022 absorbed a sustained campaign of disinformation, electoral interference, illicit financing, and coercive diplomacy while simultaneously constructing an unusual assertive architecture of institutional and societal resilience. This article undertakes a qualitative analysis of Moldova post 2022 trajectory, situating it within the theoretical literature on hybrid warfare and state and societal resilience.

Drawing on a narrative analysis of policy documents, think thank assessments, and open source reporting produce between 2022 and 2026. The article identifies three principal domains of hybrid pressure, namely the informational electoral domain, and traces the corresponding institutional reforms through which Moldova has sought to convert external vulnerability into what this article terms scaffolder resilience.  

The analysis argues that Moldova experience refines existing resilience theory by demonstrating that small state resilience under hybrid pressure is rarely self-generated but is instead co-produced with externals partners a finding with implications for other post-soviet and frontline states.